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3Abstract:
The literature surrounding the autistic child's social impairment is
reviewed. It is proposed that an impairment in some aspect of
autistic children 'a social cognition could account for many of the
observed abnormalities in their social behaviour.
First, t "lower-level" aspects of social cognition are considered.
These are mirrcr self-recognition and perceptual role-taking. The
present sample of autistic children did not differ from MA control
groups in either of these respects, confirming results rrom other
studies.
A "higher-level" aspect of self-other differentiation is conceptual
role-taking. This ability is also called a "theory of mind". This
literature is reviewed and a hypothesis is proposed which suggests
that autistic children have an impairment in their "second-order"
representational capacity which has been argued to underlie a theory
of mind. This hypothesis is explored by means of $ experiments.
These showed that autistic children 's "first-order" representational
capacity, as manifested in their understanding of physical
causality, is intact whilst their second-order representational
capacity, as manifested in their ability to attribute mental states
to others, is impaired. This deficit was not found in controls.
Furthermore, those few autistic children who passed a test of
attribution of belief at the ii year old level, failed at the
("third-order") 7 year old level, despite adequate MA.
Pretend play can be related to conceptual role-taking, since both
may require a second-order representational capacity. The literature
surrounding the autistic child 's impairment in pretend play is
reviewed and the final experiment confiriis and extends previous
results in this domain.
It is concluded that particular aspects of the social impairment and
the impairment in pretend play can be seen as the result of a
deficit in one cognitive mechanism. This deficit is discussed in
terme of what has loosely been called an "impaired symbolic
capacity".
14
Table of Contents:
OAPTER ONE: The autistic child's social impairment.
1 .1. Literature Review.
1.1.(i) Kanner's description of the social impairment; 	 10
1.1.(ii)	 pirical studies of social 'behaviour' in autism; 15
1.1.(iii) Experiments on person perception in autism; 	 25
1.1.(iv) Experiments on social use of language (Ic:
pragmatics) in autism.	 314
1.1.(v) Cognitive accounts of the social impairment.	 37
1.2. Overview to whole thesis.
1.3. Methodological considerations and subject selection. 	 145
CHAPTER TWO: Perceptual aspects of social cognition in autism.
2.1 • The autistic child's concept of 'self-as-object'.	 50
2.2. The development of visual self-recognition in normal
children: literature review.	 55
2.3. Experiment 1: Visual Self-Recognition in autism. 	 63
2.14. Vlsuo-Spatial Role-Taking and Autism.	 67
2.5. Perceptual Role-Taking: literature review. 	 68
2.6. Experiment 2: Does the autistic child have a 'thecry of
sight'?	 75
CHAPTER ThREE: Conceptual aspects of social cognition.
3.1. The autistic child's conceptual role-taking ability, or
'Theory of Mind'. 	 79
3.2. 'Thecry of Mind': literature review. 	 81
3.2.(i) Philosophical Background. 	 81
3.2.(ii) Experimental studies. 	 91
3.2.(iii) Language studies.	 1014
3.2.(iv) Evidence from studies of children's 'pragmatic'
competence.	 108
3.2.(v) Do non-human animals have a thecry of mind?	 112
3.2.(vi) 5mnary of literature review on the thecry of
mind.	 117
5CHAPTER FOUR: The autistic child '5 'thecry of mind': an
empiricial investigation.
11.1. Experiment 3: Attribution of False Beliefs. 	 119
11.2. Experiment 11: Attribution of False Beliefs and
'social scripts'.	 127
11.3. Comparison of results fron Experiments 3 and 11.	 1111
11.11. General discussion: cognitive implications.	 1113
CHAPTER FIVE: First, Second and Third-Order Representation.
5.1. First-order representation in autistic and normal
children.	 1119
5.2. Experiment 5: Attribution of physical causality in autism. 155
5.3. Discussion of Experiments 3, 11, and 5. 163
5.11. Third-order representation innormal children:
literature review. 	 1611
5.5. Experiment 6: Third Order Representation in autism. 	 168
CHAPTER SIX: Pretend play in !xrmal and abrormal development. 175
6.1. The rormal development of Pretend Play: a literature
review.	 177
6.2. Experimental studies of Pretend Play in autism.	 186
6.3. Cognitive aspects of pretend play.	 196
CHAPTER SEVEN: An empirical investigation of Pretend Play
in autism.	 201
7.1. Method	 201
7.2. Video Analysis.	 209
7,3. Discussion.	 218
CHAPTER EIGHT: Conclusions and Implications:
8.1. S.mmary of experimental results. 	 2211
68.2. Implications from the second-order rep esentatiorøl
deficit theory.	 228
8.2.(i) How does the theory relate to Kanner's
description of the social impairment?	 228
8.2.(ii) Other implications from the second-order
representatiorl deficit theory.	 235
8.3. Relationship betien this and other
cognitive theories of autism.	 214 1
8.3.(i) Different cognitive thecries. 	 2141
8.3.(ii) Is there a general "symbolic deficit"
in autism?	 2143
REFERENCES.	 24 9
APPEND ICES:	 287
(1) Checklist/Questioire of autistic symptome.	 288
(2) Subject Data of children in first 6 experiments.	 290
(3) Raw Data of Experiment 14. 	 293(Ii) Protocols from Experiment 14.	 299
(5) Pictures used in Experiment II.	 311
(6) Raw Data of Experiment 5.	 321
(7) Protocols from Experiment 5.	 326
(8) Pictures used in Experiment 5. 	 3314
(9) Protocols from Experiment 6.	 3141
(10) Pretend Play transcripts from videos.	 3142
(11) Subject Data of children in Experiment 7.	 358
7Table of Tables:
Table 1.1: Subject Variables (means, standard deviations and
ranges) for the first 3 Experiments.	 18
Table 2.1: Number of children producing correct response to
each question in Experiment 2.	 76
Table 2.2: Average number of children (and percentages of
each group) producing correct responses in Experiment 2.	 77
Table 1L1: Percentage of subjects passing in Experiment 3.
	
122
Table v.2: Subject variables (means, standard deviations and
ranges) in Experiments 1 and 5.
	
131
Table 1L3: Group mean scores for the 3 conditions in
Experiment •	 132
Table 1I.: Percentage of utterances classified according to
use of descriptive or
	
tal state language.	 137
Table 5.1: Group mean scores for each condition in
Experiment 5.
	
158
Table 5.2: Percentage of utterances classified as Causal
in Experiment 5.
	
160
Table 5.3: Subject variables (means, standard deviations and
ranges) in Experiment 6.	 171
Table 5. 11: Performence on the Test Question in Experiment 6. 	 172
8Table 7.1: Subject variables (means, standard deviations and
ranges) in Experiment 7.
Table 7.2: Toy-Type x behaviour categcry interaction in
Experiment 7.
Table 7.3: First judge's (experimenter's) rating, expressed
as percentage of each group showing each play
behaviour.
202-3
208
211-12
Table 7.14: Number of subjects in each group producing
different quantities of unambiguous pretend play.
	 213
Table 7.5: Test-Retest reliability measures for each
unambiguous behaviour categcry, by first judge. 	 2114
Table 7.6: Inter-rater reliability measures for each
unambiguous play categcry. 	 2114
Table 7.7: Background variables in 'Pretenders' (P)
and 'Non-Pretenders' (P') in Experiment 7.
	
215-16
9Table of Figures:
Figure I.1: Procedure for Experiment 3. 	 120
Figure 1L2: Group differences on Belief Question in
Experiment 3.
	
123
Figure 'L3: Contents of Picture Stories in Experiment IL	 129
Figure 1i.l: Group mean scaes for the 3 coniltions in
Experiment IL	 133
Figure 1L5: Diagram of a 'seconi-order' representation. 	 11i5
Figure 5.1: Picture stories used in Experiment 5.
	
158
Figure 5.2: The layout of the toy village used in Experiment 6. 169
Figure 7 • 1: Backgrouni variables in 'Pretenders' ani
'Non-Pretenders' (1st judges rating) in Experiment 7.	 217
Figure 8.1: Evidence from experiments 1-7 implicating
intact ani impaired cognition in autism.	 226
Figure 8.2: Modification of Gould's triad theory.	 227
10
Chapter 1: The Autistic Oiild's Social Impairment.
1.1: Literature Review.
1.1.(j): Kanner's description of the social impairment.
The earliest descriptions of the social impairment in autism appear
in the form of clinical impressions rather than experimental
evidence. The language of these is, by modern Journal standards,
unscientific. Kevertheless, many of these early clinical impressions
have been supported by later experimental studies (Section
1.1.(ii)).
Kanner's (19 143) first paper's main focus wes, in tact, on the social
impairment in these children, as is evident in it's title "Autistic
Disturbances of Affective Contact". A close reading of this paper
reveals that the social impairment actually spans a very wide range
of behaviours. It is perhaps unfortunate that Kanner never
specifically listed the features which comprise the social
impairment in a form which could be easily confirmed or disconfirmed
by others. In what follows, aspects of the social impairment
mentioned by Karmer in his 19113 paper are identified, and an example
of his clinical description is quoted so as to convey the flavour of
his language, as well as to contextualize the isolated symptom. For
this purpose 15 different aspects, drea from the case descriptions,
are listed overleaf. It should be noted that not all of these
aymptome are found in one child. These are taken from his 11
original cases, which have been considered as prototypical of the
new psychiatric category of autism since then.
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I. Lack of positive emotional expression:
eg: "He has no apparent affection when petted. He •.. never seeme
glad to see father or mother or any playmate." (p.2)
II. Withdrawal from people:
eg: "He seemed almost to draw into his shell arid live within
himeelf." (p.2)
III. Disinterest in people:
eg: "He paid no attention to persons around him. When taken into a
room, he completely disregarded the people arid instantly went
for objects..." (p.5). Similarly,
eg: "She has no relation to children, has never talked to them, to
be friendly with them, Cr to play with them. She moves among
them like a strange being, as one moves between pieces of
furniture In a room." (p.32)
IV. Non-social use of language:
eg: "The major part of his "conversation" consisted of questions of
an obsessive nature. He was inexhaustible in bringing up
variations: "How many days in a week, years in a century, hours
in a day, hours in half a day, weeks in a century, centuries in
half a millenium" etc, etc., " (p.?). Similarly,
eg: "He never used language as a means of comaunicating with
people." (p.27)
V. Abnormel non-verbal coriunicat1on:
eg: "...he did not use coemunicative gestures." (p.8)
VI. Non-social response to other people's language:
eg: "When he responded to questions ar ocemarids at all, he did so by
repeating them echolalia fashion." (p.10)
VII. Responding to parts of people, arid not wholes:
eg: "When a hand was held out to him so that he could not possibly
ignore it, he played with it briefly as if it were a detached
object." (p.11). Similarly,
eg: "When the Readers Digest was taken from him arid throi on the
floor and a foot placed over it, he tried to remove the foot as
if it were a detached and interfering object, again with no
concern for the person to whom the foot belonged." (p.27)
VIII. Lack of differential response to people and objects:
eg: "He never looked up at people's faces. When he had any dealings
with persons at all, he treated them, or rather parts of them,
as if they were objects. He would use a hand to lead him. He
would, in playing, butt his head against his mother as at other
times he did against a pillow. He allowed his boarding mother's
hands to dress him, paying not the slightest attention to her."
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(p.15). Similarly,
eg: "People, so long as they left the child alone, figured in about
the same manner as did the desk, the bookshelf, or the filing
cabinet." (p.38)
IX. Preferential response to objects over people:
eg: "When with the other children, he ignored them and went after
their toys." (p.15)
X. Inappropriate use of personal pronouns:
eg: "He never used the pronoun of the first person, nor did he refer
to himeelf as Paul. All statements pertaining to himaelf were
made in the second person, as literal repetitions of things
that had been said before. He would express his desire for
candy by saying " You want candy". He would pull his hand away
from a hot radiator and say "You get hurt". " (p.15)
XI. Lack of eye contact:
eg: "When he is with other people, he does not look up at them."
(p.26). Similarly,
eg: "He did not respond to being called, and did not look at his
mother when she spoke to him." (p.27)
XII. Lack of bshaviour appropriate to cultural norma:
eg: "At 2 years old, she was sent to a nursery school, where she
independently went her way, not doing what the others did. She,
for instance, drank the water and ate the plant when they were
being taught to handle flowers." (p.30)
XIII. Selective attention to 'non-social' features of people:
eg: "(At the Child Study Home..) she soon learned the names of all
the children, knew the colour of their eyes, the bed in which
each slept, and many other details about them, but never
entered into any relationship with them." (p.31)
Most of these features of the social impairment are reiterated in a
later paper (s!Iier and Eisenberg, 1956), with an additional 2
included:
XIV. Lack of empathy:
eg: "This amazing lack of awareness of the feelings of others, who
seem not to be conceived of as persons like the self, rins like
a red thread through our case histories. We might cite a 4 year
old boy whose mother came to us with the account that on a
crowded beach he uld walk straight toward hi., goal
irrespective of whether this involved walking over news-
papers, hands, feet, or thros, much to the discomfiture of
their oiers. The mother was careful to point out that he did
not intentionally deviate from his course in order to walk on
others, but neither did he make the slightest attempt to avoid
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them. It was as ir he did not distinguish people from things,
or at least did not concern himeelf about the distinction...
The existence of feelings or wishes in other people that might
not accord with the patients obm autistic thoughts and desires
seemed beyond recognition." (p.95)
XV. Lack of 'savoir-faire':
eg: "Even the relatively "successful" children exhibited a lack of
social perceptiveness, perhaps best characterized as a lack of
savoir-faire • This can be best illustrated by the following
incident involving one of our patients who had made
considerable progress. Attending a football rally of his junior
college and called çon to speak, he shocked the assembly by
stating that he thought the teas was likely to lose - a
prediction that was correct but unthinkable in the setting. The
ensuing round of booing dismeyed this young men, who was
totally unable to comprehend why the truth should be
unwelcome." (p.91U
It is likely that these 15 aspects do not comprehensively define
what Kancer saw as the social impairment. Furtherimre, the described
behaviour could of course be categorized aix! 'chunked' in meny
different ways and, undoubtedly, there is overlap between these
categories. For example, Iteme VII aix! XIII are clearly not mutually
exclusive. Nor are Iteme III and VIII, since in eh pair, one
implies the other. Iteme VIII and IX appear to be contradictory,
though both are consistent with Item III. Any contradictions
probably reflect that the child's behaviour varies across different
situations. Since the 2 papers from which these features are draw
(Kanoer,19 1$3; Kanoer and Eisenberg, 1956) are in the form of case
histories rather than diagnostic check-lists, such apparent
contradictions are of no importance, since the aim of such histories
is to provide detailed, concrete and accurate descriptions of actual
behaviour, however changeable, rather than an abstracted list
specifying necessary and sufficient, mutually exclusive, and
non-contradictory diagnostic features.
Kanoer (193) suarized the social impairment as follows:
'The outstanding, "pathognosonic", fundamental disorder is
izi
the thildrens inability to relate themeelves in the
ordinary way to people and situations from the beginning
of life...There is from the start an extreme autistic
aloneness ..." (p.33)
Ka!rler further assumed that the social impairment dated from (or
before) birth:
"We w.ist, then, assume that these children have come into
the world with innate inability to form the usual,
biologically provided affective contact with people, just
as other children come into the world with innate physical
or intellectual handicaps...We seem to have pure-culture
examples of inborn autistic disturbances of affective
contact." (p.113)
Nover, this nativist assumption is only an assumption, as neither
flrvier nor any subsequent researcher to thte has yet provided any
conclusive evidence as to either aetiology, or exact time of onset
of the social impairment. Indeed, in his later paper (Kanner and
Eisenberg, 1956) an explicit statement is made rejecting any
simplistic "hereditary versus environmental" antithesis (p.99).
Regarding the course and outcome of the social impairment, Kanner
(1973) documented that whilst some autistic ailts can apt
sufficiently to live within society, their social impairment, though
changed in that they are more participative, nevertheless persists
into acblthood. Butter, Greenfield and Lockyer (1967), in their
follow-up study of the social outcome of 63 autistic children, also
documented a very poor prognosis. Butter (1978a) sumearizes this
problem:
"By the time ..(the intelligent autistic children)..reaoh
acblt life most of them have good language skills, they
have a normal level of intelligence, there is no thought
disorder or psychotic disturbance, they want social
relationships, and y.t they still have marked and
persistent social difficulties. Why?" (p.505).
In the final chapter (8) an attempt will be made to account for
these 15 aspects of the social impairment in terma of a deficit in
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the autistic child's 'thecry of mind'. This will itself be linked to
a possible deficit in ayinbolio capacity'.
Some experimental studies into the autistic child's social
impairment are revied in the next section. These have largely
confirmed Karier's mocount but have also given us a more detailed
picture of the social impairment.
i.1.(ii):	 pirical studies of social baviour' in autism.
Hermelin and O'Cormor (1963) were among the first to investigate
experimentally Karrer's claime regarding autistic children 'a social
bchaviour. They confirmed that their autistic subjects (n = 12, mean
CA = 9 yrs, severely retarded MA) responded less -to a person than
matched retarded controls, but this is also true of their response
to toys. Since the autistic children, like their controls, still
responded more to a person than to non-persorl stimuli, Hermelin
and 0'Corror (1970) concluded that their' social impairment might be
part and parcel of a central cognitive deficit. This view will be
discussed in more detail in Section 1.1.(v).
The next influential contribution to kmwledge about the social
impairment came from Wing and Gould (1979) èrn carried out an
epidemiological survey within the defined geographical area of
Camberwell (a South London borough with a population of 35,000
people under 15 years old). They set out to ascertain the prevalence
and distribution of 3 types of abnormelities: (a) absence or
impairment of social interaction; (b) absence or impairment of
verbal or non-verbal coamunication; and (c) repetitive and
stereotyped activities of any kind. Of 91 children under 15 years
old who were kro'.mi to the local health, education, or social
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services to have some kind of physical or mental handicap a'
behaviour disturbance, they ideitified 132 children who all
possessed at least one of the 3 abnor.alities and/or who were in the
severely retarded intelligece range (IQ < 50). Of interest to this
review was the children 's eocial behaviour, which was grouped under
one of 11 headings:
I. 'Social aloofness' - this was the most severe impairment of
social interaction;
II. 'Passive interaction';
111. 'Active-but-odd interaction' - Wing and Gould designated
behaviour in this oategcry as inappropriate because it was
undertakm'i mainly to indulge some repetitive, idiosyncratic
preoccupation, showing no interest in and no feeling for the needs
and ideas of others; arK!
IV. 'Appropriate interaction'.
Since this is one of the few epidemiological studies of social
impairment, it will be discl.3sed in some detail here:
Wing and Gould found that 1111% of children 's social interaction was
appropriate fbr their mental age, arK! these were labelled the
"sociable, severely retarded" group. The other 56% of the sample
comprised the "socially impaired" group. 73% of the socially
impaired group were male. Of the total sample, only one named
syndrome could be reliably ideatitied by 3 indepedet raters, and
this was autism, all the cases of which fell into the socially
impaired group. (It is of interest that 117% of the sociable,
severely retarded group were Dobm'a Syndrome, a tact which will be
disctsed later in relation to the selection of an appropriate
experimental control group for autism).
It was found that the socially impaired group could be subdivided by
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2 independent methods, namely, on quality of social Interaction
(categories I - III, above), and on presence or absence of a history
of classic autism. 23% of the socially impaired group had previously
been diagnosed as autistic. Of these, a large proportion (70%) fell
into the 'aloof' group, and the others (30%) ire found in the
'passive' and 'odd' groups. The 'aloof' group was more likely to
have a low level of language comprehension. Of all socially impaired
children, those with a history of typical autism tended to have
somewhat higher intelligence levels than those without, even though
the majority re In the severely retarded range. The autistic
children made up only 10% of all children in this sample who had an
IQ score below 50.
The overall finding was that 21.2 bf every 10,000 children aged
under 15 years in the area showad impairments of reciprocal
interaction of the 3 types, described above. Of these, 1.9 had a
history of typical autism. This study demonstrates the pervasiveness
of the social deficit in all autistic children In this sample, thus
suggesting, like Karier, that the social impairment has the status
of a central or key problem in autism. The study also draws
attention to the fact that the social deficit is not unique to
autism.
This study represents an important advance over Kamer's (19113)
earlier description of autistic children 's 'aloof' social behaviour,
in distinguishing the 2 other types of social impairment. To
reiterate, one was 'passive interaction', which describes those
children who do not make social contact spontaneously, but who
accept approaches, and do not resist if other children drag them
into their games. Wing and Gould write that these children might
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sometimes be used by normal classmates as babies in a game of
'mothers and fathers', or as patients in a game of 'doctors and
nurses'. The other new category of social impairment was 'active but
odd interaction' - the authors remark that these children
characteristically pester others. Wing (1978) emphasizes that these
latter type of children have good speech and make social apprcaches
and thus may appear, superficially, to have normal social
interaction, but observation shows that their contribution to a
social situation tends to be a recital of their owi special
preoccupation and not a tie-way conversation.
There are 2 ahcrtcoed.ngs of this study. First, the autistic subjects
which fell into this geographical sample are typical only of the
very retarded proportion of the autistic population: of Wing and
Gould's autistic subjects, only 0.003% had an IQ in the normal range
(IQ ) 70), whereas in the autistic population in general, beten
20-30% have IQ scores in the normal range (Lockyer and Rutter, 1970;
Lotter, 1966; DeMyer, 1976; Bartak and Rutter, 1976). The Camberwell
autistic population is presumably untypical because the selection
criteria in this study specified low IQ children. This raises
questions as to the generalizability of this data to other autistic
samples. Secondly, 95.5% of the socially impaired group had an IQ
score beten 0 - 19, which is extremely low. One wonders whether
the social impairment of people who are impaired in all their
general cognitive skills so severely can be meaningfully compared to
the social impairment of people whose general cognitive skills
approach normality. ie: Is the category 'aloof', for example, too
all-embracing to be informative? Are 'aloof' children with IQ 's
above 70 'equivalent' in terme of their social skills to 'aloof'
children with IQ's less than 19? Unforturtely, epidmatological
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studies of the social impairment in higher IQ children are largely
still lacking.
Wing (1978) reports that the full, classic picture of aloofness and
detachment seeme much more marked in the younger autistic child, of
less than 5 years of age. However, many authors make the important
point that one should be careful not to interpret any "remittance of
withdrawal" seen in older autistic children as the onset of normal
social behaviour, since it is possibly only a sign of shifting
between the categories of social impairment.
The 3 types of social impairment have been found to be useful, by
Hopkins and Lord (1981), as mutually exclusive categories to rate
the social behaviour of autistic children towards non-autistic
versus autistic peers. Their study also looked at the effect of
peer-familiarity on the social behaviour. They observed 6 autistic
children (CA = 10-12 yra, Leiter IQ 35_145) first individually
matched with a same-sex normal child (CA = 5-6 yrs), then with a
same-sex, same age normal child, in dyads of one normal and one
autistic child. Each dyad was observed alone over 10 thily 15 minute
sessions.
Their results showed that on thy 0, all autistic children 's social
behaviour toward eachother was categorized as 'aloof'. By day 20,
the autistic children who were in a dyad where the non-handicapped
peer was told to actively help the autistic child to play were found
to have increased on all social behavioural eaaurea, while the 2
autistic control children had not. The same age peers initiated
interaction 5 times more often than the younger playmates, and were
almost twice as likely to respond to the autistic child. These
results were replicated in a second study by Hopkins and Lord
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(1981), this time using 2 higher functioning subjects (Leiter IQ
76 and 83), since the subjects in their first study were severely
retarded.
However, these 'increases' on the social bthaviourel measures did
not mean 'improvements', but only indicated that the social
bchaviour changed from one form of abnormality to another. Wing and
Gould 'a 3 categories were fbund to be useful in describing the
changes in these children: 'Aloof' children could be discriminated
from 'passive' children on the basis of their frequency of
interaction and their responsiveness to the other children's
overtures. Similarly, 'odd' children could be discriminated from
'passive' and 'aloof' children by the number of initiations they
made, and their ability to make some active contribution to
sustaining an interaction. Hopkins and Lord 'a conclusion draws
attention to the fact that the autistic children moved from one
category of social impairment to another not only across time (eg:
'aloof' to 'passive', or 'passive' to 'odd'), but also moved between
categories as a function of whom they were with in the room (le:
autistic versus non-autistic playmate). This study therefore
suggests that it is unlikely that Wing and Gould's 3 categories are
mutually exclusive for any one child. Lord (198 1 ) instead proposes
the categories may comprise a developmental progression from 'aloof'
to 'passive' in responsiveness, and from 'aloof' to 'passive' to
'odd' in rate of initiation.
Hopkins and Lord 's result is impressive both because the differences
between the types of impairment were demonstrable even In a very
amall sample (n:6), and because the increases in social
responsiveness (but not initiation) generalized from non-handicapped
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peers to autistic peers. However, to reiterate, the study only
demonstrates that the social impairment can become more
'other-directed as a function of type of playmate and degree of
familiarity. The study does rot demonstrate that the social
impairment becomes alleviated.
MUlst Wing and Gould's 3 categ'ies have here been shoe to be
discriminable ndependently, they are nevertheless open to the
criticism that they are at a very general level of description. For
example, Wing and Gould 'a study does not allow us to specify how the
autistic socially 'odd' children differed from the non-autistic
socially 'odd' children if, as we might expect, they did. Much finer
grain descriptive categcries are needed if we are to characterize
these more subtle differences.
One imptant Fact to emerge from Hopkins and Lord's (1981) studies
is that autistic children, far from being totally socially
unresponsive, do take account of the bchaviour of other persons.
This has also been shom in a number of other studies: Sussnan and
Sklar (1969) found that their sample of autistic children (CA range
= 117 yrs, no MA repted) tended to comply significantly more
frequently to teachers' ocemands that were spoken in a soft
'persuasive' maroer than in a harsh, firm way. If autistic children
were completely 'unaimre' of the social 1krld, one would have
expected their responses to different kinds of social approeches to
be random and unpatter'ned. Clearly, autistic children can
discriminate these differing features in other people's bchaviour,
and show preferences.
Clark and flutter (1981) identified 2 other factors ithich predict
appropriate task-directed and ackalt-directed bchaviour in autism.
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These were amount of structure (ie: the extent to which the task
objectives were sade explicit) and amount of interpersorml demands
(ie: the extent to which the acilt tried to regulate the child's
actions). These 2 factors were positively ccrrelated with
appropriate responses by the child. However, in both of these last 2
studies, degree of compliance is maasured. This is not a
particularly informative index of the autistic children 'a social
relations, nor is it any indication that their social impairment is
in any way reduced. It merely demonstrates that their social
impairment is amenable to reshaping into socially more acceptable
forim.
In a study by MoRale, Siumonason, Prcus and 011ey (1980), other
aspects of the social context were manipulated: They showed that
overall, autistic children displayed significantly more
cosinunication in a 'Teacher Present' condition than in a 'Teacher
Absent' one. In the Teacher Absent condition, almost 75% of the
children 'a behaviour was asocial: they did not direct their actions
towards the other children present. However in the absence of any
non-autistic control group comparison, it is hard to evaluate what
this 75% means.
This study can also be criticized on several other grounds: First,
the results of the social manipulation are in no way surprising: one
would expect autistic children to respond 'socially' more often when
teachers are present than when they are absent, on the grounds that
teachers would tend to initiate social behaviours with an autistic
child far more often than autistic children would do towards one
another. Secondly, autistic children 'a pushing and pulling of a
teacher are labelled "mo tar ic-gestur'al coemunicative behaviours";
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however, pushing and pulling another person is not necessarily
comeunication. The child might well have been acting on the teacher
as another physical object (which one can also pull or push) rather
than as a social subject with mental states. Pushing and pulling
behaviours might more appropriately be termed inatrumental'
behaviours. Also, when words were used by the autistic children,
these were scored as "symbolic, coiinunicatory actions", despite the
later observation by' these authors that "even when autistic children
produced words, they were as likely to use them asocially as they
were to use them socially" (p.310).
PicHale's (1983) study is subject to exactly the same criticisme: she
reports that non-handicapped peers "were able to coemunicate with
autistic children..." (previously described as socially impaired)
"...arxl engage them in social interaction (for) 75% of observation
time by week 10." (p.88). As in her earlier study, the definition of
what constitutes 'social' behaviour is clearly Inadequate. For
example: "Children were scored as part of a group if they were
judged to be within 5 feet of one another, or were playing on or
with the same toy." (p.87). However, neither physical proximity nor
action on someone else's object necessarily involve two-way,
reciprocal, cooperative behaviour, which most definitions of
'social' would require. Damon (1979) and Frye (1981) have proposed a
definition of social behaviour in terme of "mutually intentiorml
relations", Ic: both people's intentions are coordinated with each
other. We will discuss this definition in detail in Chapter 3.2.(i).
The mejor problem, then, with the studies reviewed in this section
(1.1.(ii)) is that, with the exception of Wing and Gould, they all
lack any attempt to distinguish between whether autistic children 'a
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actions or utterances were truly' aocial', as compared to those
which might have superficially appeared social but which need not
have been at all. None of them propose e cperatiorml definition of
normal social behaviour. Nevertheless, all of these studies confirm
the earlier clinically reported descriptions of these children as
being socially aloof and passive. They also highlight the need to
devise new scoring categories into which 'behaviours directed toward
another person' can be meaningfully divided in terme of how social
the actions really are.
The category of "active but odd" social behaviour has been
identified in another study, by Dewey and Everard (1971$). They
provided a non-empirical but imnensely valuable collection of
observations by a panel of parents and professiornls with first-hand
experience of autistic adolescents who had an IQ in the near normal
range. Whilst this was not a study using quantitative methods, they
reported that the panel agreed strongly that, despite the normal
intelligence of these autistic individuals, their social
abnormalities stood out strikingly. These were manifested for
example in non-reciprocal speech, that is, extended nologues,
showing no awareness that their listener is bored. This is what
Rutter, Greenfield and Lockyer (1967) call lack of social
"know-how". They write:
"This lack of empathy or social perceptiveness sometimes
led children to make outrageous or tactless remarks...For
example, an intelligent 17 year old girl comaented 'what a
very ugly baby' when introduced to the newly produced
offspring of a friend of the family. Typically, this
remark was made without any sense of mischief. ..(Another
example is of) an intelligent adolescent boy (who) came
dot completely nude when his parents were giving a party,
in order to ask where his pyjamas were." ( p. 1187).
Dewey and Everard (19711) add that these adolescents lacked awareness
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of such social dimensions as class and social status in other
people. This could well do with experimental replication. These
signs of social abnormality have been noted by Newson, Dawson and
Evererd (198 11), and are pointed out in descriptions of Asperger's
Syndrome (Wing, 1981; Asperger, 1979; Van Krevelen, 1971), which may
well be closely related to autism. However, whilst these studies
clearly indicate that the social impairment persists both over time
and scross all levels of intelligence in autism, it should not be
assumed that all aspects of their social behaviour are impaired. For
example, Sigman and Ungerer (19811a) have found that autistic
children do show some attachment behaviours towards their caregiver,
appropriate for their MA. In the next section, studies of autistic
children 'a person perception are reviewed, some of which show areas
of non-impairment as well as impairment.
1.1 .(iii): Experiments on Person Perception in Autism.
There are now a number of independent studies confirming that
autistic children 'a understanding of physical objects is in line
with their MA (Wetherby and Gaines, 1982; Curcio, 1978; Sigman and
Ungerer, 1981; Serafica, 1971; Hamees and Langdell, 1981). Some
experiments have been carried out to see if autistic children 'a
perception of people, as a special class of physical objects, might
be impaired, as a way of explaining their social abnormalities.
The frequently described clinical phenomenon of 'eye gaze avoidance'
was one of the first aspects of person perception studied with
autistic children. Hutt and Ounated (1966) compared fixation
duration towards 5 faces draim on card, and found least fixation
towards the 2 human ones. They also found their sample of 8 autistic
subjects (CA range : 3-6 yrs, no MA reperted) looked at real
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people's faces less than controls, and this has been found by Richer
(1976) and Castell (1970). However, this result was refuted by
O'Cotxor and Hermelin (1967), who reported data to ahow that
autistic children (MA = 5.3 yre, CA 11. 1$ yrs) do not look less at
a person's face than at other objects, but they simply have shorter,
more frequent fixations for all types of stimuli, compared to
subjects. This finding was replicated by Davids (197s) and Langdell
(1981). This underlines the importance of controlling for types of
stimuli. O'Cormor and Hermelin found that both autistic and normal
children spent more time looking at a real face than at a
photographed face, and spent equal amounts of time looking at a face
with its eyes open and the same face with its eyes shut. On the
basis of these results, O'Comor and Hermelin seriously questioned
the very existence of the phenomenon of eye-gaze avoidance in
autism.
Nevertheless, the matter remains controversial, since contradicting
results were reported by Richer and Coss (1976): they found that
autistic children (mean CA 7.7 yrs, Vineland SQ < 70, no MA
reported) look more at a face with one eye covered up, than at a
face with 2 eyes exposed, and look even more at a face with both
eyes covered up. They argue the difference between their results and
those of O'Cormor and Hermelin's (1967) may in part be due to the
total time of exposure to the alt's face: O'Cbrmor and Hermelin
exposed the ac).ilt to their subjects for a total of only 20 seconds,
whereas Richer and Coss did so for 8 minutes. However, Richer and
Coss' results might simply reflect the fact that unusual stimuli
(covered eye[sl) are more interesting and novel, but there was no
control for this dimension in the experiment. Absence of eye contact
has also been noted in home movies of infants as young as 6 months
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o were later diagnosed as autistic (I'ssie, 1980, 1978; kubicek,
1980) but, again, control data is not included in these studies.
All of these early studies focussed on the quantitative aspects of
eye-gaze, but this measure y be too crude to capture the social
use of eye-gaze. A recently published pilot study by Mirenda,
Donnellan aria Yoder (1983) has raised the possibility that there is
a qualitative rather than a quantitative difference between eye gaze
use in autistic arxi normal children: Argyle (1972) observed that
normal adults typically tend to look at another person's face more
when listening than when speaking, and Mirenda et al have confirmed
that this is true for normal children also. However, the results of
their study comparing frequency and duration of eye-to-face gaze
during monologue and dialogue situations found that overall autistic
children (mean CA : 11.0 yrs, no MA reported) spent as much of the
time engaged in eye-to-face gaze with an adult as did normal
children, but that autistic children tended to look for longer
periods of time and more frequently during monologues than did
normal children. This study is reperted only as at the pilot stage
(n=lI autistic subjects) and therefore awaits further support. Argyle
(1972) has suggested that one social and pragmatic function of
eye-gaze is to regulate turn-taking during dialogue. Since the
autistic children made more eye contact during monologues and the
normal children exhibited more during dialogues, this suggests that
autistic children are not conforming to this rule of social
interaction. In Oapter 8, an account of this 'symptom' will be
proposed in terme of autistic children 's impaired 'theory of mind'.
Tiegern and Primavere (198 1 ) found that autistic children (CA mean
= 13.9 yrs, no MA reported) gazed at the experimenter most when the
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experimenter imitated the child 'a actions, and that they showed
least eye-to-eye gaze when the experimenter acted completely
independently to the child 'a actions. It is clear that these authors
have found a way of establishing eye-contact, but it Is doubtful
whether this iuld actually be useful in social interaction.
Langdell (1978) carried out systematic manipulations to investigate
if normal, retarded, and autistic children, matched for both CA and
MA or IQ, used the same or different facial features in identifying
other people. He tested 2 age groups of each type of child (n=80)
for their ability to recognize isolated facial features of kra
peers from photographs of their faces. Additiorally, in order to
test the hypothesis that autistic children my treat the face as a
"pure pattern" rather than as a "social stimulus", a condition was
included in which the subject had to identify peers from inverted
photographs. A number of authors, reviewed by Ellis (1975), had
previously found that a normal subject's recognition ability is
reduced by the inversion of a face, compared to his or her ability
to recognize other inverted stimuli. This could be due to the
'social aspects' of the face which lose their 'meaning' when
inverted. Whilst this theory is frustratingly lacking in precision,
Langdell argued this inversion phenomenon might not occur to the
same extent in autistic children, cbe to their krx,im social
impairment.
He found 2 significant differences between the groups: first, the
autistic children made fewer errors when the lower half of the face
was shoim, than the control groups; this suggests that they were
less dependent on the information contained in the upper part of the
face, perhaps the eye region, for recognition. Secondly, the older
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autistic children (mean CA 1L1 yrs, sd 1.1) had a significantly
lower mean percentage error score for the inverted mode than all the
other groups, although they too showed the inversion effect.
L.angdell (1981) established which hypotheses did not explain this
inversion advantage: it was not because the autistic children were
more practiced at focussing on the mouth rather than the eyes, since
deaf children who depend on lip-reading did not show this inversion
advantage. Nor was it siaply that the autistic children were only
'mentally rotating' the mouth area and not the eyes (the former
being arguably easier), because there was no difference in their
ability to recognize a face if the upper half or the lower half was
inverted only.
Langdell (1981) then proposed a deficit in 'perceptual Integration':
He found that autistic children were also better than E1 children
Ratched for reading ability at recognizing inverted words. (Reading
ability was tested by recognition • of words correctly oriented).
Langdell argued that since both words and faces may normelly be
perceived holistically, perhaps the autistic children 's inversion
advantage was due to their inability to integrate perceptions of
specific features into a whole. The assumption here is that
individual inverted items are easier to recognize than relationships
between inverted items. L,angdell 's explartion needs more
substantiation, but his results can be taken as evidence that
autistic children have no particular problem with recognizing faces.
Hobson (1985) explored the question of the significance of facial
expressions, as well as gestures aix! vocalizations, for autistic
subjects. He proposed that while these are always used as indicators
of inner e.otioral states by normal people, it may be that for
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autistic individuals they do not have the same Impact, Cr are not
perceived as carrying the same information. Using a matching
paradigm, Nobson presented 3 different videotapes to autistic,
retarded, and normal m.bjects. One videotape (1) was of 1 facial
expressions showing the emotions of happiness, unhappiness, anger,
and tear. For esob, the child was asked to select a schematic
drawing of a face "to go with this face". All subjects were trained
to match these correctly.
Re then showed the subject a vidwtape (2) of a person enacting in
turn the of each emotion, but with the face obscured by a
balaclava. After each of these, the subject was given schematic
drawings of a faceless figure with a 'frozen' gesture matching the
final gesture on the videotape. (We ist assume that Hobson believed
that the effect of the film and drawings of faceless people would be
equally undisturbing for all the groups of subjects, although this
was not checked). The child was then presented with a choice of the
same 5 drawings of faces, depicting the 1$ emotions and a 'neutral'
pose, and was asked to choose the one to complete the picture. A
similar technique was employed with an audiotape of non-verbal
vocalizations appropriate to each emotion, and also with a final
videotape (3) of some 'contexts' which might lead the actor to feel
happy, unhappy, and so on. There were also 2 comparison videotapes.
In the first there were non-personal, non-emotional 'things' (a
train, car, bird, and dog), each of which had a characteristic form,
'gesture', sound, and context. The other tape comprised personal but
non-emotional stimuli, in the for. of a man, men, boy, and girl.
These figures were depicted in gestures, vocalizations, and contexts
characteristic of their age and sex. This last condition was to
explore the question of whether autistic children 'a recognition of
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the person-variables of age and gender irns normal.
Briefly, Hobson's results were as follows: All subjects were equally
good at choosing the picture of the 'things' to match the
non-personal videotape. However, the autistic subjects made
significantly more errors in choosing the schenatic faces for the
emotional expressions tape for gesture and vocalization and context.
They were also irse on the 'persons' age and sex tape, than their
controls (both normal and non-autistic mentally retarded). One
striking finding here is, of' course, the 'normal' performance of the
non-autistic mentally retarded children, who highlight the severity
of the impairment in the autistic group. The latter group's failure
to match the emotional expression drawings c armo t have been due to
an inability to integrate different features of a stimulus, since
they could do this with 'things'; nor is it likely to have been due
to an inability to discriminate the facial configurations, since
Langdell (1981) has ahoim that, at least for older autistic
children, to sort photographs of different faces according to the
emotions expressed is significantly above chance level and does not
differ significantly froei matched E children. Thus, though the
facial and non-facial atimuli obviously differ enormously In
complexity, there is no reason to suppose that such complex stimuli
per se pose particular perceptual problema for autistic children.
However, it is difficult to evaluate exactly which aspects of the
tasks the autistic children might have had difficulties with: for
example, are the 'task demands' in the 'things' videotape of
'gestures' (in which the child has to match the Thopping blurred
image" of a bird with a picture of a bird) the same as those in the
'persons' videotape of gestures (in which the child has to match a
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person's gesture with a face)? It is likely that there are more
differences than just the critical social ones. However, Hobson's
interpretation is that the autistic children simply did not know
that facial configurations are not merely "perceptual patterns" but
are expressions, that is, signifiers, denoting inner emotiorl
states. An investigation into autistic children's understanding of
'non-emotiorBi' mental states such as beliefs will be reported in
Chapter . Certainly, the autistic children's failure in Hobson's
experiment appears all the more chronic when looked at next to
Walker's (1982) finding that even 5-7 month old normal infants can
recognize the ccrresporxence between the visual and acoustic
expressions of certain emotions. Consistent with Hobson's finding
that there is a dissociation between autistic children 's perception
of social and non-social things, Jennings (1973) found that autistic
children (n=11) prefer to sort photographs of faces according to
non-affective stimuli (eg: hats) rather than by expressions, whilst
matched normal and retarded controls show no preference.
Nobson (1983a; 1983b) retested autistic children's ability to
discriminate people's sex and age, using card-sorting paradigms.
Hobson (1983a) confirmed their failure to distinguish between
children and ackilts consistently accurately, relative to their high
ability to sort geometric figures, and old versus new ron-persorl
objects. However, autistic children could discriminate people's
gender (Hobson, 1983b) and this has been confirmed by others
(Sherman, Sigi.an, lingerer, and t'indy, in preparation). Abelson's
(1981) study demonstrated more specifically that only very retarded
autistic children have difficulty in recognizing gender identity, as
tested with the Michigan Gender Identity Test (P(1T), and that this
difficulty is rot found among those of higher MA. Abelson and
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Paluszny (1978) have also shobm the strong correlation betien MA
and gender identity recognition in retarded subjects. Why autistic
children should find difficulty with age-related discriminations
betbeen people, but not gender related features, has not been
explained, but it is possible that this dimension does not carry the
same impor tanc e or salience for autistic children, since they do no t
actively seek out peers in the normal way. It should be noted that
Lewis and Brooks-Gunn (1979) and Brooks and Lewis (1976) have
demonstrated that very young normal infants exhibit selective modes
of responsiveness to other people who differ in the body
characteristics associated with age and gender.
To sumearize the present literature on person perception in autism,
it appears that appropriate social use of eye-gaze is absent
(Mirenda et al, 1983), face-recognition skill is present as normal
(Langdell, 1978), as is gender-recognition (Hobson, 1983b; Sherman
et al, in prep; Abelson, 1981), but that autistic subjects have
difficulty in the recognition of emotiornl expressions (Hobson,
1985). This suggests that while the physical aspects of person
perception are intact, social and emotiotel cues are nevertheless
confusing for them. Hermelin and O'Conoor (1985) have recently
proposed the notion that these deficits are a result of affective as
well as cognitive disturbances. Whilst the domain of affect is of
considerable importance, and aimits further enquiry, only a
cognitive account is considered here. Thus, in apter 3 an
interpretation of these deficits is proposed In terma of an
impairment in their ability to attribute mental states to others.
However, in the next section more experimental evidence is reviewed
for the autistic child's social deficit in the area of pragmatics.
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1.1.(iv): Experiments on the social use of language (le: pragmatics)
in autism.
Hurtig, Ensrud and Tomblin (1982) arlysed the question production
of verbal autistic children which, among other things, has been
described as lacking any relation to the isediate social context
(Karrier, 1913). Cunningham (1968) has also reported that many of the
questions autistic children ask are ones to which they already know
the answer. Hurtig et l tested the hypothesis that higher
functioning verbal autistic children (n:6, mean IQ:72) who ask many
questions may often not be sincerely interested In gaining verbal
information. They specifically assessed the degree to which listener
response to questions produced by these children influenced the
likelihood of conversatiormi continuation. They found that a large
percentage of questions (conservative estimate 28%, lenient
estimate = 61%) produced by autistic children were rot necessarily
intended as requests for information, as the children possessed the
information already. They also found that when the experimenter
provided a 'minimal response' to a question (ie: only the
information asked fbr), 87% of the children's 'next turns' were
inappropriate; ic: they lacked the further pragmatic or discourse
competence that	 uld allow them to appropriately select topical
material to maintain the dyadic interaction.
Hurtig et al interpreted these results as indicating that autistic
children probably are motivated to initiate social contact - (why
else uld they ask questions?), and their persistence of
inappropriate questions may represent the children s vain attempts
to maintain the social contact. It is unforturmte that this study
did not include any control groups. Nevertheless, their finding that
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autistic children lack the "converaatiorl maigement skills" to
maintain the dialogue, following the listener's anier to their
question, conFiri similar pragmatic difficulties found by other
authors:
Baltaxe (1977), in her study of the pragmatics of 5 verbal, male
autistic adolescents (IQ = 86-118), followed Bates (1971$) in her
definition of pragmatic competence as the ability to express oneself
in a manoer which is appropriate to a given social context. The
speaker must be able to make certain assumptions about the hearer
and about what the hearer brings to the linguistic interchange, in
terma of knowledge, social background, and other variables. These
assumptions affect the interchange itself. Baltaxe's study, though
lacking in contextual detail (and thus difficult for the reader to
evaluate) reported that the autistic children were impaired in their
differentiation of speaker-hearer roles (eg: they adopted many
different speech styles of different speakers as their oa). They
also reperted an observed impairmant in the differentiation of old
and new information in a dialogue (eg: what the listener already
knows and does not know - which Roth and Spekman (1981$) call
'presuppositions').
This pragmatic deficit stands in aharp contrast to their often
intact syntactic and semantic skills, as has been suggested in
various reviews (Frith, 1982; Tager-Flusberg, 1981; crcmer, 1981).
The typical pattern of social role-playing with an "imaginary
interlocutor" found in the bedtime soliloquies of normal infants
(Weir, 1962) has also been found to be missing from an autistic
child's bedtime soliloquy (Baltaxe and Simeons, 1977). Fay and
Schuler (1980) have also noted such autistic pragmatic-deficit
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characteristics as excessively rigid interactive routines, problema
in initiating and terminating interaction, deficits in topic
maintainance, topic-shifting, and perception of the listener's
perspective.
of course, pragmatic competence is not restricted to verbal language
only: Some aspects of non-verbal comeunication have also been looked
at experimentally in autism: Langdell (1981) looked at the
production of emotional facial expressions by autistic, retarded,
and normal children, matched on MA and CA. The children were simply
asked to look happy a' sad. Photographs of the children 's attempts
were taken, and subsequently rated for the adequacy of the
expressions, from the point of view of recognizability. The
independent raters did not know to which of the 3 groups any one
particular child belonged. t.angdell found that the autistic
children 'a attempts to look happy a' sad were far less successful
than those of the other children. In fact, the raters frequently
found it difficult to decide whether a particular attempt by an
autistic child was meant to convey a face showing a happy a' a sad
expression. Such uncertainties never occurred when judging the faces
of the control children.
Attcod (198 1$) observed Doim's Syndrome children, 1$ year old normal
children, and autistic children (of varying drees of mental
retardation, namely severe, moderate and mild) in the naturalistic
setting of a school playground. The Do 'a and normal children used
3 types of gesture, (1) pointing; (2) instrumental (ie: movements
serving to regulate another person's behaviour, eg: comaarxl
gestures, such as 'come here'); and (3) gestures expressing mental
states. The autistic children used the former types of gestures in
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their (infrequent) interactions, but never the latter. This
preporxlerance of 'instrumental' gestures and absence of
'ocemunicative' ones has also been found by Wetherby aril Prutting
(198 1;) and Curcio (1978) and, taken together with the observed
pragmatic deficit, suggests that their social impairment is not
confined to verbal couuunication but to non-verbal as well.
It will be argued later (thapter 3) that these observed impairments
in verbal and non-verbal comaunication, so-called 'pragmatic
deficits', are a product of an inability to attribute mental states
to others, ie: a failure in conceptual role-taking. This will be
expanded upon in the light of experimental evidence presented. In
the next section (1.1.(v)), we briefly consider three different
cognitive exp1artions that have been proposed for the autistic
child 's social impairment, as we have seen it manifested in terme of
social baviour, person-perception, and pragmatics.
1.1.(v): cognitive accounts of the social impairment in autism.
This thesis attempts to give a cognitive account of the social
impairment in autism. It will be assumed that 'ultimate
explartions' in terme of either 'constitution' or 'enviroient' are
independent of such cognitive accounts. It is also an acknowledged
limitation of the thesis that only cognitive explarmtions are
tested, and this is due to both historical reasons aix! availability
of experimental paradigms. The affective dimension to the social
impairment in autism is beginning to be discussed elsewhere
(Hermelin and O'Connor, 1985).
Within the set of explarmtions that have been called Cognitive
Deficit Theories, different aspects of cognition have been
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postulated as direct explartions for the social deficit. Three such
theories are (1) the 'central language disorder' theory (Rutter,
1968; 1978b), (2) the 'central encoding deficit' theory (Hermelin
and O'Connor, 1970; Frith, 1970a,b), and (3) the 'impaired symbolic
capacity' theory (Ricks and Wing, 1975; Wing et al, 1977; Richer,
1978; Hanines and Langdell, 1981). Data from other clinical groups
baa contributed to the refutation of the first of these
explartions; the remaining t, however, remain to be taken
seriously and, indeed, in Chapter 8 it will be argued that the data
reported in this thesis is consistent with the both of the latter
t cognitive accounts.
The 'central language disorder' account has been refuted on the
following grounds: 'Aphasic' and 'dysphasic' children have specific
language impairments, and these children have been compared to
autistic children (Bartak, Rutter and Cox, 1975; Cantwell, Baker and
Rutter, 1978). However, Rutter (1983) concludes from these
comparisons that the 2 groups were "much less alike in their social
and behavioural characteristics than some of the earlier clinical
descriptions had suggested... There were many developmentally
'dysphasic' children who showed a severe defect in their
understanding of spoken language but yet who were not in the least
autistic." (p.552). The evidently normal social development of
aphasic children has also been docented by Caparulo and Cohen
(1977). This suggests that 'language disorder' per se (and this is a
very vague term) does not necessarily cause a social impairment of
the type(s) found in autism.
Whilst a nber of specific deficits in cognitive processing have
been suggested in autism, many of these are theoretically inadequate
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to account for the autistic social i.pairment. One exception is the
suggestion by DeMyer (1971) and Dawson and Adama (1981) that the
social impairment might be due to an inability to imitate others,
but the thildren in these samples had very low MA's, and there is
evidence that the social impairment persists even among those
autistic thildren of higher MA who show imitative abilities (Haiires
and Langdell, 1981).
Certainly, general retardation canoot account for the social
deficit, since Doim 's Syndrome children, despite often being
language-impaired and of low IQ, may be delayed but nevertheless
still progress through the normal social milestones in the first
year of life such as the social smile (Eade, Katz and Thorpe, 1975),
and "maternal referencing" is: when infants check their caregiver's
emotioral facial expressions for information which they then use to
guide their behaviour (Sorce, Eade and Frank, 1982). Later, Dori's
Syndrome children show normal social/comnunicative use of gesture
and speech (Owens and PcDornld, 1982; Coggins, Carpenter and
Owings, 1983) and laugh at different stiilus itema in the same
order as normal infants (Cicthetti and Sroufe, 1976). Corniall and
Birch (1969) have also shoa that 'social maturity' continues to
develop in Doa 'a Syndrome even when IQ begins to decline with age.
Doa's Syndrome children, therefore, while delayed in their social
development, provide a clear case of how general retardation may
slow doi but does not impair early social development.
What of the 'central encoding deficit' theory? This proposed that
the deficits in autism are not specific to language but are found in
other modalities as ll. Thus, whilst autistic children were found
to be more impaired in "decoding" auditory-vocal input, in tasks of
A
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Rencoding R
 they were more impaired in the mn-verbal charmels as
veil (Hermelin and O'Cormor, 1970, p.70-71). Using memory-recall
paradigms, Herelin and O'Oormor (1967) found that whilst
non-autistic retarded children 's performence improved when
word-strings were 'me aningtul', autistic children's scores for
sentences versus random word arrangements were not significantly
different. This i*s also found by Frith (1969), using a paradigm in
which meaning as contained in phorological stress as well as syntax
was varied. In non-verbal charmels, Frith (1970a,b; 1972) found that
autistic children were less sensitive to structure in sequential
etiili in both perception and production, and instead tended to
impose their om structure onto non-random data.
These authors proposed that such cognitive deficits could lead to an
inability to acquire social skills (Hermelin and O'Cormor, 1970,
p.72). The model, though never explicitly stated, implied that a
failure to perceive meaning' would inevitably lead to a social
impairment. This model is in some respects consistent with data
reported in this thesis: we argue later that an inability to impute
mental states to others leads directly to the social impairment, and
would also render autistic children unable to decode 'meaning',
since this would involve being able to attribute to another person
an intention to send a particular (meaningful) message. Moreover,
just as the 'central encoding deficit' theory argued, this impaired
'theory of mind' should affect both verbal and non-verbal charmels.
We will return to discuss this cognitive account in Chapter 8.
The third major cognitive account of the social impairment in autism
is the 'impaired symbolic capacity' thecry. The main problem with
this account is that the term "symbol" has been used quite loosely,
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without clear definition. Nevertheless, the support for such a
theory continues to come from a growing number of studies èith have
observed deficits in autistic thildren's pretend (ie:symbolic) play
(Ungerer and Sigman, 1981; Wing et al, 1977; Riguet et al, 1978;
Gould, in press; Experiment 7, this thesis). A further problem with
this theory is that there have been almost no attempts to relate
such deficits in symbolic play to the social impairment, despite the
notion of 'impaired symbolic capacity' being used as a generel
explartion for autism (Wing et al, 1977). These to shortcomings of
the theory are addressed in Chapter 8. To anticipate an argtrent
which is presented there, if a thorough definition of symbol is used
(Langer, 19112; Cassirer, 1972; Werner and Kaplan, 1963), it is
possible to see (a) an impaired 'theory of mind' (described in
experiments in Chapter 11, and linked directly to the social deficit)
and (b) symbolic deficits (as manifested in an absence of pretend
play - described in an experiment in Chapter 7) as both due to an
impairment in "second -order" or mets-represents tio r 1 capacity
(Pylyshyn, 1978; Dennett, 1978a; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Leslie, to
appear; Flave].l, 1979).
This will be elaborated In Chapter 8. To sumearize the various
cognitive accounts of the social impairment in autism, t points
should be stressed. First, that the impairment is not confined to or
caused by a language impairment, but is more 'central' than that
(Hermelin and O'Connor, 1970). Secondly, any cognitive account which
seeks to explain the social impairments should ke explicit how
cognition and social behaviour are related. This thesis attempts to
follow this prescription by examining various aspects of the
autistic child 's social cognition. The next section suarizes what
is meant by 'social cognition', and presents an overview of various
hypotheses examined in this thesis. These hypotheses attempt to
specify in more detail which aspects or social cognition in autism
are impaired or intact.
1.2. Overview of thesis:
What is meant by 'social cognition'? Briefly, a number of authors
have argued that the physical and social environments are
qualitatively different to each other, in that changes in the latter
occur for quite different reasons than changes in the former (Glick,
1978; Geiman and Spelke, 1981;	 mon, 1979 & 1981; Ramlyn, 1974).
One illustration of this difference which is often cited is the
social phenomenon that a person who is stared at will in all
likelihood move ay, whereas a rock, hover long it is stared at,
will never move at all. From the point of view of the developing
child 's cognitive system, understanding the social world requires
not only attending to the physical attributes of a person, but also
attending to their internal states, which are more indeterminate. It
is argued, therefore, that in the social world much of the
information to be processed by the cognitive system is nonveridical,
and that to make sense of the social world one ist make inferences
about mental states which Involve going beyond the ininediately
available thta.
'Social cognition' therefore refers to the mental structures,
processes, and knowledge that are employed in interpreting the
social world. (It is easily confused with and to be distinguished
from the Vygotaky tradition of 'social determinism', which studies
the aspects of the social environment which influence cognitive
development; social cognition' describes a part of the cognitive
system, whereas 'social determinism' describes some effects of a
part of the environment). The "social world" effectively comprises
the knowledge one has about self and others. This conceptual
distinction is a central focus throughout the thesis. To reiterate,
because the social world is held to be qualitatively different to
the 'non-social' world in many important respects, it is argued that
specific cognitive structures and processes are likely to be
necessary in order to understand it.
Chapter 2 will consider some so-called "lower level" aspects of
social cognition in autism, namely, visual self-recognition
(2.1-2.3) and visuospatial .ttakin (2.1_2.6). This latter area
looks at children 'a knowledge of what another person can see. These
aspects are 'lower level' because ich of the relevant information
for these skills is perceptual, Ic: is available to the senses.
These cognitive processes are, in the jargon of the times,
"bottom-up". In contrast, Chapters 3 and will look at a
"higher-level" aspect of social cognition in autism, namely,
conceptual role-taking ie: children's knowledge of what another
person thinks. As discussed earlier, this sort of skill requires
going beyond perceptual information and inferring what another
person knows on the basis of his or her particular experience. This
skill involves 'top-dom" processes.
To anticipate some results, experiments are presented which indicate
that the 'lower level' (ie: perceptual) aspects of the present
sample of autistic children's social cognition are intact and
normal, relative to their mental age, and this contIr experimental
results from elsewhere. In contrast, severe deficits are found in
their 'higher level', conceptual role-taking abilities, and this has
not been experimentally tested before. These findings are fitted
into a discussion of the autistic child's concept of 'self', which
is seen to be unimpaired at the 'physical' level (the
"self-as-object') but impaired at the level of 'ental states' (the
'self-as-subject").
Chapter 5 presents data in support of the hypothesis that this
deficit is specific to this part of autistic children 's social
cognition - autistic children 's understanding of causal relations in
the physical world is shoa to be normal (5.1-5.2). Sections 5.35.1
attempt to establish the upper limits of all tested autistic
subjects' social cognition. Chapter 5 ends with an attempt to fit
the experimental results so far obtained into a theoretical
frauieirk which distinguishes "first-order and second-order
representatiorml capacities" (Leslie, to appear). Briefly, autistic
children's normal cognition about the physical world is explained in
terme of an intact first-order representatiol capacity. Their
deficit in social cognition is taken as evidence of an impairment in
their second-order repreaentatiorl capacity. Finally, no autistic
children but some non-autistic control children show evidence of a
"third-order" representatiornl capacity. All of these terma are
fully discussed in that chapter.
Chapters 6 and 7 then address the question of autistic children's
pretend play, a knoa' area of deficit, since this is also considered
to require a second-order representatiorml capacity. This final
experiment confirme results from other studies that autistic
children are impaired In their production of pretend play, and
extends this literature in that new operstiorml definitions of
'pretend' are used and various methodological shortcomings are
refined. Chapter 8 draws some conclusions from all these
145
experimental findings, and discusses the notion that the social
impairment and the impairment in symbolic or pretend play are both
primary (in that neither one is a byproduct of the other), and that
both may be the result of a deficit in one cognitive mechanism. The
relationship between this deficit and other 'symptome' of autism
also discussed, as is the idea of a general 'symbolic deficit' in
autism.
1.3. Methodological considerations and subject selection.
a. Control groups:
The question of who are the correct 'controls' for autistic children
has been discussed by a number of authors (eg: Yule, 1978). However,
selection of a control group depends on the hypothesis being tested;
it depends on which factors need to be controlled or ruled out of
later interpretation of results. Because of the 'nature' of autism,
there is at least one control group which is essential in all
experiments which aim to demonstrate autism-specific
characteristics: Autism can be associated with all levels of
intelligence, from severely mentally retarded to normal and even
above normal IQ (Nermelin and O'Corrior, 1970; Wing and Gould, 1979).
Therefore, in experiments which search for autism-specific features,
the effects of general mental retardation must be controlled, and
this is achieved by comparison with a non-autistic mentally retarded
group. This notion was pioneered in some seminal experimental
research by Hermelin and O'Comor (1970). In the 7 experiments in
this thesis, this control group is Doiii 'a Syndrome. This group was
chosen because it represents a relatively homogeneous clinical
diagnostic group, relative to other instances of mental retardation.
Also, their frequently described 'sociability' makes it easy to rule
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cut the presence of autism in these thildren.
Thus, any deficits found within the autistic group which are not
found in the Do 'a Syndrome group can be more reliably attributed
to autism-specific factors rather than mental retardation per se.
This circ.mvents the familiar problem of having to define what is a
'pure' case of autism, uncontaminated by retardation or anything
else.
The experiments in this thesis also include a control group of
normal children. This controls for the effects of handicap in
general, in that normal subjects can be matched at the same mental
age as the handicapped groups, but differ from them in the crucial
respect of being 'normal '. The normal children also function to
highlight any differences that might be due to IQ, in that IQ
represents the relationship between MA and CA; this relationship is
different in normal and retarded children, MA and CA being
discrepant in the latter, and in principle equivalent in the former.
To aumearize, these two control groups are used in order to
establish whether failures in the autistic group represent a
specific deviance or just a developmental delay (Zigler and Balla,
1982). Deviance can only be identified when a failure occurs which
would not be expected from the subject's MA.
is:
The autistic subjects were draia'i from special ichoola in and
around the London area. They were included if they had been given an
unequivocal diagnosis of autism in their past. Since 2 of the
schools were run by the Natiorml Autistic Society, the referrals to
which are all by expert psychiatrists, the diagnosis of those
children was not in any doubt. However, the other 2 schools acnitted
not only children diagnosed as autistic, but also those with some
"autistic features", but not with the full autistic syndrome.
Therefore, a syuptoma checklist (based on Wing, 1978) was given to
the child 'a teacher to fill in, and only those children who showed
the full syndrome to a chronic degree were included in the sample.
The checklist/questioraire is shown in Appendix I.
The Down's Syndrome subjects were all attending one of 2 FSN(M) or
SSN schools in London, and had been unambiguously diagnosed. The
normal children were drawn from 2 nursery/primary schools in London.
The Down 's Syndrome and normal children 's schools were in lower
middle class and working class neighbourhoods. Social class in the
autistic group was heterogeneous, since children were drawn from all
over London. This variable was not specifically checked and maybe
this was an oversight, given the controversial findings that there
is a bias towards upper middle class families in autism (Schopler,
Andrew and Strupp, 1979; Rutter and Lockyer, 1967; Wing, 1980).
However, there are no grounds for expecting that social class
variables affect the results of the experiments to be reported.
c • Subject Selection and Rand o ess:
The schools were chosen on grounds of convenience, ie: in or near
London. Autistic children in these schools tend to be overtested and
over-researched relative to non-London autistic children, and this
is regrettable, since subject selection canoot be said to be 'truly
random'. However, there is so far no epidemiological evidence to
suggest that geography might be an important variable to control, so
this was ignored.
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The sex ratio of the subjects ms approximately 1:1 in the Dow's
and normal groups, and $: 1 (male to female) in the autistic gr.ap,
in line with the ratio in the wider population (Wing and Gould,
1979).
d. Matching procedure:
Since autistic children are knoii to have a performance IQ higher
than their verbal IQ on nst tests (Shah and Ho]mes, 1985; DeMyer,
1976; Lockyer and Rutter, 1970), each of the clinical subjects was
assessed fbr both verbal and non-verbal MA. For the latter, the
Leiter Internatiorl Performance Scale 19'$8 Revision (Leiter, 1980)
was used, and the verbal MA was assessed using the British Picture
Vocabulary Test. Details of the ãubjects used in the first 3
experiments are given in Table 1.1:
Table 1.1: Subject Variables (means, standard deviations and ranges)
for the first 3 Experiments.
Group	 n	 CA	 Nonverbal MA	 Verbal MA
Autistic 20 x	 11:11	 9:3	 5:5
ad	 3:0	 2:2	 1:6
range 6:1-16:6 5:'$-15:9
	
2:8-7:5
Dows	 1'$ x	 10:11	 5:11	 2:11
sd	 11:1	 0:11	 0:7
range 6:3-17:0 '$:9-8:6	 i:8-'$:8
Normal 27 x	 '$:5	 -	 -
ad	 0:7	 -	 -
range 3:5-5:9 -	 -
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A, is clear from Table 1.1, the autistic arid Doii'a Syndrome
subjects are of equivalent CA, arid all 3 groups have an 14* > 1$
years. This is chosen on the grounds that Experiment 3 required it
as a minimum level of intellectual development (Winier arid Perner,
1983). With respect to the t clinical groups, it is also clear
from Table 1.1 that the autistic children have an advantage over the
Dowi's Syndrome subjects on both verbal and non-verbal MA. This
ensures that any superior performance by the Doai '5 Synd rome
children cannot be due to their MA advantage. This will be discsed
in the context of later experimental results. The next chapter
considers one "primitive" level of autistic children's social
cognition, their concept of self-as-object.
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Chapter 2: Perceptual aspects of social cognition in autism.
2.1 • The autistic child's concept of 'self-as-object'.
A number of authors have argued that autistic children have an
undifferentiated sense of self: Ornitz and Ritvo (1968) described
autistic children as having an "inability to maintain a distinction
between self and non-self" (p.87), and Anthony (1958) also mentions
the "confusion of self and non-self" in these children. Goldfarb
(1963) also argued 'schizophrenic' children "lack an image of their
bodies which is stable in time and clear in form" (p.I9). His view
was based on observations of 50 cases, of which the following are
examples:
"Betty was teased by another child who said she looked
like a horse. For days she was compulsively preoccupied
with the armtomtcal features of the horse, and was
obviously bewildered and uncertain about whether she could
be distinguished fr the horse...Dorria became fascinated
by the ,tions of her hands and addressed her hand as a
baby..." (p. 119) etc.,
One problem is that these children were labelled 'schizophrenic' -
they may or may not have been autistic. Another problem is the lack
of experimental validation of Goldfarb's interpretation of the
children 'a behaviour. However, the same idea appears in other
papers: for example Creak (1961), in her sumeary of the 'British
Working Party', included "apparent urwareness of persorl identity"
among the diagnostic criteria of autism. While this notion appears
somewhat vague and non-empirical, it has nevertheless had a lot of
mileage as an explart1on of the social impairment in autism and has
continued to appear in recent research (Cohen, 1980). Why the
self-concept has been considered as an area of disorder in autism by
so many authors may in part be due to Bleuler's (1913) original
coining of the term "autistic", since this is derived from the Greek
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word 'autos', meaning self.
The psychoanalytic line of research in autism has specified this
notion in far more detail: Bettelheim's (1967) classic book on
autism even includes this notion in its title 'Infantile Autism and
The Birth of The Self'. He credits Stern (192 1 ) as responsible for
the idea that, in the normel child, the concept of self is not
present at birth, but develops slowly, culminating in the conceptual
distinction beten subject and object in the second year of life.
Betteiheim's belief is that through the experience of successf'ul
autonomy in interaction with other people, the infant gradually
develops a concept of being a separate person. This view is shared
by other psychoanalysts (eg: Winnicott, 1951/82). In autism,
Betteiheim contends, the infant's efforts at influencing the social
world are repeatedly frustrated by meternal insensitivity during
'critical periods', and hence the development of self is arrested.
Mahler (1952, 1968) proposes a similar psychoanalytic view, and she
specifies the different stages in the "separation-individuation"
process which are rot achieved in autism (t'hler and Furer, 1972).
'Separation' in her thecry refers to the process of self-mother
differentiation, while 'individuation' refers to the infant's
gradual realization of its independent autonomous capacities. The
hypothesized process is a shift from the "normel autistic phase" (no
differentiation betien self and other) through "normel symbiosis"
to "differentiation", Ic: fornmtion of a stable mental
representation of the mother in her absence. Mahier's they, like
Bettelbeim's, focusses on the emotiol aspects of separation, and
in this they both have ich in coon with Bowlby's (1969) thecry of
attachment. Other psychoanalysts, too, have proposed that autism
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comprises a 'disorder of the self' (Fordham, 1976; Tustin, 1981).
It is interesting that although there is no scientific evidence for
the setiological view of autism proposed by these psychoanalysts,
the notion of an undeveloped sense of self in autism has continued
to be a focus of interest and hypothesis. For example, 'pronominal
reversal' has been taken to support the idea of an undifferentiated
concept of self (Bosch, 1962/70; Despert, 19146), although this
interpretation has been questioned by a number of studies (Bartak
and Rutter, 19714; Silberg, 1978). The obvious question that is
begged by all this is the meaning of a 'concept of self'. In what
follows, the notion of an urnalysable concept of self is
discredited.
What is a concept of self?
In experimental psychology, the term 'self' was banished by the
radical behaviourists, but previously had been discussed by William
James (1890, Chap. 10). James (p.1400) contrasted t fundamental
aspects of the self, the 'self-as-subject' (the 'I') and the
'self-as-object' of one's knowledge (the 'Me'). James also
characterized this distinction as the 'self-as-knower' (the 'I') in
contrast to the 'self -as-knoia' (p. IIO1). In post-behaviourist
psychology, the self has once again become a focus of investigation.
In Lewis and Brooks-Gunn '5 (1979) theory, for example, the earliest,
most primitive aspect of the self concept is termed the
'existential' self, comprising Iaxwledge of 'I' as distinct from
'other'. A later aspect is the 'categorical' self, which includes
knowledge of the categories by which one is defined (eg: 'I am big',
'I am female' etc).
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In this thesis, perceptual knowledge of the physical separateness of
the self will be termed the 'self-as-object', whilst the term
'self-as-subject' will be confined to refer to the child's knowledge
of the separateness of his/her oi mind as distinct from other
people's minds. A third distinction, the 'self-as-agent' Oizrter,
1983) will be used to refer to the infant's earliest knowledge which
is derived from the 2jenc between self-generated motor
bthaviour and outcome (eg: when one's eyelids close, the world
becomes dark; or eg: the "double-sensation" phenomenon which occurs
when touching one's o body, thus atiilating two skin-surfaces at
once). Such contingent feedback is both iimiediate and consistent. To
reiterate, the 3 different stages in the development of the self are
hypothesized (and termed) as follows:
1. The self-as-agent ( >8 months): comprises knowledge of
'My actions' eg: I can do x.
2. The self-as-object ( >15 months): comprises knowledge of
'My body' eg: I am y.
3. The self-as-subject ( > 30 months): comprises knowledge of
'My mind' eg: I think z.
The 'self-as-agent' will not be studied at all in this thesis, in
that we assume there is no debate over whether autistic children can
conceive of themeelves as agents. This assumption is made on the
basis that autistic children have frequently been observed to be
able to act on the environment in order to change it. The
'self-as-subject' (as defined above) will be explored in Chapter 3.
In this chapter (2.1-2. 1*) the focus is only on the 'self-as-object'
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(as defined above).
Which technique would be useful to test the hypothesis that the
autistic child's concept of 'self-as-object' is impaired? In the
experimental literature, one widely used technique for determining
if an infant has a concept of self even at the most primitive level
is through mirrcr self-recognition'. This ability was noted long
ago in a biography by Darwin (1877) of his baby son:
"When four and a half months old, he repeatedly smiled at
my image and his om in a mirror, and no doubt mistook
them for real objects...like all infants, he ch enjoyed
thus looking at himeelf, and in less than 2 months
perfectly understood it was an image; for if I made quite
silently any odd grimace, he would suddenly turn around to
look at me...Whei a few days under 9 months old, he
associated his obm name with his image in the looking
glass, and when called by rmme would turn toward the glass
even when at a distance from it." (pp.289-90).
This early study records the young infant's understanding of the
reflective property of mirrors, but the presence of self-recognition
ability is ambiguous. However, mirror self-recognition ability was
also assessed in far more detail as part of early infant
intelligence tests such as Cattell's (19 1 0) and Gessell's (1928,
quoted by Harter, 1983). The idea to use mirrors to test this
ability may seem somewhat contrived; however, mirrors are not modern
artefacts, but date back at least 3000 years to the Bronze Age. This
fact has been used to argue that mirror representation is therefore
ecologically valid. (Its validity is also based in its relation to
more 'natural' reflective surfaces, such as water - oehler (1925,
p.318) describes chimpanzees' interest in their oia reflections in
water, for example).
Mirror self-recognition seemed to offer the possibility of a
relatively simple way to establish whether autistic children do in
tact have an impaired concept of self, at least at the level of
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visual self-recognition (Ic: at the level of the 'existential' self,
or self-ae-object', as defined above). The literature surrounding
this experimental paradigm is reviewed in the next section (2.2.).
This emphasis on the visual modality is because normel infants'
auditory and tactile self-recognition have not been studied
empirically.
One terminological point needs to be clarified: Lewis and
Brooks-Gunn (1979), as mentioned above, argue that mirror
self-recognition tasks test whether the infant knows that self (as a
physical entity) exists separately from other - they call this the
"existential self". Equating this with William James' (1890)
distinction of 'self-as-subject' versus 'self-as-object', Lewis and
Brooks-Gunn write that the existential self is the self-as-subject.
However, the subjective aspects of self are not tapped in mirror
self-recognition experiments. (By subjective, we mean inner,
non-observable mental states). Rather, knowledge of the identity of
the self as an object of the infant's perception is being tested in
the mirror tasks. Therefore, a more appropriate formulation might be
that the existential self is the self-as-object.
2.2: The development of visual self-recognition In normal children:
literature review.
As has been tioned, the assumption has been that at birth infants
do not conceptualize a self-other distinction (Piaget, 1926; Mahler,
Bergman and Pine, 1975). Building on this assumption, Lewis and
Brooks (1975) have argued that it is kinesthetic and sensory
feedback (in the form of contingency information) which provides the
basis for the development of a self-concept. A number of studies
have doetmented the changes from birth to 211 months in the infant's
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reactions to its oiri mirror image and to that of others.
Boulanger-Balleyguier (196 1;) has noted that, as early as one month
old, the infant already shows interest in a mirrw, looks longer at/
prefers its ow image to that of a female stranger's image, but
prefers its mother's image more than its oi image. By 6 weeks of
age, the mirror elicits a smiling response in the infant
(Boulanger-Ballayguier, 1961;). Lewis and Brooks (1975) also review
evidence that the 16 week old infant can discriminate between mother
and strange female's mirror images. These visual preference studies
cannot however be taken as evidence that the infant has a
self-concept, but only demonstrate the infant's capacity to
discriminate between people's mirror images, and the degree of
interest engendered by different people.
Dixon (1957) observed 1; stages in infants' mirror reactions. Stage
1: the 'Mother' stage: the infant first 'enjoys' watching the
mother's reflected movements. In stage 2 (5-6 months - the
'Playmate' stage) the infant responds to its om image as if it were
a playmate. Then between 6-12 months, the infant shows an interest
in the image of its oi actions (- this third stage is emuslngly
termed the 'Who Do Dat When I Do Dat?' stage). Finally, stage 1; is
characterized by coy, shy or fearful behaviour lnfront of the mirror
(the 'Coy' stage). Again however, this study does not urmmbiguously
demonstrate the presence of a self concept.
A technique which does provide evidence of an organism's concept of
self is the red-dot method, first used by Gallup (1970) with
non-human primates. He found that if a red odourless non-irritating
dye was placed on an aiesthetized chimpanzee 'a eye-brow, when
subsequently viewing a mirror it first treated the image as if it
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represented another chimpanzee, but with mirror experience, began to
explore the red-marked part of its face. Using this technique, no
monkeys lower than the great apes have demonstrated racial
self-recognition, despite adequate rd.rrcr-experience (Gallup, 1977;
1979; Lethmate and Ducker, 1973; Maclean, 196 2$). Animals such as
fish and birds display aggression a' sexual arousal towerds their
mirror image instead (Thompson, 1963; 196 1 ), which is a socially
appropriate conspecif'ic behaviour, and therefore not evidence of
self-recognition. (In passing, one prediction from this work is that
those (rare) human cultures in which there are no reflective
surfaces, such as the Tasathy jungle people (Lewis aid Brooks-Gunn,
1979), would nevertheless demonstrate the capacity for mirror
self-recognition after some preliminary mirror-experience).
It is interesting to note that lower monkeys can use mirrors to look
at objects indirectly:
"If a human being thus viewed (in the mirror) makes a
threatening movement, she (a Macacus monkey) will turn
directly from the mirror to the person, as though
verifying her indirect picture of the situation."
(Tinklepaugh, 1928, p.218)
Nevertheless, lower monkeys still do not seem to understand the
nature of a reflective surface as it pertains to themselves (Gallup,
1970). Mirror self-recognition is therefore more than merely
understanding how mirrors work. It is now widely accepted that
mirror self-recognition illustrates a striking discontinuity between
great apes and lower primate species.
Amsterdam (1972) was the first to use Gallups red-dot technique
with human infants (although she devised her technique
independently). In her study an infant or toddler has its nose
marked with a small amount of rouge (under the pretext of needing
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its rose wiped) arid is then faced towards a mirror. If the child
reaches toward his or her nose rather than the mirror, the child is
said to have demonstrated self-recognition. Thus, mirror
self-recognition (self-directed behaviour) is operatiorl1y
distinguished from ithat Gallup (1968) called mere 'mirror-image
stiiiulation' (mirror-directed behaviour). Mirror-directed behaviour
has been characterized as a sociable or an other-directed response
that drops out as self-recognition emerges (Amsterdam and Greenberg,
1977; Gallup, 1977). It is seen as sociable in that human infants at
First win search behind the mirror, presumably for the 'other
person' (Amsterdam, 1972), as will lowar primates (Gallup, 1979).
The results of Amsterdam's study, and other similar ones with
infants, can be sumaarized as follows:
Until about 10 months of age, normal infants are either indifferent
toward the mirror image, or else treat it much like a "playmate"
(Sctiu].man and Kaplowitz, 1977; Amsterdam, 1972). Betwaen 12-114
months, infants will turn towards other persons or objects that are
reflected in a mirror, thus demonstrating they are beginning to
acquire an understanding of the reflective nature of mirrors
(Berenthal and Fischer, 1978). Around 1 year of age, a variety of
new responses emerge, including curiosity, avoidant behaviour, and
withdrawal (Amsterdam, 1972; Ber'enthal and Fischer, 1978). By 114
months, some infants act "embarrassed", "coy", or "self-conscious"
(Amsterdam, 1972; Schulman arid Kaplowitz, 1977; Lewis and
Brooks-Gunn, 1979; Dixon, 1957). Nowaver, most strikingly, by 21-214
months, most children (>75%) show a definite recognition of their
reflection by touching their rouge-altered nose (Berenthal and
Fischer, 1978; Lewis arid Brooks-Gum, 1979; Amsterdam, 1972;
Sthu]man arid Kaplowitz, 1977). Lewis and Brooks-Gum (1979) report
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the earliest mark directed behaviour, manifested by 25% of 15 month
olds. By 2l months, more than 66% of toddlers also use persoil
pronouns to label their mirror-image (Lewis and Brooks, 1975;
Sduiman and Kaplowitz, 1977; Zazzo, 1982). The strong consistency
between results from different studies suggests a stage model of
visual self-recognition is appropriate.
Other techniques have also been employed to investigate
self-recognition: it has been found that infants do not show any
preference between normal and distorted mirror images of themselves
until 18-20 months of age (Modaressi and Kenny, 1975; Sthulman and
Kaplowitz, 1977). Lewis and Brooks-Gunn (1979) have tested
self-recognition in videotapes: babies were shom their obm tapes as
well as those of other infants, in which someone approached silently
from behind. Infants as young as 15-18 months were more likely to
turn around under conditions in which they were seeing another baby
on the screen. Infants also tended to imitate their on images twice
as much as a strange thud '5 image. Since the videos of self and
other baby were not 'live', these studies demonstrate that such
self-other discrimination is independent of contingency cues and is
entirely based on facial feature recognition. Results from other
video studies (Papousek and Papousek, 197Z; Amsterdam and Greenberg,
1977) are consistent with this. In a pictorial self-recognition
task, 9-12 month old infants smile ich more at their owi photograph
than at photos of their peers, while 15-18 month o].ds (for some
unexplained reason) do just the opposite (Lewis and Brooks-Gunn,
1979). Of course, these video and pictorial studies do not
demonstrate self-recognition ability as clearly as the red-dot
method.
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Lewis argues that since self is just a particular instance of object
(in all of these tasks), self-recognition should be present as early
as object permanence and 'person permanence'. This claim is
debatable: self-recognition ability requires knowledge rot only of
self-'permaneice', but also of self-'identity', and these 2 aspects
of knowledge are rot equivalent. Secondly, whether knowledge of
permanence in these three domains of knowledge (self, person, and
object) do all appear simultaneously is not only an empirical
question, but also depends on which theory of object permanence is
being used (Bower, 1975; Gratch, 1975). However, Bererithal and
Fischer (1978) have fbund strong correlation between stages in
mirror self-recognition and stages in object permanence as measured
by the Uzgiris-Hunt scales (r(l6)=0.8, p<0.001), although the
relationship was not such that one skill was clearly a necessary
precursor of the other.
The mirror and the video techniques are the best so far developed,
given the constraints of pie-verbal infants. These 'red-dot'
techniques are limited to use with infants with relatively developed
motor ability (eg: hand-eye coordination). At the cst, they can be
said to test facial self-recognition visually, and all these studies
acknowledge that this is only one aspect of the self-concept. It
should be noted that although 2$ month old infants do demonstrate
mirror self-recognition unambiguously, there are reports that some
a&.ilt schizophrenics have difficulty with mirror self-recognition
(Faure, 1956; Traub and Orbach, 196 1 ) and react to their mirror
image as if in the presence of another person. The same has been
found emong profoundly retarded children (Boulaoger-Balleyguier,
196 1 ; Harris, 1977; Pechacek, Bell, Cleland, Baum and Boyle, 1973;
Shaitoub, Soul.airac and Rustin, 195 1 ). In the schizophrenic case,
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there may be some break-doia of the ability as a result of the
disease, but the results from the retarded population suggest a
minimal level of cognitive development (MA)2yrs) may be necessary
for self-recognition ability (as tested with these paradi) to
emerge at all.
Mirror self-recognition in autism:
Self-recognition in autism has also recently been studied. Neuman
and Hill 'a (1978) experiment involved only 7 autistic children (all
male, CA range = 5:5-11:), and used a video technique rather than a
mirror. The child 's face was marked while blindfolded, supposedly
for a 'Pin the tail on the donkey' type game, thus ensuring the
child was not aware of the application of the red mark. 6 out of 7
of the autistic children showed a significant increase in
mark-directed responses during the first session, and 5 out of 6 of
these subjects deliberately rubbed and attempted to remove the merks
from their faces. Although this study did not indicate if they gave
any verbal responses indicating self-recognition, the autistic
children 'a non-verbal responses are clear indications of their
ability for self-recognition. A major criticism of this study
however Ia that it did not clarify the relationship between MA and
self-recognition ability in autism, since MA was not assessed.
Another of its problema was the very small sample size.
These problema were overcome in a study by Ferrari and I'tthews
(1983), who used 15 autistic children of varying mental ages. The CA
of their subjects ranged between 3:510: 13 years. Self-recognition
ability was assessed using a mirror, and some purple theatrical
rouge was smeared on the tip of the child's nose while the
experimenter pretended to wipe the child's nose. These authors found
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that 8 out of 15 of the autistic children (53.3%) showed clear
evidence of self-recognition by touching their rouge-altered noses
when in front of the mirror. Of the remaining 7 'non-recognizera', 3
touched the mirror, as if the rouge were on the surface of the
mirror. The autistic children who showed self-recognition ability
differed from those who did not In terms of their MA (recognizers'
mean MA 38.13 nths, SD e 17.1;; non-recognizers' mean MA : 22.1k
months, SD 8.7), but rot in terms of their CA.
Spiker and Ricks (198 11) obtained a similar result: 36 out of 52
autistic subjects (69%) showed mirror self-recognition and, as in
the previous study, these subjects were only distinguished by MA
(using Goldfarb's (1961] scale of overall functioning levels in
psychotic children). Dawson arid McKiasick (1981;) also found that 13
out of 15 autistic children (CA range 11:1-6:8 yrs) showed mirror
self-recognition, arid the 2 who did rot were the only children
scoring below stage V or VI on the Object Permanence Scale.
These 1; studies present a consistent picture, Ic: that mirror
self-recognition in autism is dependent on a minimum level of MA.
Hence, any apparent delay In this ability is not an autism-specific
deficit. An explartion fbr the social impairment in non-retarded
autistic children In terms of an impaired concept of self-as-object
is thus ruled out by these studies. It was nevertheless decided to
attempt to replicate these findings with the particular sample of
non-retarded autistic children that are to take part in the later
experiments, employing a simplified version of the technique,
described below. This is felt necessary in order to establish that
the autistic subjects In our sample, whatever else their problems
with 'self' might be, at least could be showt to have this minimum
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level self-concept. This iøuld later enable an impairment in concept
or self-as-object to be ruled out with confidence as an explartion
of their social impairment.
2.3: Eperiment 1: Visual Self-Recognition in Autism.
Procedure:
Each subject was seen individually, in a smell room that contained
only a table arid chairs, in the child's school. Thus, there were as
few distracting objects as possible. The experimenter sat next to
the subject and first allowed the child to get used to the room and
explained that they were going to play a game. This initial period
was found necessary in crder to relax the subject arid procure his or
her attention. (This 'relaxation arid familiarization' period was
used at the start of all the other experiments reported in this
thesis, and usually lasted no more than 3-5 minutes). The
experimenter then merely asked the child 'Who is that?', while
holding up a round mirror (10 Inches in diameter) in front of the
child's face. The experimenter then noted dobit the verbal response
by the child. The red-dot technique was not thought necessary in the
testing of these children since they all had the minimel level of
speech necessary (in contrast to normel pre-verbal infants, for whom
the red-dot technique is necessary). Thus, if the child said his or
her rme, or responded with a first-person pronoun (eg lie'), this
was assumed to be an adequate indication of the ability to recognize
self in the mirror.
Subjects:
There were 3 groups of subjects, 27 normal children, 114 Doi's
Syndrome children, and 20 autistic children. The 2 clinical groups
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both had a mean non-verbal MA > 5 yrs, using the Leiter
Int.ernatiorml Performence Scale. The autistic group's mean verbal
MA, using the British Picture Vocabulary Test, wes 5.5 yrs, ad = 1.6
yrs, and the Dort's Syndrome children's mean verbal MA was lower (x
: 2:11 yrs, ad = 0:7 yrs). These subject cta were showi earlier
(see Table 1.1, p.18).
Results and Discussion:
This experiment resulted in all subjects performing at ceiling.
There were no differences between groups, so no further arlysis wes
necessary. Thus, the hypothesis that autistic children are impaired
in their ability to recognize self-as-object is refuted by previous
studies, and this refutation is confirmed for the present sample of
high-functioning autistic children (mean MA = 9.3 yrs, ad = 2.2) in
Experiment 1 • This demonstrates very clearly that the widely held
notion that autistic children carnot differentiate self from other
is incorrect, at least at this level of visual self-recognition, ie:
at the level of 'self-as-object'.
One doubt concerning the result fran Experiment 1 mey be over
whether the test was adequate: Gallup (1979) argues that ^flin
of the mirror reflection need not imply self-recognition. This
criticism is valid, and is an instance of the general problem of
whether 'performance' always reflects 'competence'. However, this
criticism is answered by the studies (discussed earlier, p.61-62),
which did use the red-dot technique, and which also demonstrate that
autistic children are not impaired In visual self-recognition
(Daweon and Mokissick, i98 1 ; Ferrari and t'tthews, 1983; Spiker and
Ricks, 198i; Neuman and Hill, 1978; Flanoery, 1976). Unlike the
experiment reported here, these studies did not find ceiling
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perforeences for all their autistic subjects, but found that those
who did not demonstrate mirror self-recognition tended to be of much
lower developmental level, both in terme of language and general
cognitive development.
We can assume that cur sample of autistic and Dow 's children did so
well on this task because of their relatively high MA. This
explanation is supported by Mans, Cicctti and Sroufe (1978) who
found that MA is a good predictor for Doai 's Syndrome children 'a
ability to demonstrate self-recognition in mirrors. They conclude
that mental retardation may cause a developmental (Ic:
chronological) delay in visual self-recognition ability, but Doa's
syndrome subjects with MA ) 3 years old do show this ability.
These results from autistic subjects may have Implications for one
particular psychoanalytic theory: Lacan (19 1 9/77) proposed a model
of child development in which it appears that mirror
self-recognition causes the onset of social awereness. The words "it
appears that" in the last sentence need qualifying: It is very
difficult to specify exactly what L.aoan's theory predicts, since the
philosophical framework within which he writes is not directly
translatable into the experimental psychological one. For example,
he writes that "This moment in which the mirror-stage comes to an
end inaugurates.., the dialectic that will henceforth link the 'I'
to socially elaborated situations." (p.5). It may be that Lacan did
not intend a literal interpretation of his use of the term 'mirror'
(Muller and Richardson, 1982, p.30), but if Lacan is proposing that
mirror self-recognition ability Is a necessary and sufficient
condition for social relations to develop, the thta from autism
disconfirm this: in autism, mirror self-recognition ability is
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intact, but social relations	 nevertheless chronically impaired.
In stary, the result of Experiment 1 did rot reveal any
autism-specific deficit, and this allows us to conclude at this
stage that, at a perceptual level (Ic: recognition of the physical
attributes of the stimulus), the concept of self is not impaired in
this sample of autistic children, and others of similar MA. Since
this experimental result is in line with the other studies on this
question, cited above, this is therefore row a strong result. In the
terms used and defined earlier, autistic children can be said to
have a concept of 'self-as-object' of their o perception.
However, the fact that this aspect of their self-concept is Intact
does not imply that other aspects of it are rot impaired. In fact,
t of the studies on mirror self-recognition In autism report a
striking lack of shyness, embarrassment, or coyness in front of the
mirror (Neuman and Hill, 1978, p.576; Spiker arid Ricks, p.221),
reactions which are usually found in young normal children (Dixon,
1957; Amsterdam and Greenberg, 1977) and are present in Dow's
syndrome children 'a reactions in front of the mirror (Mans,
Clochetti and Sroufe, 1978). There was also a conspicuous lack of
auch 'self-conscious' behaviour in this autistic sample In
Experiment 1. Thus, there are certainly grounds for continuing to
check other aspects of autistic children 's concept of self, for any
evidence of Impairment. The next section considers another
perceptual aspect of self-other differentiation, that of
visuospatial perspective taking.
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2.: Visuo-spatial role-taking and autism.
An arguably more complex aspect of self-other differentiation is the
development of knowledge about one's ObI visual perspectives in
contrast to those of others. Piaget reported that this understanding
does not develop until as late as 8 years of age (Piaget and
Irthelder, 1956) in that, when younger children (aged 14-7 yrs) were
presented with a model of 3 mountains and asked to select or
construct a picture to correspond with the viewpoint of a doll that
"observed" the scene from different positions, they tended to depict
their oa view of the landscape. The Piagetian argtrent is that such
"egocentrism" (whether it is menifested in the visuospatial
role-taking domein, or in some other, such as language) is pririly
a result of undeveloped cognitive structures (such as knowledge of
'reversibility'); and that such egocentrism prevents social
competence (Piaget, 1926).
A reasorble hypothesis therefore is the notion that the autistic
child 'a social impairment is due to an inability to appreciate the
"perceptual viewpoints" of others. This idea was originally proposed
by Anthony (1958), and has been tested by Hobson (19814). Experiment
2 (p.75) will test this hypothesis using a different experimental
technique to Hobson's, for reasons to be explained below. In this
hypothesis, it is the perceptual aspect of role-taking that is
considered, in contrast to the conceptual aspect. Perceptual
role-taking can be called the thild 's "theory of sight" in so far as
it is concerned with the thud 's knowledge about what other people
can see, given their spatio-temperal relations to objects in the
environment. It is important to emphasize that such perceptual
role-taking is only one of meny kinds of role-taking. In Chapter 3,
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for example, we will examine conceptual role-taking, or that has
been termed the child's "theory of mind" (Premack and Woodruff,
1978). This refers to the child's kncwledge of the mental states
(beliefs, desires, etc.,) of ancther person. Yet a third aspect of
role-taking might be characterized as emotiormi role-taking, or what
is sometimes called "empathy" - Ic: the identification of the
emotions of arEther person. Kurdek and Rodgon (1975) mede a similar
distinction, using the terms 'perceptual, cognitive, and affective
perspective-taking s , respectively.
M'iilst it is probably the case that most 'real' social situations
are of a complexity that requires participants to make judgements
about the perspectives of others on (at least) all three levels
(perceptual, conceptual, and emotlorEl) together, it is possible
under experimental laboratory conditions to present simplified
social situations in which the different types of role-taking can be
disentangled and tested separately. Thus, Hobson's (1985) experiment
(see p.3O-) could be said to have Identified deficits in affective
perspective taking in autism. Experiment 2 (p.75) tests the
specifically perceptual aspects of role-taking (or the child's
'theory of sight') in autism. The justification for this Experiment
requires a disctsion of the literature surrounding it.
2.5: Perceptual role-taking: a literature review.
The most famous task that Piaget and Inhelder (1956) used in their
study of visual perspective-taking has already been mentioned: the
'3 mountains' task. Piaget and Inhelder elicited 3 different modes
of response: first, the child wes asked to reproduce the doll's view
by arranging 3 pieces of cardboard shaped like the mountains.
Second, the child s asked to select the doll's view from a set of
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10 pictures. Finally, the child was asked to ch000se one picture and
thea decide which position the doll must oceçy to have that
particular view of the mountains.
Piaget and Inhelder interpreted their data from 100 children (aged
1$...12 years) as falling into a series of stages of perspective-taking
ability:
Stage 1 (<14 yrs): The child does not compreh€nd the task.
Stage 2a (Ii-5:6 yrs): The child does not distinguish between his/her
ow and the doll 'a view of the objects.
Stage 2b (5:6-7 yrs): The child becomes aware of the possibility of
imegining other viewpoints, but carmot identity them successfully.
Stage 3a (7-9 yrs): The child understands some relationships between
viewpoints, but rot all.
Stage 3b (>8:6 yrs): The child can igthe all relationships between
viewpoints.
The Stage 2 child "appears to be rooted to his ow viewpoint... so
that he carmot imegine any perspective but his mm" (Piaget and
Inhelder, 1956, p.2142). There is no suggestion, however, that the
children consciously realize that they are responding with their om
view. Nor is it suggested that the child does not know that
appearances change as the observer moves, since Piaget reperts the
stage 2 child is not "surprised to find that in moving from position
A to position C opposite, he has to make a new picture quite
different from the previous one" (p.217). 3-5 year old children's
knowledge of this is confirmed by Shantz and Watson (1970) who found
evidence of "expectancy violation" in a trick condition In which the
array did not appear as different when viewed from the opposite
side. Piaget's emphasis is on the child's inability to 	 or
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anticipate the change.
Results from more recent experiments which use a different approach
to the study of perceptual role-taking have throimi doubt on Piaget's
interpretation of the young child's failure on the 3 mountains task.
Masangkay et al (197's) presented 30-36 month old toddlers with a
picture task and an eye-position task: in the picture task a piece
of card with a different picture on esch side was positioned
vertically between the child and the experimenter so that eh saw a
different picture. Each child was asked what they could see and what
the experimenter could see. In the eye-position task the child was
asked to specify which of 1$ toys the experimenter was looking at.
Most children in this age-group were able to do both tasks
correctly.
Lempers, Flavell and Flavell (1977) tested 12-36 month olds with 10
so-called 'percept production' tasks (eg: a photograph of a familiar
object was glued to the inside bottom surface of a hollow cube and
the child was asked to show the picture to the observer, thus
demonstrating acwledge of how the environment-observer relationship
must be arranged in order to 'produce a percept' in the other
person). 11 'percept deprivation' tasks were also acninistered (eg:
the child had to hide a toy car tram the observer by moving it
behind a screen). Finally, in 2 'percept diagrDsis' tasks, the child
was asked to state which object the experimenter was looking at.
Astonishingly, 2-3 year olds were successful at this whole range of
tasks.
Preschool children 's success at percept production tasks has also
been demonstrated by Fishbein et al (1972), Bcrke (1975) and Flavell
et ci (1968). Levine (1983) found that 2 year old boys' success at
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percept production tasks was not correlated with mirror
self-recognition, but was related to pronoun comprehension and
production. Flavell, Shipstead and Croft (1978) also found that
30-42 month o]ds could hide an object by placing it on the opposite
side of a screen from another person even though it was visible to
themae]ves. Similarly, Hughes and Dorldson (1979) found that 90% of
three and a half year olds could hide a boy doll from 2 toy
policemen positioned at separate points of 2 intersecting walls.
Hobson (1980) obtained a similar result. Using 2 policemen (so there
was only one possible hiding place) Hughes and Dozldson found the
success rate remained high (79% ccrrect on all 4 trials). With 3
policemen and a wall arrangement with 6 sections, 60% of 3 year olds
and 90% of 4 year olds re still correct. Experimental results such
as these have led some authors to challenge the very notion that
young normal children are 'egocentric' at all (Dormldson, 1978).
How can the Piagetian finding of 8 year olds' inability to identify
other perspectives on the 3 mountains task be reconciled with these
more recent findings of children as young as 2 years old making
correct inferences on the basis of someone else 'a perceptual
viewpoint? One way is to argue that the recent studies have
simplified the task demands sufficiently for younger subjects to
attend to the relevant cues. Indeed, a number of studies have
demonstrated that 2 important variables affecting role-taking
ability in young children are salience of cues, and type of response
requirements (Borke, 1975; Flavell et al, 1968; Huttenlocher and
Presson, 1973; Fishbein et al, 1972; Roy, 1974). Hughes and
Doildson (1979) explain their particular result in terme of the
task demands testing the child 'a knowledge of intentions (to hide
and to seek), which they claim even 3 year o]ds find very easy.
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There is a third explartion, which is in terma of the cognitive
processes used: this latter explartion of the conflicting results
makes use of a distinction that is made in the literature (Cox,
1980) between 2 types of observer-object relations:
(1) In one, called perspectives probleis, the subject is asked to
predict what a statiorary array imuld look like train a different
position. The subject has to mentally rotate him/herself into
another person's position and then use the 'facts of vision' to
infer what would be visible to self in the new position. The 'facts
of vision' are discussed by Lempers, Flavell and Flavell (1977) and
include krowing that normally at least one open, unobstructed eye is
necessary for vision, that eye-orientation indicates which objects
are being viewed, that objects which are not occluded by any other
and which stand along any imaginary straight line from a person's
open eye(s) will be visible, and that what one person sees or does
not see has absolutely no effect on what another person sees, etc.
Such knowledge can be said to comprise one's "theory of sight".
(2) In the other, called rotation problei, the subject is asked to
predict the view of an object if it were rotated while a/he remains
statiomry. This second type of problem involves the subject
rotating the array only, and does rot involve knowledge of the
'facts of vision', since the 'mental rotation' can be done without
having to imagine either oneself or another person at all. These 2
problema are also called "viewer-rotation" and "array-rotation"
probleme respectively. Huttenlocher and Presson (1979) found that
viewer-rotation problei were easier than array-rotation problei
when diildren were asked questions about where specific itema in the
array uld be train another perspective. Why one type of rotation
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should be easier than another is not iemediately evident. However,
since a viewer-rotation problem usually involves imagining either
another person or oneself in the future, this kind of activity may
be more fami liar than a rather laboratory-contrived mental-rotation
type task.
This distinction between the 2 types of rotation strategies can be
applied to explain the conflicting results concerning age at which
perceptual role-taking is possible in the different tasks described
earlier. It may well be that subjects treated the 3 mountains task
as an array-rotation problem, and thus found it difficult; whilst
the tasks used in the more recent experiments quoted above were
treated as viewer-rotation problems, and were thus easier. This
interpretation seems plausible, given that in the latter set of
studies the experimenter explicitly emphasized that the thud was to
view the array from the position of the experimenter, Ic: to rotate
self into another person's position, whereas the 3 mountains task
asked about the appearance of another side of the mountain (easily
construed as an object-rotation problem). Certainly, the Hughes and
Dormldson experiment was deliberately designed as a hide and seek
game so as to emphasize that the dolls were 'perceivers' into whose
position one could rotate oneself.
This brief review is sufficient to demonstrate that a wide variety
of tasks and paradigms have been used to investigate thildren 's
visual/perceptual role-taking ability, but that many of them may
have required a different ability altogether (eg: mental rotation of
arrays) to solve them.
The one experiment that has investigated perceptual role-taking in
autism is by Hobson (198k). In one of his tasks, 12 autistic
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children (mean CA:13.8 yrs, performance 10 range 62_loll) had to
position a doll so that it could either see the experimenter or the
child, who were seated on opposite sides of a table. All 12 autistic
subjects were able to do this. In the secori of his tasks, Hobson
found that 11 out of 12 autistic children could hide model people so
that the experimenter was unable to see them. In the third task
which involved stating a doll 'a visual perspective of a cube, eech
face of which was a different colour, 8 out of 12 autistic children
performed without error • Errors were more frequent amo rig children of
lower mental ages. In other words, performance was found to be
influenced by	 level of cognitive development rather than by
autism specific factors.
Hobson's 3 tasks did not test autistic children's 'theory of sight'
directly, ie: their knowledge of the 'facts of vision'. Certainly,
his third task can clearly be performed as an 'array-rotation'
problem, and thus the autistic children 's success in this instance
may not have been due to perceptual role-taking ability. In his
other 2 tasks, it is likely that a 'viewer-rotation' strategy would
have been required, and these can therefore be taken as evidence
that perceptual role-taking ability is not impaired in higher MA
autistic children. In order to establish that in the present sample
of high functioning autistic children the social impairment was not
due to impaired perceptual role-taking ability (ie: an impaired
'theory of sight'), a simple task was used (Experi.ent 2) which is
designed to only test the subject's knowledge of the facts of
vision'. This experiment is described in the next section.
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2.6 ExperIment 2: Does the autistic child have a 'theory of sight'?
This experiment was based on a study by Lempers, Flavell, and
Flavell (1977), which investigated very young normal children 's
knowledge of visual perception in others. They found that the role
of another person's e yes in seeing was wall understood at least by
2'$-30 months of age. For example, a child or this age would take the
other person's hands away from their eyes before trying to show then
something, and could ivally tell where the other person was looking
from the person's eye-orientation alone. Scaife and Bruner (1975)
and Butterworth and Cochran (1979) found that 100% of 11-lU month
old infants showed this capacity for 'joint visual attention', too.
Lempers et al called these abilities 'percept diagnosis", since it
Involves the child Identifying the percept(s) of another person.
One of their tasks was given to the same autistic, Dom's Syndrome
and normal subjects as participated in Experiment 1 (see Table 1 .1,
p.U8). The prediction was that autistic children would not be
impaired in this ability, relative to their MA. The task assessed
the subject's ability to infer what the experimenter was attending
to by the orientation of his eyes alone. The procedure is described
below:
Procedure:
As in Experiment 1, subjects were tested individually, with only the
experimenter present. Four small toys were placed around the seated
subject: one above the child on a shelf approximately feet behind
him/her, near the ceiling level, one below (on the floor near the
child's feet), and one to either side (placed on tables
approximately 2 feet to either side). The child was first asked to
76
rme each toy, to check that these iteme were within their
vocabulary, which in all cases they were. The experimenter, facing
the subject, closed his eyes, ved them under closed lids to face
one of the toys, and only thai opened his eyes, continuing to face
straight ahead. The subject was thai asked: "Which toy am I looking
at?". Thus, only the experimenter's eye-orientation and not
head-orientation were available as useful cues. The child had to
name the correct object to 'pass' the test. The child's verbal 2nd
non-verbal responses to the test questions were noted doia. The
order In which the toys were looked at was random.
Results:
Table 2.1: Number of children producing correct response to eh
question In Experiment 2.
TRIALS
n a bed
AutIstic 20 19 19 20 19
Do's	 i	 13 13 13 12
Normal	 27 27 27 27 26
(a,b,c,d = refer to 1$ different toys)
Since there were no significant differences across questions within
the task, the frequencies were averaged:
77
Table 2.2: Average number of ohildren (and perce'tages of eaTh
group) producing correct response in Experiment 2.
n
Autistic 20	 19 (95%)
Doi's	 1l 12.8(99%)
Normal	 27 26.8(99%)
Subjects in all 3 groups performed at or virtually at ceiling, so no
further analysis wes performed on these results.
Discussion:
Experiment 2 tested autistic children's 'theory of sight', Ic: their
understanding of the role of another person's eyes in seeing. The
autistic children demonstrated they understood this as well as their
matched MA controls. Thus, this level of perceptual role-taking is
not impaired in these children. This result is In line with Hobson's
(198 ts) study.
Autistic children therefore clearly demonstrated that they
appreciate that other people (and eve models of other people) can
'see', that Is, that people have perceptions, and stand in a
particular relationship to a perceived eivironment. In short,
autistic children do appreciate that there exists a system of
coordinated viewpoints, and that what a person (ci' a doll) 'sees' is
determined by what is in front of its 'eyes'.
As Hobson points out, autistic children provide a 'natural' test and
disconfirmation of the Piagetian view that non-egoc,trIc
visuospatial role-taking Is sufficient for the development of social
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competence. (In fact, Piaget and Inhelder's (1956) argent was that
non-egocentric visuospatial role-taking skill is necessary for the
development of social competence, even though this might not be
sufficient. This view is not challenged by the autistic data). If
visuospatial role-taking ability and social competence (as discussed
in Chapter 1] really are independent, it may not be surprising that
autistic children whose (non-verbal) MA is in the region of 9 years
old are able to succeed at visuospatial role-taking tasks, since
this is in the repertoire of children with an MA of 2-3 years old
(Lempers et al, 1977).
Si.mnary of results from the 'Mirrcr' Experiment and the 'Vision'
Experiment:
The first tic Experiments demonstrate that the autistic subjects in
the present sample have a concept of self-as-object (Experiment 1)
and they have a "the'y of sight" (Experiment 2). These 2 perceptual
aspects of self-other differentiation are within their social
cognition, and cariot therefore be used as explartions of their
social impairment. These tic experimental results thus serve as
replication.! of other findings in autistic children 's intact social
cognition, and as a way of ruling out these 'lower level' aspects of
their social cognition as being unimpaired. They can be called
'lower level' to the extent that they are both present in the normal
30 month old infant, and that they do not require any attribution of
abstract, mn-observable mental states. Such 'higher level'
attribution is tested in the next chapter, which considers whether
the aspect of self-other differentiation in autism which is impaired
is conceptual role-taking, Ic: their 'thecry of mind'.
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Chapter 3: Conceptual aspects of social cognition.
3.1: The autistic thud's impairment in conceptual role-taking
ability.
There is a curious history to the notion that conceptual role-taking
ability in autism is impaired. It is curious in that this ability
has frequently been assumed to be impaired in autism (Kanoer, 191i3;
Wing and Gould, 1979; Newson, 1977; Rutter, 1983), but nevertheless
the empirical truth or falsehood of this assumption has never been
formelly investigated, or even clearly articulated.
The notion has st frequently been couched in terme of a lack of
"empathy", which includes conceptual role-taking, but which is
certainly not synonymous with it. Thus, for example, Kaver (1913)
observed that
"the existence of feelings or wishes in other people that
might not be in accord with the patient's o autistic
thoughts and desires seemed beyond recognition." (p.95).
Similar statements have been made by other authors (Wing and Gould,
1979; Rutter, 1983). Newson (1977) eve included "a failure in
social empathy" as one of the diagnostic criteria for autism. She
defines social empathy as "the ability to put oneself in another's
shoes, and to know what a situation is like from another's point of
view" (Newson, 1979, p.8). We have already seen that the autistic
child 'a social impairment has to do with a lack of
appreciation of another person's "point of view" in the literal,
perceptual sense (Experiment 2, this thesis; Hobson, 19811). As such,
Newson's definition above does not help clarify the nature of the
impairment. However, she also defines social empathy as that "which
gives the normal child such easy access to other people's needs and
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wishes" (Newson, 1979, p.8, my emphasis). This takes us a small step
further: it implies that autistic thildren's difficulty is in
getting access not to what other people perceive but to what other
people believe they need, and what they desire. Expressed more
simply, autistic children are postulated to be impaired in their
appreciation of other people's mental (but not perceptual) states.
The example Newson gives to illustrate this is worth quoting:
"A parent...called out one afternoon to her adolescent
son, 'While you're out, buy me some cloves, I haven't got
any. Take the money from my drawer'. When he had not
returned after 3 hours, she looked in the drawer, to find
he had taken $50. He finally returned well pleased with
himaelf, laden dot with smart boutique carrier bags, from
which he produced the 'clothes' that he thought his mother
had asked tbr, in teenage styles quite unlike those she
normally wore, and including bra and pants" (Newson, 1979,
p.9).
The autistic person in this account has clearly failed to ask
himeelf the questions:
(1) Does my mother really intend me to buy her some clothes?
(2) Does my mother mistakenly believe she does not have any clothes?
(3) Which type of clothes would my mother desire for herself?
() Does the salesgirl in the boutique think it is a little strange
that I am buying undervear fbr a female, even though I am male?
All of these 1 questions involve thinking about the mental states of
another person. While Newson does not specifically identify the
deficit in autism as in conceptual role-taking ability, this is
clearly what she intends.
There are various argLm,ents to establish that this ability is
directly necessary for social skills, and these are outlined in
section 3.2. below. Given these, it is perhaps surprising that this
ability has never been experimentally investigated as a potential
explartion for the social impairment in autism. Therefore, the
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hypothesis which will be tested (in Chapter is) is that autistic
children are specifically impaired in their 'thecry of mind'. The
term 'thecry of mind • was originally coined by Premack and Woodruff
(1978) to refer to conceptual role-taking ability. They defined it
as the ability to
"impute mental states to himeelf and others. A system of
inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a thecrl
because such states are nct directly observable, and the
system can be used to make predictions about the bthaviour
of others." (p.515)
In Chapter is, t experiments which test conceptual role-taking
ability in autism are reported, using different paradigms
(Experiments 3 and is). Before describing these, Chapter 3 will
review the philosophical and psychological literature surrounding
the development of this skill in ncrnml children.
3.2: 'Theory of mind': literature review.
3.2.(i): Philosophical background:
The relationship between a person's kncwledge of mental states
(their 'theory of mind') and their social competence has perhaps
been most closely studied within the realm of comaunication. In
particular, this relationship has been powerfully analysed by the
philosophical school of Speech Act Theory (Grice, 1957; Searle,
1965; Strawson, 1979). This theory of comaunication centres on the
fundamental questions of what the of an utterance is, and
what is involved in understanding an utterance. A sketch of this
theory is outlined below:
An act of coumunication is assumed to minimally consist of "an
utterer's meaning something by an audience-directed utterance on a
particular occasion" (Strawson, 1979, p.521). He continues:
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"An utterance is something produced or executed by an
utterer; it need not be vocal; it could be a gesture or a
drawing a' the ving a' disposing of objects in a certain
way. What an utterer means by his utterance is...
specified in specifying the complex intention with which
he produces the utterance." (p.521).
According to the theory, then, it is impossible to give an adequate
account of the concept of meaning arid conunieation without
reference to the possession by speakers of audience-directed
"complex intentions" (Strawson, 1979, p.520). A 'complex intention'
is an intention which involves other intentions within its scope.
Thus, in the case of an assertion, John intends his audience to
think he has a certain belief, arid he intends that this intention of
his should be recognized by the audience as the intention behind his
utterance. Similarly, in the case of coimnarida, requests, and the
like, he intends his audience to think he desires them to perform
some particular action, arid he intends that this intention should be
recognized by the audience as the intention behind his utterance.
Expressed in a re formalized way, Speech Act Theory proposes that
every act of conunication involves the embedding of at least t
intentions:
1: I intend you to think I have belief (b) or desire (d); arid
2: I intend that you recognize this intention (1) is the intention
behind my utterance.
This embedding of intentions has certain cognitive implications,
which will be discussed later (Section $.I1., p.111-6).
One of the earliest proponents of this sort of ar1ysis is Once
(1957). Let us consider one of his examples:
"I have a very avaricious man in my room, arid I want him
to go; so I throw a pound note out of the window. Is there
here any utterance with a meaning? No, because in behaving
as I did, I did not intend his recognition of my purpose
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to be in any y effective in getting him to go...It on
the other hand I had pointed to the door... then my
behaviour might well be held to constitute a meaningful
utterance, just because the recognition of my intention
would be intended by me to be effective in speeding his
departure." (p.57).
Austin (1962), Strawson (196'l) and Searle (1965) similarly proposed
that meaningful coinunication always contains such embedded 'complex
intentions'. Utterances or gestures that meet this definition of
being comunicative are kno as "illocutiorøry acts", or "speech
acts". Throwing the pound note out of the window would thus not be
en illocutiorary act, but a "perlocutiorary" one, Ic: one that
causally affected someone else's behaviour without the participants
having any necessary awareness of the other's mental states.
In 1967, Grice extended Speech Act rhecx'y to the armlysis of some
specific 'complex intentions' which speakers hold implicitly as
'rules' which goveri discourse. These rules are all part of what he
called the "Cooperative Principle" (p.45) governing counIcation.
He proposed 4 in categories of this principle:
1. Quantity (eg: be as Inforiitive as is required fbr the current
purposes of the exchange);
2. Quality (eg: do not say what you believe to be false);
3. Relation (eg: be relevant); and
4. Marner (eg: be perspicuous, unambigous, orderly, polite, etc.,).
These he also called "maxime" (p.47). These ensure that discourse is
an effective exchange of Information which influences other people.
Thus, Grice argues that in comunicative discourse both participants
hold the implicit belief that the other speaker intends to be
cooperative in all of these 4 iys. (of course, Grice mentions other
'iiaxIma' which could be specified: eg: do not just walk off in the
middle of a conversation unless there 15 a shared understanding that
$the conversation should terminate. However, these 1i categcries cover
the most important implicit beliefs governing discourse). Such an
implicit belief is knowi as a "conversatioral implicature" (p.7).
Comeunication is thus characterized as having a "quasi-contractual
basis" which allows the contributions of the participants to be
"dovetailed" (p.148).
Of course, another important 'conversatioral implicature' is that if
any of these ivmxime are violated, this may courunicate a speaker's
non-cooperative intentions. (eg: If a speaker violates the maxim 'Be
Relevant', this may indicate/be interpreted as meaning the speaker
intends to mislead his or her audience). One of Grice's examples is
worth quoting:
"A is standing by an obviously imeobilized car and is
approached by B; the following exchange takes place:
A: I am out of petrol.
B: There is a garage round the corner." (p.51).
If A assumes that B intends to respect the maxim of relation ('Be
Relevant'), then the implied meaning of B's utterance is that B
thinks the garage is open and has petrol to sell; if A assumes B
intends to violate this maxim, the implied meaning changes to one of
deception.
Speech Act Theory thus asserts that in every oomiun1cative
interaction both participants have beliefs about the other's
intentions, and the meaning of the exchange is indiasociable from
these 'complex intentions'. Strawson's paper compares Speech Act
Theory to an alternative theory of meaning, that proposed by Formal
Semantic Theorists. This latter theory attempts to account for
meaning only by reference to the truth conditions of semantic and
syntactic rules, without any necessary reference to 'complex
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intentions' of the speaker. Strawson demonstrates how such a thecry
is inadequate, since the nction of 'truth-coyxitions' IS
inappropriate for many types of utterances (eg: imperatives,
interrogatives, etc.,). Strawson concludes that while much of
meaning obviously relies on arxl resides in the syntactic arxl
semantic rules of a language, the meaning of speech carot be
separated from the speaker's "comaunIcative-intentions" (p.539)
within the particular coe,nunicative context.
The argimient, then, is that both verbal aril 'non-verbal
comeunication is impossible without mutual awareness of mental
states, ie: without a 'thecry of mind'. Logically, the question
begged Is 'What is a mental state?'. Here again, there is a
philosophical literature which provides an analysis: Brentarc (18711)
is credited as being the first of the modem philosophers to
identify the specific characteristics of mental states. 'Brentano's
Thesis', as it is called, maintained that all phenomena are either
physical or mental, arx1 that mental phenomena have certain unique
qualities. These qualities ar their uses are suninarized in the
following 7 points:
1. Mental states are what are referred to by such natural language
ternm as believe, desire, expect, hope, want, remember, Iaxw, think,
promise, assume, intend, pretend, imagine, etc.,. The first
characteristic of such terma is that they are all directed to
(eg: one hopes for something, believes that something,
intends to do something, etc.,). This quality of 'direotedness"
philosophers have called "Intentionality" (Searle, 1979; Dennett,
1978a, 1979a, 1979b). The latin root for this term (inte!idere: to
point towards something) clarifies the use of this term. Thus, there
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are always ti parts to mental states: the 'attitude' (eg: I believe
that) and the 'proposition' (eg: it is raining). Knowing someone
else's mental state thus involves knowing both of these t aspects
siimiltaneously. We will return to the cognitive implications of this
later (Section li•ii).
2. Propositions predicated by mental state terme do not have the
same logical properties as any other type of propositions. Their
unusual logical properties are:
(a) Non-entailment of existence or non-existence:
eg "John believes in ghosts" can be true without entailing that
ghosts actually exist or do not exist.
(b) Non-entailment of truth or falsehood:
eg: "John believes that I am rich" can be true even if I am in fact
poor. (nb: Compare the logical implications of a proposition not
predicated by a mental state: "I am rich" is true only if I am in
fact rich, and is false if I am in fact poor).
(c) Referential opacity:
eg: "I believe my next door neighbour uld make someone a good
husband" does not imply that "I believe the Mad Strangler iuld make
someone a a good husband" even if my neighbour is the Mad Strangler.
(For instance, I might not know that my neighbour is the same person
as the Mad Strangler). The previous example comes from Dennett
(1983). An example from Johnson-Laird (1983) is equally irrestible:
" 'Mrs Thatcher thinks that the man who leaked Cabinet
secrets is a traitor • may be true, but 'Mrs Thatcher
thinks her husband is a traitor' may be false, even if the
2 noun phrases are co-referential" (p.3O).
Thus, in these 3 logical properties (a,b and c above), there is a
suspension of 'normal' reference, truth, and existence relations of
propositions predicated by mental state terme. These logical
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properties are a unique feature of mental states.
3. Attributing mental states to other people allows one to explain
and predict their actions (Dennett, 1971, 1978a). Consider
Dennnett's (1978a) example: Why did the man stand under the tree?
Because he thought it was reining and he wanted to stay dry, and he
believ the tree would shelter him. Thus, only reference to the
man's beliefs explain his actions, not the fact of whether it was
raining a' not, or whether the tree would in fact shelter him.
Dennett emphasizes that the predictive power of this form of
explart1on is highly reliable. He calls such mental state
attribution explartions "folk psythology'. He writes:
"We use folk psytho]ogy all the time, to explain ari
predict eachother's behaviour; we attribute beliefs and
desires to eachother with confidence - and quite
unselfoonsciously - and spend a substantial portion of our
waking lives formulating the world - not excluding
ourselves - in these terme...Everytime we venture out on a
highway, for example, we stake our lives on the
reliability of our general expectations about the
perceptual beliefs, normal desires and decision
proclivities of the other motorists. We tind...that it is
a theory of great generative power and efficiency. For
instance, watching a film with a highly original and
unstereotyped plot, we see the hero smile at the villain
and we all swiftly and effortlessly arrive at the same
complex theoretical diagnosis: 'Ahal' we conclude (but
perhaps not consciously), 'he wants her to think he
doesn't know she intends to defraud his brother?' "
(Dennett, 197g b, p.8-9).
. Attributing mental states to complex mn-human systema is also
often an effective way of explaining and predicting the system's
behaviour. Dennett (1971, 197k) cites as an example of this a
person trying to outwit a aess playing computer:
"By
	
the computer has certain beliefs (or
information) and desires (or preference functions) dealing
with the dess game in progress, I can oalculate...the
computer's most likely next move..." (Dennett, 197k,
p.27 1).
88
5. A consequence of using such an 'intentional stance', Dennett
(197g b) points out, is that we treat each other as if we were
rational agents (Ic: John believed x, therefore he acted in ways y
and z). He continues: "This cheerful myth - for surely we are not
all that retional - works very well because we are pretty rational"
(p.12). Dennett (1978a) adds that the 'intentional stance' is
pointless in cases where one has no reason to believe in the
system's rationality, eg: "In weather predicting, one is not apt to
make progress by wondering what clever move the wise old West Wind
will make next" (p.238).
6. Mental states can have a causal relation to behaviour (Davidson,
1963), eg: "Her belief that John knew her secret caused her to
blush" (Dennett, 197g b, p.21). This causal role (of mens rea') has
for some time been a central assumption In legal and moral
philosophy (eg: Bentham, 1789, p.8k).
7. Dennett emphasizes that adopting an explanatory 'intentional
stance' (that is, using a 'thecry of mind') makes no factual clams
about the nature of the system being explamn; it merely describes
the nature of our attitude t.oiards that system. However, Dennett
does identify certain properties about the nature of a system which
can employ a 'thecry of mind':
"Let us define a second-order intentional system as one to
which we ascribe not only simple beliefs, desires and
other intention.,, but beliefs, desires and other
intentions about beliefs, desires, and other intentions.
An intentional system would be a second-order intentional
system if among the ascriptions we make to it are euch as
S believes that T desires that p, S hopes that T tears
that q, and reflexive eases like S believes that S desires
that p" (Dennett, 1978a, p.273).
So, a system that can hold beliefs about beliefs (etc.,) is a
"second-order" system. An example of a "first-order" intentional
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system, Dennett argues, Is any animal or machine to which a belief
or desire can be attributed (eg: a mouse moves towards a piece of
cheese because it believes It is edible and wants to eat). Thus, one
attributes to a first-order system beliefs about the world, but not
beliefs about beliefs. The question of whether or not the mouse
really has beliefs is irrelevant to this explaration of Its
behaviour. As Dennett (1978a) says, the intentioral stance is
adopted for "pragmatic" reasons (p.238), and not because the object
necessarily has beliefs or intentions.
So far, a plethora of terma have been used by the different authors
reviewed to refer to the same ability: 'the intentioral stance',
'conceptual role-taking', 'theory of mind', 'attribution of mental
states', etc. Henceforth, only the term 'theory of mind' shall be
used, but the assumption is that it embodies all of these.
The above discussion concerning the relationship between 'theory of
mind' and comaunication largely centred on the taiman case, as this
is obviously of most relevance for our consideration of the autistic
child's theory of mind. However, it is worth noting that the
philosophical issues raised are equally relevant for any aralysis of
animal coemunication. Mackay's (1972) classic paper links human and
non-human comaunicative processes by focussing on the intentioral
aspect. He poses the question: "Is it good enough to say bluntly
that...'all behaviour is comaunicatlon'V' ( p . 1 ). He, like the Speech
Act Theorists, proposes that information is not itself comaunicative
if it is not both represented as intentioral by the 'sender' and
perceived as intentioral by the 'receiver'. He cites some examples:
a school boy's face would inform others that he had measles, but
would not count as an instance of oomnunioation, but only of
90
perception. Similarly, many (arid perhaps all) signals which elicit
responses between animals do not fall under this definition of
comaunication since they are frequently neither inteitiormlly sent
nor perceived by the receiver(s) as such. We will retuii to the
question of whether non-human animals are capable of employing a
theory of mind in the review of experimental literature in section
3.2.(v) below.
To sunmiarize the arginents from the philosophical literature
reviewed, employing a theory of mind is necessary for both
'meaningful' coenunieation and fbr explaining and predicting the
behaviour of others. These t aspects of social behaviour (and
maybe others) are thus seen to depend on the employment of a thecry
of mind. The next section reviews the literature surrounding the
developing child's ability to attribute mental states to others.
Although this review is quite lengthy, it is necessary because it
will form the backdrop to the test of the autistic child 's theory of
mind in the next t Experiments. Its length is a result of the
inherent difficulty in actually obtaining evidence of a thecry of
mind. It is not an entity which can be pinpointed as either clearly
absent or present but, in the normal case, is inferred from a range
of different experimental situations, as well as language and
'pragmatics' studies. All of these are reviewed in sections
3.2.(ii)-(iv), below.
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3.2.(ii): Experimental studies:
There have been experimental studies into young children 'a
understanding of mental states as varied as 'motive', 'intention',
'belief', 'kncw', etc. For the sake of convenience we will consider
these separately, whilst bearing in mind that their 'semantic
separateness' is unlikely to be so clearcut.
a) Attribution of 'motive' and 'intention':
It is often believed that Piaget's (19) study of children's moral
judgements centred on the question of whether young children
possessed the concepts of motive and intention. In Piaget's classic
study, 100 6-10 year olds were told stories about 2 actors, one who
was ill-intentioned and accidently broke one cup, and the other who
was well-intentioned and who accidently broke 15 cups. Piaget found
that children under 7 years of age tended to only use the
information about outcome (ie: high or low damage) in their moral
evaluations of the actor, rather than considering the actors motives
or intentions. Contrary to some interpretations of this result,
Piaget in fact never suggested that this result implied that
children under 7 lacked the concept of motive a' intention; his
result wes instead concerned with the question of whether these
concepts influenced the moral judgements the children made. This is
an entirely separate question to that which is of current interest,
namely, at what age can normal children attribute the mental-state
concept of intention to others.
Piaget (19) did consider the latter question elsewhere: fran his
observations of his om 3 children, he concluded that it is only
before 30 months old that children carmot "distinguish between what
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is 'done on purpose'. . .and what is 'not done on purpose'" (p.176).
In the recent literature (Berndt and Berndt, 1975; easey, 1978) the
point has been sede that the terse 'motive' and 'intention' are
frequently confused. Certainly, Piaget often used them
interchangeably. They can, however, be separated: a motive refers to
the outcome an actor wants to produce (eg: to get a toy), whereas
intention refers to whether an actor produced a given outcome
accidently or 'voluntarily' (eg: injuring another child in the
process of getting the toy). Berndt and Berndt (1975) showed films
to 2 groups of children (mean CA = 1$:11 and 8:2, respectively) in
which the actor 'a motives and intentions were independently varied.
They found that 5 year olds' answers to such questions as "Did he do
it on purpose?" and "What did he yant?" revealed that they did
understand both the concept of a motive and the
accidental-intentioral distinction. However, like Piaget's results,
the children 's knowledge of these mental states was not always
evident in their later moral evaluations of the actor.
Smith (1978) found that whilst 5-6 year olds could consistently
distinguish 'voluntary'/intentioral acts (eg: sitting doiai) from
'involuntary'/unintended acts (eg: sneezing), Z year olds tended to
say that all the film sequences (including ones of involuntary
actions) were intended. Can we conclude from this study that 1 year
old children lack the concept of intention? For each sequence, the
children were asked questions such as "Was (the actor) trying to (do
x)'?"; the fact that they tended to reply 'yes' to all such questions
may simply indicate that they did not understand the question. It
certainly does not necessarily demonstrate an inability to
distinguish intended and unintended actions. Despite this problem
over how to interpret incorrect responses by the 1 year o]ds,
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Smith's study supports Berndt and Beridt's (1978) demonstration that
children over 5 years old can attribute intentions to others. Other
atudlqs repert similar results (Chandler, Greenspan and Barenboim,
1973).
Evidence that this ability is present in children as young as 3
years of age comes from more recent studies: Shultz, Wells and Sarda
(1980) argued that moral judgement type paradigms are mt useful to
address this question because they do not test the child's
understanding of intention directly; in their first task they
therefore menipulated the subject's intention directly. Two pennies
(one shiny and one dull) were placed next to each other on a table
in front of the child. In the first condition the child had to close
his/her eyes and pick up the shiny one, which all the children were
able to do. In the second condition, the subject wore a set of prism
glasses that laterally distorted his or her field of vision. When
the glasses ware removed, the child discovered that s/he had picked
up the dull penny by mistake. After each condition, test questions
were asked: "Did you mean to pick up that penny? Why did you pick up
that penny?". In the second task, similar mistakes ware induced,
this time using verbal repetition: the child had to repeat a
'tongue-twister' ("She sells sea-shells by the sea-shore"). Again
the child was asked "Did you mean to say it like that? Why did you
say it like that?". Two further tasks involving finger and hand
coordination were also used to induce mistaken behaviour'.
These li tasks ware designed to elicit knowledge of intentions. A
further manipulation concerned whose intentions were to be
described. First, a child (A) was asked to explain his/her oi
behaviour; then another child (C) who had not been a subject was
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asked to explain child A's behaviour; finally, a child who had beeT
a subject (B) is asked to explain child A's behaviour. Thus, the
observers ire either describing self or other's behaviour, and re
either 'experienced' or not. The results shod that children as
young as 3 years old accurately distinguished intentiorEl from
mistaken actions, both their owi and someone else '5, and that they
could do this whether or not they themeelves bad previously
performed those behaviours. The explartions offered by the children
referred to internal, intention-like causes of behavior.
In their second experiment, Shultz, Wells and Sarda (1980) found
that 5 year olds could distinguish intended actions from reflex
actions (eg: 'knee-jerk' reflexes), although 3 year olds re not so
good at this. This suggests that 3 year olds do have the concept of
intention, but the distinction of intention-mistaken (experiment 1)
may be easier (or occur developmentally earlier) than
intention-reflex (experiment 2). Nevertheless, these 2 experiments
show that 3 year olds regard intentions as causes of behaviour. This
was also demonstrated by Mccarrigle and Dormldson's (197/5)
well-knoii result in which 3 year olds re able to 'conserve' under
conditions of "accidental change" as opposed to the experimenter's
"intentiorni change".
In another experiment, Yuill (198k) used a 'judgement of
satisfaction' paradigm, where the relation betwaen an actor 's motive
and an outcome was varied so that the outcome was either intended or
accidental. Thus, the child's understanding of motive and intention
were separately tested. One of her stories, for example, was as
follows: a boy wants to throw a ball at another boy to hit him on
the head (bad motive), but the other boy catches the ball instead
95
(unintended outcome). In the picture stories used, the character's
motive was conveyed using a cartoon 'thinks' bubble, made from
reduced versions of the outcome pictures. The experimenter asked the
probe question 'What did the boy want to do?'. Then the outcome
picture was laid do and the child was asked 'Is the boy pleased or
sad about what happened, or just in between?'. The experimenter
contrasted matching and mismatching the motive and outcome pictures
(ie: intended outcome (match] or the accidental outcome (mismatch]).
The results showed that all three age-groups (3, 5 aid 7 yr olds)
tended to judge an actor as more pleased with an intended than an
unintended outcome, although the 3 year olds could only do this if
there was no bad motive involved.
The studies reviewed above prese&t evidence of normal 3 year olds'
ability to understand the concepts of intention and motive,
separately, at the simplest level. Individual differences in
intention-cue detection skills among same-age 'normal' peers have
been studied: Dodge, Murphy and Bixhsbaum (198 14) found that children
identified by sociometric measures as having a peer status as
'socially rejected' or 'socially neglected' made significantly more
errors than children identified as 'socially popular' or 'average'.
The socially rejected and neglected children 's errors tended to
consist of erroneous labels of prosocial intentions as hostile.
These differences lie In the detection of type of intention, but not
in the ability to attribute intentions per se.
b) Attribution of 'belief' and 'know':
(e paradigm which has been used extensively to investigate young
children s understanding of the mental state concepts of 'belief'
and 'know' is "conceptual role-taking". As we discussed In thapter
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2, this is distinguished from the traditior2l Piagetlan perceptual
role-taking tasks in that, as the name suggests, it requires
inferences about amother person's thoughts rather than their
percepts. As such, conceptual role-taking could tt be performed
using a mental rotation strategy. The seminal set of experiments in
this field is by Flavell et al (1968).
Flavell's first experiment (called the 'coin game', p. 115) involved a
game using 2 cups, one with a nickel in and one with a dime; the
subject (S) had to remove the money from either one while arzther
person (A) was absent, and then A would enter and thoose a cup. The
reward was that A could keep whatever was in the selected cup. The
experiment focussed on where S thought A would search, and why.
Flavell found that the younger subjects (aged 7-10 years) tended to
predict that A would simply choose the dlme' cup, on the grounds
that A would want the larger amount of money. Older subjects (1O1ZI
years) predicted that A would choose the 'nickel' cup, on the
grounds that A would think that S would think that A would choose
the 'dime' cup because s/he would want the larger amount of money.
In the 'coin game' experiment, then, the developmental shift is from
younger subjects attributing to A a strategy based on a simple
"monetary motive", to older subjects attributing to A a strategy
based on complex, reflexive cognitions. Flavell calls the first,
earlier attribution a "Level 1 operation" (p. l$9), (and this matches
what Dennett (1978a) called a 'second-order intentiomi stance').
Flavell defines it as "S thinks that A believes that x". The more
complex attribution Flavell calls a "Level 2 operation" (p.51),
defined as "S thinks that A thinks that S or B (a third person)
thinks that x". A oonversatiorml example of this would be "I'm sure
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you know what I think about Bill" (p.51). (This would be what
Dennett called a "third-order intentiorl stance"). In section 5.1k
these more complex levels of attribution will be discussed in
detail.
To sumearize, in the 'coin game' experiment, the youngest subjects
were 7-8 years old, arid they were capable of 'Level 1 operations'.
From this Flavell argued that children at this age are therefore
capable of role-taking, since "the fundamental definition of role
taking is...the attribution of cognitions, in the broadest sense, to
another individual" (p.52). Flavell believed that this ability, and
the one at the next level up ("I think that he thinks that I
think",etc, p.52) emerge for the first time in "middle thildhood and
adolescence". Other experiments are reviewed later (see p.99) which
show this to be an underestimetion of younger children 'a abilities.
In Flavell's second experiment (widely knoiii as the "apple-dog"
story), one experimenter (El) displays a series of 7 pictures arid
asks the subject (3) to tell the story which they illustrate. 3
specific pictures are then removed, a second experimenter (E2)
enters the room, arid S is requested to predict the story which E2
would probably tell from the 1$ remaining pictures. (E2 has
supposedly never seen the whole series of 7). The pictures are so
constructed that the entire series suggests a certain story while
the series of i suggests another, quite different story.
Once again, in this experiment, the same developmental shift in
responses is obtained: the probability of the subject predicting
that E2 would tell the correct story (ie: one consistent with E2's
lack of knowledge of the other 3 pictures) increased with age,
although even meny of the youngest subjects in Flavell 'a sample were
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able to do this. The ability required fbr this task, Flave].l
concludes, is definitely achieved by age 9-10 years (p.75). He
maintains that role-taking demands not only "the ability to search
and find the other's perspective. It is also likely to demand the
ability to counteract the insistent intruions of one's om
(perspective) during the search" (p.81). In other rds, it involves
the siDiltaneous representation of t views (oia and other's), and
the appropriate selection of these. The cognitive implications of
this are discussed in Section L14.
Flavell 'a t experiments without doubt require the attributions of
the mental states of 'belief' and 'know' to another person. As such,
they are definitely conceptual role-taking tasks. Borke (1971) set
out to show that such studies enormously overestimated the age at
which this abililty is present. She found that children as young as
3 years old could indicate in which situations another child would
feel happy a' sad, etc. Hover, this type of role-taking is not
conceptual, but affective, and these tc skills may be totally
independent of eachother. This possibility seeme to have been
overlooked in much of the debate on this issue, as noted by Kurdek
and Rodgon (1975). Thus, Chandler and Greenspan (1972) say that
their results, in which 6-10 year olds ire still very "egocentric",
refute Bcrke's claime. This is an example of where different
researchers are talking at cross- purposes, since Chandler and
Greenspan's experiment, unlike Ba'ke's, is very similar to Flavell 'a
second experiment. The subject is required to tell a story from the
limited perspective of a late-arriving and thus partially informed
bystander, someone who thus does not have the "privileged
information" that the subject has about the events in the story.
This task does test conceptual role-taking in a way that Borke 'a
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does not. As such, their results are not comparable, and there need
be no contradiction.
Chandler and Greenspan's (1972) experiment introduced a very
important methodological consideration into tests of conceptual
role-taking: that, to ensure non-egocentric responding, subjects
must be required to adopt a point of view of someone who has a
totally different belief about the situation than their
Mossler, Marvin and Greenberg (1976) took this precaution in their
experiment, in which they used thildren from 2-6 years of age. The
children were sho a story on videotape, and then their mother was
brought in to watch the same film but with the sound track turned
off. Thus, the thud had 'privileged information' (x) about the
story, which the mother lacked. The thildren were then asked "Does
your momy know that (x)?" etc. The results revealed that II and 5
year olds were able to attribute 'lack of knowledge' to another
person 'non-egocentrically'. In another experiment, Marvin,
Greenberg and Mossler (1976) successfully replicated these findings
using a "telling-a-secret" paradigm, in which the child again had to
distinguish between those who knew x and those who did not know x.
The authors' explanation for why subjects in their tbE) experiments
show this ability at a younger age (1 years old) to those in other
studies wes that they had sufficiently and legitimately simplified
the test of conceptual role-taking.
This explanation is very valid. Studies are still being done (eg
Chandler and Helm, 19811) which conclude on the basis of 11 year old
children's failures that they are "egocentric", ie: unable to
conceive of another person's mental states, whereas often their
failure may be due to the Inappropriate arxl tnineoessary complexity
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of the task. In the next subsection, the 'best' experiments that
have been done on the question of young children 'a theory of mind
are reviewed. Their strengths lie in the fact that they ensure there
is a clear conceptual difference between what the subject and the
other person knows, (thus demanding 'true' conceptual role-taking),
and they use tasks designed in such a way as to maximize the chances
of eliciting a very young child's theory of mind, if it exists. The
first of these features is most clearly found in the studies on
attribution of false belief.
c) Attribution of false belief:
Many of the studies reviewed In the last section investigated
children's ability to represent the absence of knowledge in another
person. A number of coentators have argued that a more rigorous
test of a child 'a theory of mind occurs iEen the child has to
represent another person's definite belief which differs from that
which the subject knows to be true (Bennett, 1978; Dennett, 1978b;
Rarman, 1978). In other words, the subject is required to attribute
a false or wrong belief to another person, thus demanding that two
people's different conceptual views of the world are simultaneously
represented. The fbrmal paradigm suggested by these authors as the
'acid test' of this ability is outlined as follows:
The subject is awere that s/he and another person observe
a certain state of affairs (x). Then, in the absence of
the other person the subject witnesses an unexpected
change in the state of affairs from x to y. The subject
now knows that y is the case and also knows that the other
person still believes that x is the case.
These authors suggested this paradigm in response to attempts to
test whether chimpanzees had a theory of mind (Premack and Woodruff,
1978; Woodruff and Premack, 1979). Premack's interesting work will
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be discussed in Section 3.2.(v).
Wi!iner and Per,ier (1983) used this paradigm to test children aged
t9 years old. They told the subject a story in which a protagonist
falsely believed a chocolate was in one location (x), when the
subject knew it had been moved to another (y). The child was asked a
'Belief Question' which required the child to predict where the
protagonist would look for the chocolate, on the basis of his wrong
belief. Wimer and Perner found that 57% of i-6 year olds and 86% of
6-9 year olds pointed correctly to location x, thus demonstrating
their ability to attribute a false (and therefore different) belief
to another person, and their ability to use this attribution to
predict another person's behaviour. Control questions checked their
ability to represent the actual state of affairs as well. The
authors argued on the basis of this result that children as young as
years old had the ability for "metarepresentation" (Pylyshyn,
1978), in that the child could represent not only a state of affairs
(y) but also represent another person's relationship (believing) to
these representations. This, again, is what Dennett (1978a) calls
the child's ability to adopt a "second-order intentioral stance".
As a test of the stability of the children 's theory of mind the
subject was then asked to predict what the protagonist would say if
he wanted to either deceive an antagonist or truthfully inform a
friend about the chocolates location. Winmier and Pemer found that
85% of those who had correctly thought the protagonist would search
in x also correctly thought that he would direct his antagonist to
location y and his friend to location x. This correct attribution
was found independent of age; however, M-5 year olds were less
successful at perceiving when an utterance was a lie than they were
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at producing a lie appropriate to someone else's belief state.
Wisiner and Pemer's (1983) results support evidence from other
studies that lê year olds can attribute False beliefs to others:
Shultz and Cloghesy (1981) found that at this age diildren start to
understand the competitive nature of the 'Hide and Seek' game, which
also depends on the correct simultaneous representation of two
different "epistemic states" (Wininer and Perner, 1983, p.126).
Wininer, Gruber and Perner (198k) also found that 1$ year olds
understood that a speaker in a story held a false belief, and they
understood that the speaker held this false belief unintentiormlly,
although most of then still called this a "lie". Despite this
tendency to confuse 'being mistaken' with 'l ying' , $ year olds are
clearly shoii to have a theory of mind. Similarly, the finding that
3 year olds have some ability to make correct "appearance-reality
discriminations" of visual illusions (Flavell, Flavell and Green,
1983) suggests that they are aware of their Ob1 false beliefs as
well as those of others.
Russell (in press) has explored young children's understanding of
'intensiornlity' (with an s ), that is, their understanding of the
limits of paraphrase or co-designation of mental state utterances in
natural language. This refers back to the logical property of
'referential opacity' which was defined as a feature of mental
states in 3.2.(i), p.86 (point c). In Russell's paper, entitled "Can
we say...?", he tests children's understanding of what would be true
to say of someone's beliefs, and what would be false. For example,
one of the stories that the c*iildren were told was as follows:
'George's watch was stolen while he was in a deep sleep. The robber
was a men with curly red hair. When George awoke and found his watch
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gone, he set out to find the thief.' The children were then asked
some test questions about George's beliefs: (a) "Can we say that
George was thinking 'I must find the men with the curly red hair who
stole my watch'?" (answer: no, since George could not have knoa the
thief had curly red hair if he was asleep]; and (b) "Can we say that
George was thinking '1 must find the thief who stole my watch'?"
(answer: yes]. Many 14-5 year olds made mistakes on these questions.
In other words, they did not realize that 'the thief' and 'the men
with the curly red hair' are not co-referential terme (they are
'intensiorBl') when predicated by George's mental state term (eg:
'thinking'), even though they are co-referential ('extensioral') in
the actual story ('the thief' refers to the same person as 'the men
with the curly red hair'). Thus, while children of this age are able
to attribute false beliefs to others (Wimeer and Pemer, 1983),
their understanding of the logical properties of beliefs may not be
achieved until later.
To eumearize this review of the experimental studies into normal
children's theory of mind, by at least 1 years of age children can
understand and attribute the mental states of w,tive and intention,
think and know, and false belief. This thus identities the
appropriate age control group for the planoed experimental tests of
autistic children's theory of mind (in Chaper 14).
Other studies have obtained evidence that young children use mental
state terme in their language appropriately, and these are reviewed
in the next subsection.
1 01
3.2.(iii): Language studies:
Another source of evidence for young children 'a theory of mind comes
from studies into their use of linguistic teri which refer to
mental states. Bretherton, McNew ariS Beeghly-ith (1981) and
Bretherton and Beeghly (1982) searched for any of 73 "internal state
words" used by 30 10-28 month old children. These words referred
either to cognition (eg: know, remember, dream, etc.), volition (eg:
desire, need, etc.), and morality (eg: promise, allow, etc.). They
also included words which referred to 'non-intentiorBl' inner
states, such as perception (eg: see, hear, etc.), sensation (eg:
pain, touch, ete), physiology (eg: hunger, thirst, etc.) and affect
(eg: anger, fear, sad, etc.). Mothers were asked to serve as
observers. Of interest to this review are the intentioral' words,
of which 'know' was by far the most coion - in fact, 66% of
children produced it, and it was reported earliest in a child of 15
months. Teru such as 'remember', 'forget', 'think', and 'pretend'
were also used by about 30% of the sample. The word 'think' was
first used at 23 months, 'believe' at 26 months, and 'understand'
and 'pretend' at 28 months. These ages are within the range reported
by Limber (1973). Bretherton and her colleagues conclude from the
linguistic data that the ability to armlyse motives and beliefs in
others is already well developed by the 3rd year of life, and is
evidence of what they call an "explicit" theory of mind. (This is in
contrast to an "implicit" one which Bates, Camaioni and Volterra
(1975) have described in 9-13 month old children, which we shall
discuss in section 3.2.(iv) below).
Shatz, Weilman and Silber (1983) carried out a similar investigation
into "the ability to contemplate and comunicate about the
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knowledge, beliefs, and goals of oneself and others (which) is a
benchmark of human cognition" (p.301). They criticized Bretherton et
al's study on the grounds that the occurence of lexical iteme noted
does not necessarily provide evidence that young children have a
theory of mind. Rather, the words might be being used for
conversatiorl functions without any reference to mental states. For
example, 'you Iaxw' may be nothing more than a "eonversatiornl
pause-filler" etc. (p.302). Shatz et al's more conservative study
therefore decided to check whether any mental state terme used
occurred in the context of contrasts between reality and
non-reality, action and intention, fact and belief, etc. Stzh
occurrences were called "contrastives". The importance of these was
explained as follows:
"We take (contrastives) to be especially informative cases
because the recognition that mental events can be at
variance with observable events seeme to be a core element
in understanding the internal world. Indeed, making the
difference explicit see to be a prime motivation for
expressing mental states among a&lts. These sorts of
contrast ive utterances, then, constitute a paradigm case
of mental state expression, and they would be good
evidence that the young child 'a conception of the internal
world is similar at least in one way to the aóilt 'S."(p.301).
These authors define 'contrastives' as:
"Those sentences which mark an understanding of a
difference or discrepancy between some mental state and
present or observable reality. In the utterance, "Before I
thought this was a crocodile; now I know it's an
alligator", a prior belief is explicitly contrasted with
the current state of affairs...(some) further examples
(include): "I was teasing you; I was pretending 'cept you
didn't know that". "The people thought Dracula was mean,
but he was nice". "I thought there wasn't any socks, but
when I looked I saw them". " ( p.309).
The reason why contrastives are important to these authors is
identical to the reason why false beliefs are important to Wimner
and Perner (1983). Both are considered to be paradigmatic cases in
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providing evidence of a child's theory of mind. Shatz et ii derived
their thta from 2 sources: a single, longitudinal case study of a
child from 2: Il- zl:0 yrs; and speech samples from 30 2 year olds.
Using the more conservative criteria, their results nevertheless
confirmed those of Bretherton et al (1981; 1982). They also found
that their sample produced mental verbs in their third year. In
addition, they found that contrastives ware among the first mental
state utterances.
Whilst these last two studies looked at production of mentalistic
words, another set of studies has focussed on the child's
comprehension of specific mental state terms: Miscione, trvin,
O'Brien and Greenberg (1978) looked at the words 'know' and 'guess',
and Weilman and Johnson (1979) looked at 'remember' and 'forget'.
Both studies report a period during the preschool years when
children interpret these mental state terms only with reference to
external states. Weliman and Johnson found that 1 year olds judged
that if a story character correctly located an object they could be
said to have 'remembered' its location, while one who was incorrect
could be said to have 'forgotten', even when the character had no
initial knowledge of the object's location. In Miscione et al's
study, the same age pattern emerged: subjects claimed to 'know' when
they ware correct in locating an object and to 'guess' when they
were incorrect, regardless of their actual knowledge. (Their actual
state of knowing and guessing was systematically varied by having
the subject either watch or rot watch the experimenter hide the
object). These authors report that by around 5 years of age the
children's understanding becomes equivalent to the adult's.
Howaver, Johnson and Weliman (1980) succeeded in demonstrating that
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$ year olds could use the mental state terms 'remember', 'know', and
'guess' correctly, under conditions when the diild is "tricked": the
subject observed an object being hidden, but then the object was
secretly moved elsewhere. Thus, the thud's om i.nediate expectancy
or belief was contradicted by the external events. Under these
conditions, the thildren referred to their knowledge of where they
had believed the object to be. These results caution against the
view that young children base their early interpretation of mental
terms solely on externally perceived states (Miscione et al, 1978).
t4acnamara, Baker arid Olsen (1976) found evidence that many year
olds understand the "unstated presuppositions and implicatives"
(p.68) of the mental state terms 'pretend' arid 'forget', and that in
some cases they can employ such implicit propositions to make
indirect inferences (eg: 'Robert is pretending to be sick' implies
'Robert is not really sick' and indirectly implies 'Robert should go
to school', etc.).
Stern (cited by Piaget, 1926) was impressed by the anecdotal reports
of preschoolers' use of the term 'think', since it implied the
cognitive ability to differentiate opinion from fact. This ability
was also anecdotally recorded by Susan Isaacs (1930):
"Some questions of fact arose betwaen James arid his
father, and James said, 'I know it is?' His father
replied, 'But perhaps you might be wrong!' Denis ( years
7 months) then joined in, saying, 'But if he knows, he
can't be wrong? j's sometimes wrong, but knowing 's
always right?' " (p.355)
This ability has been demonstrated experimentally more recently
among 1ê year olds by Johnson arid Marateos (1977). They used a
paradigm which is very similar to that used by Wiuiner arid Perner
(1983), in which a character is told a lie about an object's
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location, and thus holds a false belief. The subject is asked (a)
where the character will therefore look for the object, and (b)
whether the character 'thinks' or 'krxws' the object is there. Some
II year olds, but ro 3 year olds, answered these questions correctly.
3.2.(iv): Evidence from studies of children's	 'pragmatic'
competence.
a. Preverbal infants:
Bruner (1975a; 1975b) argues that the preverba]. infant shows the
precursors to a 'theory of mind' in "joint reference" and "joint
attention" (Bruner, 1975a, p.9). This includes such abilities as
being able to follow arother person's 'line of regard' and
understand the 'pointing' gesture, both of which are within the
abilities of a 9 month old infant (Scaife and Bruner, 1975; Churcher
and Scaife, 1982; Butterworth and Cochran, 1979). Of course, to the
extent that the former involves a 'theory of sight' (Experiment 2,
this thesis), there may be ro mentalistic component in being able to
follow arother person's line of regard. However, arother such
preverbal "intersubjective" activity a' "format" (Bruner, 1983a & b)
is turn-taking in parent-child interactive games. Bruner argues that
all of these activities involve the child representing an
"addresser's (and an) addressee's comunicative intent" (Bruner,
1975b, p.262), much like any other Speech Act (Once, 1975). He
proposes that infant behaviour that has developed into this
"reciprocal mode" (p.277) with others is a sign that an infant's
theory of mind may be present in an embryonic form long before any
explicit verbal indicators of it are present.
This view also characterizes the study by Bates, Camaionl. and
109
Volterra (1975). Both their work and Bruner's leans heavily on
Austin's (1962) distinction that Speech Acts (both verbal and
non-verbal) are either "iflocutions" or "perlocution&' (a
distinction which was referred to before - see p.83). Perlocutions
are acts that "create effects", intentiormily or otherwise, on a
listener. Thus, a hunger cry of a newborn infant can be regarded as
a 'perlocution', as can a punch in the face. An illocutlon, in
contra at, "requires the in ten tb rm 1 use of a convent 10 na 1 signal to
carry out some socially recognized function" (Bates et al, 1975,
p.206). Bates et al regard acts such as pointing as illocutionary,
again thus attributing to preverbal infants a theory of mind. They
put the thte of this ability at around 10 months of age:
"It appears that, until 10-11 months of age, Carlotta Is
unaware of the potential role of adults as agents in
fulfilling her desires. Hence, she is unaware of the
effects of her signals as Instruments for operating on
adult intentions" (p.21i$).
The focus, for both Bruner and Bates et al, is on use of actions in
coun1cat1ve contexts, ie: on 'pragmatics'. Coggins and Carpenter
(1981) have designed a "cormirnnicative intention inventory" as a
checklist for the presence or absence of such 'preverbal speech
acts', and their terminology suggests that they agree with the
mentalist interpretations of pointing, etc. Howaver, whilst there
are now quite a number of authors (Dore, 1975; Schaffer, 1979;
Trevarthen, 1980) who subscribe to the view that preverbal children
as young as 12-18 months have a theory of mind, this view still
rests heavily on a particular interpretation of bavioure such as
pointing, etc. This view, while plausible, is acientifically
'fragile', in that It merely depends on whether one "likes it" or
not. In contrast, the experimental evidence revied earlier (eg:
Vier ant Perner, 1983) mekes certain predictions about what a
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child will do in a given situation if a/he has a theory of mind.
These latter type of studies thus produce a stronger kind of
evideice'.
b. Verbal children:
This scientific quality is also a feature of many of the studies
into verbal children's pragmatic competence. Shatz (1978), in the
tradition of Speech Act Theory, emphasizes that
"understanding involves the listeners' representing the
messages sent to them in just the way the senders intended
them to be re pre sen ted. Misunderstanding occurs when
listeners represent messages in ways other than those
intended" (p.272).
Thus, one source of evidence tht young children have a theory of
mind is if they can spontaneously repair misunderstood messages:
this pragmatic skill implies both that they are aware that their
listener has not understood the intention behind their message, and
that modifying the form of the message is necessary in order to
comaunicate the same meaning a' intention.
Maratsos (1973) found that 3 year olds who had to coisnunicate about
some objects to someone blindfolded gave far more adequate messages
than children coemunicating to someone with 'normal' vision. Thus,
they showed evidence of "nonegocentric coemunication abilities"
(p.69 7). This result is in line with studies by Shatz and Gelman
(1973) and Sachs and Devin (1976) who independently found that
year olds modified their speech when talking to different aged
listeners. Wel].man and L.empers (1977) even found this ability among
2 year olds. Similarly, Plenig-Peterson (1975) and Perner and Leekam
(1985) found that 3-14 year olds modified their speech substantially
depending on whether their listener was knowledgable about the
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experiences the thud was describing (having participated in them),
or whether the listener was 'naive'. Masur (1978) found that 3-il
year olds will also athpt their speech to their listener's
linguistic level, and Mueller et al (1977) observed that 2 year olds
will adjust their coisnunicatlons to their listener's attention. In
all these studies, the thildren were thus "tailoring their behaviour
in accordance with the listener's needs" (Menig-Peterson, p.1017),
evidence of adopting an "intentioral stance" (Dennett, 1978a).
Thus, it seeme that young children 's speech frequently takes the
form of reciprocal dialogue, Ic: it Is social, intentioral' and
coisnunicative (Garvey and Hogan, 1973; Mueller, 1972), although
other egocentric features (eg: failure to resolve referential
ambiguity) persist Into later childhood (Sormensohein and
Whitehurat, 198I; Singer and Flavell, 1981). The conclusions from
these studies on pragmatic competence tend to endorse the results
from other language studies (reviewed in section 3.2.(iii)] and from
experimental studies in conceptual role-taking (section 3.2.(ii)),
Ic: that strong evidence can be adduced to demonstrate that normal
children have a theory of mind in their third year of life which is
explicit in their language, and in the fifth year of life this is
implicit in their experimental responses. Whether it exists any
earlier than the third year is not out of the question but is simply
hard to prove, eg: Wilcox and Webster (1980) found that if the
experimenter deliberately created 'communication failures', thildren
as young as 17-23 months jould recode their messages. This could be
evidence of their theory of mind (eg: my listener does not
understand my intention), but this is not the only possible
explaration of the toddlers' behaviour. The studies reviewed in the
next section consider whether any non-human species have this
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ability.
3.2.(v): Do non-human anils have a theory of mind?
Dawkins and Krebs (1978) have described a number of examples of
behaviour from different species of what on the surface appears to
be 'deception' or 'lylng. For example, the sabre-toothed bleriny
(Aspidontus taeniatus - a fish) is evolutiorrily equipped such that
its appearance and locomotion are identical to the cleaner wrasse
(Labroides dimidiatus): this allows it to approach larger fish
closely, at which point instead of cleaning them it bites chunks out
of them. For examples such as this to qualify as 'true' cases of
deception, one would have to show that the deceiver intended to
induce a false belief in the deceived (that x is true when really it
is false). Such an intentioral explanation is unparsimonlous and
unsupported, since it is evolutionary pre-wiring which allows
'lower' aninals to behave with such "stimulus-contingent fixed
action patterns" (Quiatt, 198 11) like the sabre-toothed blenny above.
The most interesting examples of aninal behaviour that are plausible
candidates for being called 'deception' (and thus evidence of a
theory of mind) come from monkeys and apes. Van Lawick-Goodall
(1971) reports an incident of a monkey ignoring a banana until
another monkey had left the area (p.107), but whether such an
isolated incident qualifies as 'Intentional deception' is hard to
evaluate. A behaviour which occurs more frequently is "infant
stealing and kidnapping" by rhesus monkeys (Quiatt, 19811, p.26).
Descriptions of these activities are intriguing: a young female
monkey approaches the mother to groom her, thus relaxing her and
making the Infant more accessible. Slowly ahe transfers her grooming
activities to the infant, then suddenly scoops up the infant and
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runs off. Quiatt argues that if we are prepared to attribute the
"complex intentions" (Strawson, 1979) necessary for deception to the
kidnapper, then presumably the mother of the kidnapped infant should
equally possess this ability for reflection on intentions. Since
rhesus mothers do not appear to show any 'wariness' or 'suspicion'
or 'overprotectiveness' when approached ostensibly for grooming
activities, this kidnapping example mey be no different to the kind
of bthaviour of the blenny fish, described above.
What of the reports involving practical jokes? Koehler (1925, p.85)
describes a game called "thicken-teasing": the ape holds a stick in
one hand and with the other hand holds out a piece of bread to the
chickens who feed just outside the apes' large cage. When a thicken
approaches and pecks at the bread, the ape whisks it away, leaving
the thicken biting the air arid getting a sharp poke in the feathers
with the stick. Quiatt (198 1i)
 describes similar tricks chimpanzees
play on (more intelligent, warier) human victime, such as sitting
quietly in the cage until a human comes within 12 feet, and then
dousing the person with a gushing jet of water from their mouth.
This occurs successfully despite people being warned of the risks,
perhaps because the thimpanzees often do not swell out their theeks
at all.
Quiatt's explartion for these t examples Is in terme of captive
non-human prinates' need fbr sensory stimulation to dispel
'boredom'. He sees no grounds for calling these behaviours
"intentionally deceptive", since they comprise provoking startle
reactions for the sake of observing them. The fact that they are
quite complex ection sequences (especially the 'thicken-teasing')
does not thange the fact that they can be performed purely on the
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basis of a causal understanding, Je: knowing which actions will
cause which effects. In the case of the thicken game, the routine is
often performed 50 times In a row during a lunch-hour. There is thus
plenty of opportunity for apes to learn the causal patterns.
Premack and Woodruff (1978) suggested that chimpanzees' theory of
mind could be experimentally demonstrated to exist. They showed
Sarah, an adult chimpanzee, videotaped scenes of a human actor
struggling i1th a variety of probleme such as food out of reach,
being locked in a cage, trying to play an unplugged-in record
player, etc. With each videotape she was given a pair of
photographs, of which one was a 'correct' solution to the problem
(eg: a stick for the inaccessible barnas, a key for the locked
cage, eta). The fact that Sarah consistently chose the correct
photograph was interpreted by Premack and Woodruff to indicate that
Sarah had the ability to attribute purpose and Intention to the
actor, and to choose alternatives compatible with the actor's
purpose (eg:'He wants to reach the barnas, and he believes that
using the stick will achieve this', etc).
The difficulties inherent In ascertaining if a non-verbal being has
a theory of mind are enormous, and this study has attempted to
overcome these ingeniously. The question is whether these authors
have succeeded In demonstrating a theory of mind in chimpanzees. As
discussed earlier (see p.100), a number of comentators on this
experiment (Dennett, 1978b; Bennett, 1978; Harman, 1978) raised the
objection that the videotapes used could be described in
'bdiaviourist' terme just as easily (eg: 'Barmrs are for eating,
and with the stick the men reaches the barmnas and eats them').
Thus, Sarah 's correct responses on these tasks mey have been
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achieved without recourse to attribution of mental states to the
actor. An even more sceptical interpretation of her success is
simply in terme of associationism: keys go with padlocks, sticks go
with out-of-reach barras, etc.
These comaentators argued that a more stringent test of a
chimpanzee 'a theory of mind is when the chimpanzee observes someone
who sees an object put in one location (x), and who is absent when
the object is moved (to y): if the chimpanzee predicts that the
person will search for the object in x, then even the most radical
behaviourist would be fbreed to conclude that the chimpanzee
believed that the person falsely believed that the object was in x.
Thus, the chimpanzee would be adopting a 'second-order intentioil
stance' (Dennett, 1978b). The acid test, then, of whether some
person a' animal has a theory of mind is in the attribution of false
beliefs (Ic: beliefs about different beliefs). This was the basis of
Wimer and Perner's (1983) experiment with 1 year old children, as
was described earlier (p.101). It was also the basis of another
experiment on chimpanzees:
Woodruff and Premack (1979) tested whether chimpanzees could convey
and comprehend accurate and 'mis leading' information concerning the
location of hidden food. In one test, a chimpanzee was informed of
the location of the food but denied access to it:
"The animal could obtain food only by imparting
information about its location to an uninformed human
positioned outside the enclosure, in the vicinity of the
goal. One human was friendly arK! cooperative; if he found
the food he gave it to the chimpanzee, but if he failed
the animal received nothing. Another human was hostile and
competitive; if' he found the food he kept it for hiieelf,
but if he failed the chimpanzee was allowad to leave the
enclosure arK! obtain the food" (p.335).
chimpanzee subjects quickly learned to Indicate to the cooperative
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trainer the correct location of food, eventually using an
outstretched arm or leg to "point" to the baited container. All 14
also learnt to "suppress information" when rking with the
competitive trainer, and 2 of them learned to convey misleading
information, 'pointing' to the unbaited container.
Does this indicate that the chimpanzees intended the trainer to
believe that the food was where they pointed? There are ti obvious
criticisms with this interpretation of the experiment: first, the
results were achieved only after an extensive training of 5 months,
and the learned responses (outstretched arm a' inhibited arm
movement) could be explained more simply in behaviourist terms of
stimulus-contingent reinforcement. Secondly, the b..iman stooges were
expressly required not to 'see through' the chimpanzees' blatant
'lies' and modify their om behaviour accordingly. Since the
competitive trainers did not respond to 'deception' as deception,
the context can hardly be said to have any 'ecological validity'
(for the humans or the diimpanzees). Dennett (1983) and Seyfarth
(19814) further point out that it is surprising that the chimpanzees
were not 'puzzled' when the competitive trainer, having gone to the
incorrect box, failed to go to the correct box. This suggests that
they did not understand the relation between their actions and the
mental states of the trainer. Woodruff and Premack 	 uld disagree
with this view, since they believe that "these instances of deceit
(in their experiment) meet the most stringent behavioural criteria
for intentioral courunication" (p.356). It is unfortunate that they
did not really use the paradigm suggested by their conentators
(Dennett, 1978b; Harman, 1978; Bennett, 1978] earlier (Ic:
attribution of false belief), an experiment which still needs to be
done if chimpanzees, like l'aimans, are to be shoi to have a theory
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of mind.
Until then, it cannot yet be said that chimpanzees have a theory of
mind, and, since a theory of mind is necessary for 'true'
conunication (Grice, 1957; Mackay, 1972), It is thus still a raging
debate as to whether they can be said to 'coninunicate' (Seyfarth,
Che/ney and Marler, 1980; Dennett, 1983; Si.armen, 1983; de Waal,
1982).
3.2.(vi): Sxnnary of literature review on the theory of mind:
The evidence from the studies reviewed suggests the following
picture:
1. If one accepts a Speech Act Theory of coninunication, then a
theory of mid is a necessary prerequisite for the ability to
coninunicate (Grice, 1957; Searle, 1965).
2. If one assumes people are ratiorl, then a theory of mind allows
one to explain and predict other people's (ratiorml) behaviour
(Dennett, 1978a).
3. If one has a theory of mind, this implies that cognitively one is
a "second-order intentioral system" (Dennett, 1978a), capable of
"metarepresentation" (Pylyshyn, 1978 - this will be expanded in
section 11.11).
$. Since diildren as young as 1 years old have been shoit to
understand and te the mental state concepts of 'intention' and
'motive' (Shultz, Wells and Sarda, 1980; Yuill, 198k), 'believe' and
'kncw' (Mossier, Marvin and Greenberg, 1976; Marvin, Greenberg and
Mossler, 1976), and 'false belief' (Wimeer arK! Perner, 1983; Wier,
Cruber and Per'ner, 198 1 ), they can be said to have a theory of mind.
5. This conclusion i backed by evidence from language studies
reporting use of mental state terii by 2-3 year old, (Bretherton,
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McNew and Beeghly-Smith, 1981; Bretherton and Beeghly, 1982),
especially in 'contrastive' contexts such as false beliefs (Shatz,
Weliman and Silber, 1983). Other studies have also demonstrated that
year olds' definitions of these mental state words are indeed
'mentalistic' (Johnson and Wellman, 1980; Placnamara, Baker and
Olsen, 1976; Johnson and Maratsos, 1977).
6. Studies of 31 year olds pragmatic skills have danonstrated use
of their theory of mind in coemunicative contexts (Shatz and Gelman,
1973; Sachs and Devin, 1976; Menig-Peterson, 1977), and an
increasing number of authors subscribe to the view that preverbal
infants' gestures are evidence of their theory of mind being present
as young as 12-18 months (Bates et al, 1975; Bruner, 1975a; b; 1983a
&b).
7. Finally, it remains to be demonstrated convincingly that any
animals other than humans have a theory of mind, although
chimpanzees are a plausible candidate population for such an ability
(Woodruff and Premack, 1979).
In the light of this evidence of young mrmal children 'a theory of
mind, and in the context of its importance in social cognition, it
was decided to experimentally investigate the hypothesis that
autistic children are impaired in their theory of mind, since this
might go some way towards explaining their lack of coanunicative and
social skills.
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Chapter 1$: The autistic child's 'theory of mind': an empirical
invest igat ion.
i.1: Experiment 3: Attribution of false beliefs:
Introduction:
To test the hypothesis that the autistic child's theory of mind is
impaired, a task derived from Wier and Perner (1983) was used. The
experiment by Wimer and Perner was described above (p.101), which
conformed to the 'acid test' of demonstrating a theory of' mind
(Dennett, 1978b; Harmen, 1978; Bennett, 1978). The strength of their
paradigm can be suarized as follows: it requires the subject to
represent both how the world actually is, and how an ignorant story
character falsely believes it to be, thus clearly distinguishing
between the beliefs of' the subject and another person. Scess thus
requires 'beliefs about beliefs'. Secondly, it does not place too
great a value on the child's verbal responses; certainly, the child
has to be able to follow the rrrative of the story (and this is
checked by a number of' control questions), but the child is given
the opportunity to demonstrate his or her theory of mind through a
non-verbal gesture (pointing). The paradigm thus avoids the possible
pitfall of confusing mental state language with mental state
understanding. For these reasons, and because the results of their
experiment showed the ability to be present in normel children of lê
years old, it was decided to use Wier and Perner's paradigm in the
evaluation of autistic children's theory of mind.
Subjects:
The subjects who participated in this experiment were the same as
those who took part in the previous tbo experiments, and their
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details can be found in Table 1.1 on page 148. The main features of
th sample were as follows: The autistic group (n = 20) had a higher
mental age than the Doa's Syndrome group (n : 114) on both the
non-verbal scale (Leiter Internatioil Performance Scale) and on the
more conservative measure of a verbal scale (British Picture
Vocabulary Scale). It was assumed that the normal group (n 27) had
an MA which roughly corresponded with their CA. Therefore, their MA
was, if anything, lower than that of both handicapped groups. A high
functioning subgroup of autistic children was selected in order to
enable a stringent test of the hypothesis to be made: that is, that
the predicted deficit in their theory of mind would be
autism-specific, and not a function of general retardation (such as
characterizes the Doei '5 Syndrome thildren).
Procedure:
The procedure is illustrated in Figure 14.1. (This Figure is
reprinted from Baron-Cohen et al (1985), where this experiment is
reported].
Figure 1 .1: Procedure for Puppet Experiment (3).
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There were 2 doll protagonists, Sally and Anne. The children were
first tested to see if they Ia'iew which doll was which. This was
called the 'Naming Question': the experimenter asked "Which one is
Sally? Which one is Anne?". The subject only had to point to the
correct doll. Passing the Naming Question was an inclusion criterion
for the rest of the experiment, since this demonstrated a minimal
level of language comprehension. All subjects were able to pass this
first question. Then the subject was told the Following story:
"Sally has a basket arid Anne has a browi box". (These 2 containers
are placed in front of the 2 dolls). "And Sally has also got a
little red marble. She puts her marble into her basket."
(Experimenter puts marble into basket). "Now Sally goes for a walk."
(Sally walks off stage). "Anne gets up, goes over to Sally's basket,
and takes her marble. She puts it inside her brom box, arid turns
the box upside dom. (The marble is therefore out of sight). "Now,
here comes Sally, back from her walk." (Sally enters, and walks to
mid-stage, arid stops, between the t containers)."Where will Sally
look for her marble?" (This is called the 'Belief Question'. The
subject points to one of the containers. If they point to the
basket, the subject passes the Belief Question). "Where is the
marble really?" (This is called the 'Reality Question': correct
response is if the subject points to the box). "Where was the marble
in the beginning?" (This is called the 'Memory Question': correct
response is if the child points back to the basket).
The story was then repeated twice more: in the second version the
marble is moved from the basket to the Experimenter's pocket. In the
third version the ball is taken out of the basket, but then replaced
in the basket. (This was called the 'replacement' condition). On the
122
second trial there were therefore 3 different locations the thud
could point at (basket, box, and pocket). Correct responses to all 3
Questions for eh of the 2 trials were therefore different.
Results:
The results are sumearized in Table 14.1. The crucial column in this
Table is marked B', indicating the Belief Question:
Table 14.1: Percentage of subjects passing In ExperIment 3:
TRIAL 1	 TRIAL2	 TRIAL 3
BR M	 BR H	 BR M
Autistic	 20 100 100	 20 100 00	 100 100 100
Do's	 86 100 100	 92 100 100	 100 100 100
Normel	 85 100 100	 85 100 100	 100 100 100
B s Belief Question; R Reality Question; M = Memory Question.
All subjects passed the Naming Question. Furthermore, all subjects
without a single exception performed without any errors for both the
Reality and Memory Questions on all 3 trials, and in the replacement
condition, all subjects passed the Belief Quesion as well. However,
on this condition, there was no locatIorl distinction between where
the merble really was, and where Sally believed It to be. Thus, this
condition was not a test of their theory of mind, but confirmed that
all subjects followed the narrative of the story. The Belief
Question for the first 2 trIals was aniered consistently by eh
child, with the sole exception of one Dot 'a Syndrome thild (Subject
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Number 5, see Appdix 2) who tailed trial 1 and passed trial 2. The
results for the Do s Syndrome and norl subjects ire strikingly
similar: 23 out of 27 ri,rul children (85%) and 12 out of lii Dow's
Syndrome cildren (86%) passed the Belief Questions on both trials.
By contrast, 16 out of the 20 autistic children (80%) failed the
Belief Question on both trials. This difference bet the groups
is shoim in Figure 14.2 (below) and was highly significant (Chi =
25.9, df = 2, p < 0.001).
Figure 14.2: Group differences on Belief Question in Experiment 3.
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*11 16 autistic children who failed pointed to where the merble
really was, rather than to any of the other possible locations,
which suggests that their error was not due to random pointing (p =
0.006, Binomial Test, one-tailed). The tour autistic children who
passed succeeded on both trials. They were subject numbers 2,7,8,arx1
21, and their individual subject data can be found in Appendix 2.
Their CA ranged from 10:11 to 15:10 years, their non-verbal MA'S
were between 8:10 and 10:8, and their verbal MA's between 2:9 and
7:0. Comparison with the thta in Table 1.1 (p. I 8) shows that these
children were fairly average on all the available variables. They
were not significantly different from those who tailed on either CA
(t = 1.33, df = 18, p = 0.2, tic-tailed) or MA (Leiter] (t = 0.399,
df = 18, p > 0.5, tw-tailed), or MA (BPVT] (t = 0.59, df = 18, p >
0.8, two-tailed). In other words, there were certainly other
children of equal or greater MA and CA who gave incorrect responses.
The 2 Dowi's Syndrome children who failed on the Belief Question on
one or both trials are subjects 2 and 5 (see Appendix 2).
Discussion:
The tact that every single child taking part in the experiment
correctly answered the control questions allows us to conclude that
they all knew (ie: believed) that the merbie was put somewhere else
after Sally left. The critical question was: "Where will Sally
look?" after she returns. Here a group difference appeared: autistic
children answered this question in a distinctly different way from
the others. The Doi's Syndrome and the normel preschool children
answered by pointing to where the merble was put in the first place.
Thus, they lust have appreciated that their knowledge of where
the merble actually was and the knowledge that could be attributed
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to the doll were different. That is, they predicted the doll 'a
bthavjour on the basis of the doll 'a belief. The autistic group, on
the other hand, answered by pointing consistently to where the
marble really wes. They did not merely point to a 'wrong' location,
but rather to the actual location of the marble.
This becomes especially clear on Trial 2 where the autistic children
never pointed to the box (which had been the 'wrong' location on
Trial 1), but instead pointed to the experimenter's pocket - Ic:
again to where the marble really was. This rules out both a position
preference and a negativism explanation. The failure on the Belief
Question was also not due to random pointing. Nor could it have been
due to any failure to understand and remember the demands of the
task or the narrative, since these children all answered the Naming,
Memory and Reality Questions perfectly. The conclusion therefore Is
that the autistic children did not appreciate the difference between
their oa and the doll 'a belief.
The results thus strongly support the hypothesis that autistic
children as a group fail to employ a thecry of mind, Ic: they showed
no evidence of being able to attribute mental states such as
different beliefs to another person. This was in contrast to an
intact theory of mind in normal 1 year olds - a result which
replicates that found by Wimer and Pemer (1983). A more dramatic
contrast perhaps was with the Do 'ri 'a Syndrome subjects, who also
demonstrated that they possessed and could employ a theory of mind.
Thus, the failure ahow by the autistic children canoot be
attributed to the general effects of mental retardation, since even
the more aeverey retarded Dowi 'a Syndrome children performed close
to ceiling on this experiment.
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There is however a suggestion that there mey exist a smell subgroup
of autistic children who succeeded on the task and who thus may be
able to employ a thecry of mind. It is unclear in what way this 20%
of the autistic sample were different from the rest of the group.
They were rot different from the other autistic children in terme of
MA (either verbal or non-verbal) or CA. However, although not
significantly so, they were among the older subjects in the autistic
group. One hypothesis is that their social cognition is intact at
least at this simple level (the level of a normel 31 year old), and
thus they are less 'autistic' than the rest of the group, but their
social cognitive deficits uld become evident in a task of slightly
greater complexity. This possibility is tested in an experiment to
be reported later (Experiment 6, section 5.5).
As defined earlier, the Puppet Experiment (3) tested autistic
subjects' conceptual role-taking skill, in contrast to Experiment 2
which tested perceptual role-taking skill. The results of these two
experiments suggests that the t abilities are indeed distinct. The
difference is postulated to lie in the fact that attribution of
mental states is only required in conceptual and not perceptual
role-taking tasks. These t experiments also show that only
impaired conceptual role-taking skill is associated with the social
impairment fOund in autism.
In the next experiment, the impairment in autistic children 's theory
of ud.nd was retested, using a different paradigm, to test the
stability of the finding from the Puppet Experiment, and to test
whether the impairment was specific to understanding situations
which required attribution of mental states, or whether it extended
to all comprehension of all social situations.
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.2:	 Experiment 14: Attribution of false beliefs ati 'social
scripts'.
In Experiment k, picture stories of socisl (ie: interpersorl)
situations were presented to autistic children. Some of the stories
required the subject to attribute false beliefs to a character, and
some did rEt. Such an experimental design allowed the 'specific
deficit hypothesis' to be tested: Ic, that the social Impairment in
autism is Soc&fr-1 a failure to employ a thecry of mind, rather
than a difficulty in comprehending all social situations.
A picture-sequencing technique was chosen to test this hypothesis.
The appropriateness of this paradigm lies in the fact that It
"coimands Itself", that is, it requires no necessary verbal
Instructions from the experimenter. Furthermore, it requires no
verbal response from the child, which is very convenient In the case
of the autistic group. Lastly It allows a fairly uniform method of
testing many different conceptual probleme. An additiormi ratiormle
behind the experiment was to test whether the deficit found in the
first experiment using puppets was replicable using a different
paradigm.
The child's ability to arrange the individual pictures into a
coherent story wes assumed to depend on the subject applying the
appropriate explarmtory schema which would comect the separate
actions depleted in the pictures. There were 3 conditions:
SCRIPTAL 1: One person acting in very familiar situations;
SCRIPTAL 2: Two people acting in very familiar situations;
MENTAL: People acting with false beliefs;
The 'Mental' Condition was assumed to require the mental-state
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concept of false belief to link the pictures. The 'Scriptal'
Conditions could be sequenced using 'social scripts' (Nelson, 1981;
Wiier, 1979), without any necessary knowledge of aental states.
These latter stories comprised such everyday sorts of occurrences
that a single routine or 'script' (Sthank arid Abelson, 1977) could
specify their temporal order:
"A script, as we use it, is a structure that describes an
appropriate sequence of' events in a particular context. A
script is made up of slots and requirements about what can
fill those slots. The structure is an intercomected
whole, and what Is in one slot affects what can be in
another. Scripts handle stylized everyday situations. They
are not subject to much change, nor do they provide the
apparatus for handling novel situations...For our
purposes, a script is a predetermined, stereotyped
sequence of actions that define a well-known situation. A
script is, in effect, a very boring little story...(For
example) 'John went into the restaurant. He ordered a
hamburger aix! a coke. He asked the waitress for the check
and left'. " (Schank arid Abelson, 1977, p.1122).
Nelson (1981) adds:
"Scripts are...concrete...general event representation(s)
derived from arid applied to social contexts" (p.101).
Since they are concrete, they can only describe bthaviour, not
mental states. All 3 conditions could be sequenced and understood
using a mentalist strategy, since such a strategy is very powerful
(Dennett, 1978a), but a complete understanding of the 'Mental
Condition was not possible using a scriptal strategy, although this
might result in a correct sequence being produced. The child's
understanding of the sequences s/he produced, whether 'correct' or
not, was tested by eliciting protocols. This will be discussed in
the Results section later.
Materials:
The pictures were drawn on white cards, 5 inches by 5 inches. The
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images had simple black outlines, and l colours were used
throughout. A mixture of drawing styles was used, since some
material was cosnercially available, and some were drawn either to
specification by an artist, or by the Experimenter. These are shown
in AppendIx 5. Each picture contained approximately one action and
three objects, in an attempt to match the stimuli for complexity
across conditions. However, it is highly problematic to find
appropriate objective criteria with which to assess complexity, and
this question must remain open pending replication with a new range
of materials. In the present design, each child was presented with
the same set of stimuli. Thus, relative ease of performance can be
compared. Figure l.3 below shows the 9 stories used.
Figure 'L3: Contents of Picture Stories in Experiment 1:
Picture	 1	 2	 3	 11
SCRIPTAL 1:
1. Turns on tap
	
Stands under it Soaps	 Dries
2. Puts on trousers Then T-Shirt	 Then shoes	 Is dressed
3. Man with spade	 Digs hole	 Pours in seeds Fills hole
SCRIPTAL 2:
1. Girl walking	 Open shop door	 Buys sweets	 Leaves shop
2. Man rolls dough	 Sprinkles veg	 Cooks pie	 Serves it
3. Boy eats icecream Girl sits down	 Girl takes ice Girl eats it
MENTAL:
1. Boy buys sweets	 Leaves shop	 Drops sweets	 Boy shocked
2. Girl puts down teddy Picks flower Boy takes teddy Girl shocked
3. Boy puts choc in box Goes out	 Mum eats choc Boy shocked
These picture stories are shown In Appendix 5.
Procedure:
Each of the 3 conditions contained 3 stories, and each story
comprised pictures, so that the length was standardized. Autistic,
normal, and Down 's Syndrome subjects were each presented with every
story, such that each thild effectively had 3 trials in each
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condition. The order of presentation of the conditions s Scriptal
2, P4tal, Scriptal 1 for all children. This order is designed so
that the 'Meta1' condition could beetit trcm any practice effects,
and the Scriptal 1 condition could be used as a covariate in later
ar].ysis so as to assess any effects of fatigue. The stories within
each condition were randomly presented.
With each story, the experimenter placed the first picture in its
correct position (1) on a frame that had empty squares in
sequece, and the remaining 3 pictures in random order above it, so
as to avoid any position cues Eioh might lead to a systematic bias
in sequicing. Each child was told, for each story:
"This is the first picture. Look at the other pictures, and see if
you can make a story with them." If the child did not respond
inunediately, the experimenter first named all the objects in the
picture, to esure there was no ambiguity in the drawings, and the'
said: "Which is the next picture ?" The exact order of the placing
of the 11 pictures in each story was noted doirji, as well as any
self-corrections. Each child had only one attempt at each of the '1
stories. The rrrations (protocols), spontaneous and elicited, of
the stories they created were tape-recorded and transcribed (see
Appidix Ii).
The scoring system was as follows: Since the child was always told
which was the first picture, there were 6 possible permutations in
which the subject could sequ&oe the other 3 pictures. These were
g34.2.
123 1 , 12113, 13211, 11123, and 11132. The correct aequce (12311) was
give 2 points. 1 point was awarded if the child placed the last
card in the correct position (13211), since the protocols showed that
whe this sequce occurred, the child at least understood that the
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story proceeded from a beginning to an end point. As a conservative
measure, all other permutations re given a score of zero. The
expected score by chance was therefore 0.5 for one story, or 1.5 for
each condition (I.e. three stories).
Subjects:
The subjects ire almost the same as In the first 3 experiments,
with a few exceptions. The MA, CA, IQ, and Language Ages are given
in Table p1.2, below. Once again, the autistic group can be seen to
have the advantage of higher CA and MA over the control groups:
Table 14.2: Subject variables (means, standard deviations, and
ranges) for Experiments 1 and 5
N	 Chronological Age	 Sex
x	 sd	 Range	 Male	 Female
Normal	 27	 14.5 0.7	 3.5-5.9	 114	 13
Autistic 21	 12. 1  2.8	 6.1-16.9	 114	 7
Doa's	 15	 11.5 3.8	 6.3-17.0	 6	 9
Leiter M.A.
	
BPVT
x	 sd Range	 x	 sd Range
Normal-
	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -
Autistic 9.6 2.3 6.7-15.9	 5.7 2.1 2.8-12.5
Dow's	 5.9 0.9 14.8- 8.5	 2.9 0.6 1.8- 14.0
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Results:
Table 1L3: Group Mean Scores for the three Corilitions: Scriptal 1,
Mtal, and Scriptal 2.
Corxlitions
SCRIPTAL 2	 MENTAL	 SCRIPTAL 1
x	 ad	 x	 ad	 x	 ad
Norl	 I.3
	
1.9
	
5.2	 1.5	 11.11	 1.ê
Downs	 2.8 2.1	 2.9 1.1	 2.6 1.2
Autistic	 1.6	 1.8 2.5
	
1L.5 1.3
Max = 6; Mm = 0
The group mean scores for the 3 conditions is ahot in Figure
overleaf.
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Figure 1l.ê: Group mean scores for the 3 eor1itions in Experiumnt J4
SCRIPT 1	 SCRIPT2	 MENTAL
' AUTISTIC
0	 DO'?IN'S
0 NORMAL
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An MIOVA was performed to compare the 3 conditions (Seriptal 1,
Scriptal 2, and Mental) and the 3 groups. There was a significant
Group x Conditions interaction (F lI,120 = ii.68, p ( 0.001). Most
importantly for the hypothesis, on the Mental condition the autistic
group were significantly rse than even the Do a Syndrome group
(Post-Hoe Seffe Test, p < 0.05). There was no difference between
the Soriptal conditions 1 and 2, and therefore there was no order
effect. The autistic group were equal to the normal group on the
Scriptal conditions, while the Doiei's Syndrome group were
significantly rse (Stheffe Test, p < 0.01). For the Doi's
Syndrome group, performance was quite even throughout all conditions
and quite poor overall.
When the last condition (Scriptal 1) was used as a covariate in
order to control for the effects of fatigue on performance, there
was still a significant groups x Conditions interaction (P2,60 =
19.93, p < 0.001). This is effectively like matching the groups on
the final condition. When CA was used as a covariate, the Groups x
Conditions significant interaction remained ( P 13,120 = 111.68, p <
0.001) as when MACLeiter) was used (P2,68 = 11.1, p < 0.001) and
MA(BPVT) (F2,68 11.1, p <0.001). In eth case, the autistic group
were significantly rse than the Doi 'a group on the Mental
condition (SthefTe Test, p < 0.05) as predicted.
An error arlysis was performed on the sequences produced which
scored zero. These combinations were 11123, 11132, 13142, and 12i3.
Their individual frequencies for eech group were very similar, and
so these were collapsed across the 3 groups. The observed
frequencies were 21%, 21%, 30%, and 26% of the total number of
errors, respectively. On the assumption that eech had an equal
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probability of being produced (p = 0.25), these frequencies were rot
significantly different from chance (Binomial Test, p ) 0.15).
Furthermore, there were no significant differences within eh
condition (Ic: between individual stories) but only between
conditions, which suggests that within eh condition the 3 stories
were relatively homogeneous.
Protocol Analysis:
10 autistic and , Dowi's Syndrome children were sufficiently
cooperative to provide verbal descriptions for either all or almost
all '1 picture sequences. The miniiin requirement was that the child
should have given narrations in at least S out of ' trials. In
addition, protocols were gathered from a randomly selected one third
of the normal children.
The narrations were rated according to strict criteria by 3
'non-independent' and 1 independent raters to fall into the
categories of either 'mental state' or 'descriptive'. For eth
picture story a rmrratlon, regardless or length, was categorized
into only 1 of the 2 classes. The score was determined on a
"priority" basis, ie: for a Mental story, an utterance was scanned
for a "mental state" expression (see below), and the default
category was "descriptive". In Scriptal 1 and Scriptal 2 stories,
utterances were scanned for mental state expressions and scored
accordingly with "descriptive" again as the default category. Only
it there was 100% agreement that an expression should be rated as
'mental state' from all 3 non-independent raters, and it this
concurred with the independent rater, was an express ion in tao t rated
as 'mental state'. (This system, and the rating categories (shobal
overleaf), were devised by Alan Leslie).
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The mental state categorY was applied only when the utterance
contained:
a) A mental state expression (want, believe, Iaw, pretend, wish,
think, imegine, hope, expect, etc.) eg:
"He wanted to buy sweets". or eg:
"The boy didn't know she pinched his chocolate".
b) An implicit attribution of a mental state, eg:
"The boy was surprised 'cuz he couldn't find his chocolate".
c) An attribution of an utterance to the protagonist appropriate to
his or her mental state, marked by special intonation, eg:
"He's shouting, 'Where's my sweet gone?'!"
Examples that were not considered to fall into the mental state
category (because they are equivocal in terma of aentalistic
language and are probably merely descriptive) were:
"He stole the teddy". or
"His mother claps her hands. He is frightened and goes outside".
Again, these utterances were placed by default into the descriptive
category together with utterances such as:
"The girl puts her teddy do and the boy takes it, arid the girl
picks the flower", or eg:
"The boy buys some sweets and he drops them on the rood. Then there
are no ire".
The protocols are showi in Appendix 1, together with their
individual ratings. Between the independent arid non-independent
raters , 100% of Scriptal utterances and 95.6% of Mental utterances
were scored identically. The remaining ones (3 out of 69) were, by
default, scored as descriptive. For eh child the ratings were
turned into percentages relative to the total number of trials where
verbal responses were made. The results of this classification are
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ehowi in Table	 4:
Table 1$.1: Percentage of utterances classified accrding to use of
descriptive or mental state language.
CONDITION	 SCRIPTAL 1 & 2	 MENTAL
Utterances	 "descriptive"	 "mental state"
Groups
Autistic	 x	 95	 22
(n = 10)	 ad	 11	 (fl = 9)	 33
	
x	 98	 78
(n=5)
	
ad	 7	 (n=6)	 27
Normal	 x	 76	 81
(n = 9)
	
sd	 18	 (n = 9)	 24
The thta were sufficiently normally distibuted to allow ANOVA with
post-hoc Stheffe tests. In the Scriptal 1 and Scrlptal 2 conditIons
all subjects used more "descriptive" utterances than any other kind
but this was less evident in the normal groups who used a
significantly greater propertion of "mental state" expressions
(F2,21 5.'8, p < 0.01). In the Mental condition a significant
difference was obtained between the autistic group and the rest,
since they used "mental state expressions" much more rarely than the
Dowi's Syndrome and normal children (F2,21 = 7.97, p < 0.002). This
is entirely consistent with the results of sequencing and suggests
that success on this condition implies the ability to attribute
mental states.
Discussion:
The results from the sequencing scores show that the autistic group
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were significantly irse on the 'Mental' Condition than either of
the 2 control groups, though they were not worse on the other 2
conditions. What does the poor performance on the 'Mental' Condition
imply? It uld appear that, as the Puppet Experiment (3) showed,
autistic children, independent of MA, are impaired in their ability
to attribute a different belief to another person, since this is
what the 'Mental' Condition is assumed to require.
The protocol evidence, although clinically gathered and therefore
inconclusive, was highly consistent with this pattern. The autistic
children showed a paucity of mental state language even in
comparison with the Dowi 's Syndrome children. In addition, the
protocols for the autistic children showed that, with the exception
of three subjects (Subjects Number 7, 8 and 10), they gave purely
descriptive renderings of stories for which the other children
readily gave mental state explartions. For example, a Doii '5
Syndrome child (Subject Number 6) says for Mental Story 3 (see
Figure L3, and pictorially illustrated in Appendix 5):
"He says, 'Where's my chocolate?'!"
while a normal child (Subject Number 19) says:
"The boy is putting the rIeet in the box so nobody won't
find it. Then he goes out. She eat it. And he's shouting,
'Where's my 5Ieet gone?'!"
In both cases, the child attributes an utterance appropriate to the
boy's expectation that the boy then discovers is false. A striking
contrast is provided by the response to this story by an autistic
child (Subject Number 5), who had marged to get the order of the
pictures correct:
"The boy put the chocolate in the box, and the woman ate
it."
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The experimenter prompts by asking,
"What does he say?"
The child replies,
"Why did you eat my chocolate?".
The subject's protocol reveals that he has rot attributed a
different belief to the character in the picture story. The first
part of his description, however, suggests that the autistic child
has understood the story lull well in terme of the sequential
displacements of the characters and the focal object, the chocolate.
It is the final step of realizing that the boy believed the
chocolate still to be in the box that is missing. Accordingly, such
a protocol received a rating of 'descriptive' rather than 'mental
state'.
The protocols also underline the point that the autistic children
did rot do so badly on the Mental stories because they could not
make inferences or inventions "behind the scenes", as it were, to
turn a group of pictures into a story. On the contrary, t autistic
children (Subject Numbers 1 and 9) even made sense of the above
story by	 !in a second piece of chocolate:
"The boy puts his chocolate into the box. He eats his chocolate. He
goes out to play. His grandmother eats a chocolate". Or, eg:
"The boy has a chocolate. He puts it in the box. Then his mother
eats it and then he eats one too. He goes out of the door".
It appears that these autistic children, limited to purely
behavioural descriptions, created a coherent story by assuming that
there were 2 different chocolates in the story, overriding the
visual information which suggested the same chocolate appeared in
the different pictures. None of the normal or Do 'a Syndre
children did this, presumably because their ability to attribute
mental states made it possible to 'see' a different meaning in the
pictures.
What of the autistic children's performance on the 'Scriptal'
Conditions? Their good performance on these conditions suggests that
the autistic group were able to use a 'social script' strategy, ie:
they were able to sequence social events if they did not require
recourse to the mental state of the characters. Their protocols (see
Appendix 1) show that 9 out of 10 autistic children described the
'Scriptal' Condition stories they created in purely 'behavioural'
language, as they had done in the 'Mental' Condition. The 1 autistic
child who did not is one of those who used mental state expressions
in the Mental condition (Subject Number 8).
11I% of the normal and 100% Dow's Syndrome children for whom
protocols were available also did not use mental state terme in the
'Scriptal' Conditions. This suggests that these children too were
able to sequence Scriptal stories correctly without any necessary
recourse to mental states of the actors. In contrast, correct
sequencing of the 'Mental' Condition stories was highly likely to
require attribution of mental states to the actors. Thus, the
'Scriptal' Conditions could be correctly sequenced by referring only
to external behaviour. The important conclusion to emerge from
autistic children's good performance on the 'Scriptal' Conditions is
that it is rot all social or interpersonal information which
autistic children find difficult to interpret, but only those where
mental state attribution is involved.
It is also the case that 90% of the autistic children for whom
protocols were available used temporal terme in their descriptions,
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(such as then, and, first, etc.), and this suggests that they are
able to perceive their created story as a whole rather than purely
frame by frame.
It should be noted that the picture sequencing task is not well
suited to the Do's group in any of the conditions. They performed
at a medium to low level throughout. The autistic group have been
reper ted to also be particularly poor at the sequencing task of the
WISC (Lockyer and Putter, 1970; Putter, 1978b), but this experiment
suggests that it Is rot sequencing in general that they find
difficult, so much as sequencing of social stories which require the
attribution of mental states to the actors. Indeed, an ara].ysis of
the WISC-R picture-arrangement subtask shows that at least halt' of
the stories used there (and arguably as many as three-quarters) are
of a complexity that would require a 'thecry of mind' In a'der to be
able to sequence them, and this might in part account for autistic
children 's poor performance on this subtask.
14.3: Comparison of results from the Puppet and the Picture
Experiments (3 and ii).
All autistic subjects in the Picture Experiment (14] (with the
exception of one boy (Subject Number 10] and one autistic girl
(Subject Number 20] who changed schools and were thus not available)
also participated in the Puppet Experiment (3) involving attribution
of a false belief. In addition, there was one autistic boy (Subject
Number 22) who participated in the Puppet Experiment but who was
excluded from the Picture Experiment because he was uncooperative.
Re did not succeed on the Belief Question of the Puppet Experiment.
Thus, 19 autistic children participated in both Experiments (3 and
14).
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Of critical interest was the comparison of performance on the Belief
Question in the Puppet Experiment with the 'Hental' Condition
(attribution of belief) in the Picture Experiment. If these are
indeed measuring the same ability (Ic: their thecry of mind) then
there should be consistent responding in these two tasks. Of the 19
children, 12 failed in both tasks, ie: failed to predict correctly
where the doll would look for her marble on the basis of her false
belief, and scored less than 11 on the picture sequencing task. 3
children (Subject Numbers 11,5 and 11) who failed on the Puppet task,
passed the picture sequencing task (scoring 11 or more), while
another 2 (Subject Numbers 2 and 21) who passed on Puppets, failed
on Pictures. This leaves 2 children (Subject Numbers 7 and 8) who
passed both tasks. Overall, this means that ill out of 19 (711%) of
the autistic children performed consistently on both tasks.
One question concerns how to account for the few autistic children
who performed inconsistently: These comprised 3 subjects who
'passed' on the 'Mental' Condition of the Pictures but did not pass
the Puppets, and 2 children who passed the Puppets but not the
Pictures. These 5 children (Subject Numbers 2,11,5, 11, and 21) were
retested on both tasks, and their results in terme of passing and
failing stayed the same. (The actual sequences in their retest on
Experiment 11 are in Appendix 3). Hence, the inconsistency is not
unreliability. Analysis of the verbal protocols of these 5 children
was performed in comparison to the protocols of the 2 chIldren
(Subject Numbers 7 and 8) who passed on both tasks. This showed that
the protocols of those children who passed on the 'Mental' Condition
of the pictures but failed the puppets did not contain any
mentalistic terma. In contrast, the protocols of those 2 children
who passed both the pictures and the puppets did contain mentalistic
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terms.
One conclusion that can be dra from this is that the 2 children
who passed both tasks can Indeed attribute different beliefs, as
indicated in their protocols, and they used this ability in both the
Puppet and Picture Experiments. In contrast, the 3 children who
passed the Pictures only may have done so by using pictorial cues
for sequcing. Their protocols do not indicate that they could
attribute different beliefs. This Kuld account for why they failed
the Puppets. Finally, the 2 children who passed the Puppets task
only may have done so because they could use mentalistic concepts
there, In the simpler conditions of that Experiment (3), but for
some reason did not see how to use such concepts in the sequencing
task. Certainly, judging from the Dowi 'a Syndrome group 'a
performances, the Puppet Experiment was simpler than the Picture
Experiment.
14.14: General Discussion.
The results from the Puppet and Picture Experiments suggest that the
vast majority of autistic children are impaired in their theory of
mind, as predicted. Expressed differently, the aspect of their
self-other differentiation which is impaired is their conceptual
role-taking ability. This is in contrast to their perceptual
role-taking ability, or their 'theory of sight', which was shoa to
be Intact in Experiment 2 and by others (Hobson, 19814). Since the
deficit in theory of mind was not found in either of the tc control
groups, it can be assumed to be autism-specific. In addition, since
Experiments 3 and 11 used widely differing experimental paradigms
(namely, a puppet story versus picture-story aequecing), this
finding can be considered as fairly robust. Furthermore, in both
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experiments, the autistic children shod they were able to cope
with the 'structural' aspects of the tasks by performing at or close
to ceiling on the control conditions (namely, the Control Questions
in the Puppet Experiment, and the Scriptal Conditions in the Picture
Experiment). Both of these high performances indicate that 'social
information' per se is not confusing for them, but social
information the comprehension of which requires attribution of
mental states (such as false beliefs) appears to be beyond the
competence of st autistic children in the present sample.
An analysis of the cognitive underpinnings of a theory of mind
allows certain predictions to be made concerning other aspects of
the environment which might be either confusing for autistic
children, or within their competence. One such cognitive
interpretation of a theory of mind is given below.
Dennett (1978a) has argued that the nature of a cognitive system
which is capable of attributing mental states to others can be
described minimally as a "second-order intentional system". That is,
it is a system which can represent another system's representations
(e.g. have beliefs about someone else's beliefs). Leslie (to appear)
has called this a "second-order representational system". (Perner
and Wimer [1985) use a different notation, calling it "first-order
belief attribution", since they do not include the subject's ow
mental state in their counting system. We will adhere to Dennett and
Leslie's notation of 'second-order' to describe beliefs about
beliefs. Thus, 'third-order' would be 'beliefs about beliefs about
beliefs' etc.). Johnson-Laird (1983) points out that, since
"the essential phenomenon about (other) people 'a beliefs
is that they may be ndstakei...(eg: They may believe that
Euthanasia is a country somewhere in South-East
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Asia)..,(thusj when you mentally represent someone else's
beliefs, you can (and must) insulate th from your own"
(p. 1433)
In order to do this, he argues, our cognitive meohinery must be
capable of a "recursive embedding of mental models" (p.1133).
Furthermore,
"ie person can have an attitude about aixther person's
propositiorl attitude, and so on indefinitely: eg 'Maggie
krx,ws that I hope Eddie believes that his wife thinks
that. • .you are here', and such assertions are accomoda ted
by the recursive embedding of mental models within mental
models" (p.1137).
In practice, Premack and Woodruff (1978) point out, human cognitive
systeme are liid.ted to 11 a' 5 levels of recursive embedding, before
reaching the lindts of comprehension - it is therefore not an
indefinite process, except in principle.
At the simplest level of a theory of mind, then, recursive, embedded
second order representations are required. Johnson-Laird (1983,
p.11311) has drawn out a diagram of such a representation (Fig. 14.5):
Figure 4.5: Diagram of a 'second-order' representation.
Your beliefs:
i. All the members of the government (g) are monetarists (m).
a. Phil (p) believes (-.) that at least some members of the
government are monetaristS.
. We both bclievt that the chancellor of the exchequer (c) is a
mooctariat.
Your beliefs:
g - in	 c
I-
g	 m
(m)
An example of a nested set of beliefs within a mental model.
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Other authors have called this a 'metacognitive' system le: a system
that has cognitions about cognitlons (Miller, essel and Flavell,
1970; Barenboim, 1978; Flavell, 1979; Eliot et al, 1979; Shultz and
Cloghesy, 1981) and, like Johnson-Laird, all emphasize the recursive
property of a representatiorEl system capable of this. According to
Leslie (to appear) the ability to form second-order representations
emerges at around 18 months in the normal child. Before this, the
infant already possesses the ability to form "first-order
representations". That is, the infant can represent real 'objects'
and relations between objects in the outside world. Evidence of how
robust the normal child 's theory of mind is by the age of i years
old is demonstrated in their understanding of the distinction
between 'mind' and 'brain' (Johnson and Weliman, 1982).
One cognitive interpretation therefore of an impaired theory of mind
in autism is a deficit in the ability to form second-order
representations. From this hypothesis a prediction is that autistic
children would also be impaired in areas other than the use of a
theory of mind but which also require use of second-order
representations. One such area is pretend play (Leslie, to appear).
There is some evidence that pretend play is deficient in autistic
children (Wing et al, 1977; Ungerer and Sigman, 1981; Riguet et al,
1981; Gould, in press), and Experiment 7 [described in Chapter 7)
reports an attempt to explore this evidence further.
It is rth clarifying the nature of the postulated deficit: A
person's theory of mind is the ability not only to have beliefs
about beliefs, but also intentions about beliefs, beliefs about
intentions, desires about intentions or beliefs, beliefs about
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desires, etc. In the Puppet and Picture Experiments (3 and U, only
one aspect of autistic children 'a theory of mind was investigated
ie: their ability to have beliefs about beliefs, and this s found
to be impaired. These experiments did not look at their
understanding of intentions or desires, although these may be of
equivalent cognitive complexity. (As discussed earlier [p.101), the
reason why 'beliefs' were selected fbr investigation was because
this was a mental state donnin where one could guarantee a
difference between one's o and another person's mental state
[Winmer and Perner, 1983; Dennett, 1978b)).
If it is indeed the case that autistic children are impaired in
their ability to attribute mental states to other people, this would
make much sense of their 'avoidance' of and incompetence in the
social world: Since a great deal of people's behaviour is
uninterpretable (Ic: meaningless) without a theory of mind, people
would appear unpredictable and confusing. The world of physical and
Inanin2te objects, In contrast, which requires 'first-order'
representations, should appear predictable and lawful to them, since
the 'second-order' deficit should leave their understanding of
physical causality unimpaired. This prediction is the basis of
Experiment 5, reported in the next chapter.
Before proceeding, it is worth stopping to consider for a moment how
the social world might appear to someone if they did indeed lack a
theory of mind. The closest insight to such a 'world view' is
perhaps to identity it as a form of 'Radical Behaviourism' (Watson,
1913; Skinner, 1971):
"We do not need to try to discover what persorlities,
states of mind, feelings, traits of character, plans,
purposes, intentions, or the other prerequisites of
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autonomous man really are in order to get on with a
scientific arlys1s of behaviour". (Skinner, 1971, p.20).
Radical Behaviourists argued that all human behaviour could be
understood in terui of operant conditioning and àontingent
reinforcement of the environment. However, such an apprch becomes
too cbersome to explain meny social events, in that it involves
taking account of the history of every piece of behaviour, and it
cannot account at all for totally novel behaviour. Furthermore,
there are certain classes of behaviour which are unarlysable in
Behaviourist terme. One such is deception, where attribution of
false beliefs is essential if the behaviour is to have any
'meaning'.
To summarize, a theory of mind avoids the laboriousness of a
Behaviourist arlysis of people's actions, in that a single mental
state can be attributed to a person to explain an action that might
otherwise require dozens of S-B chain-links in a Behaviourist
explartion; and a theory of mind can be used to explain both novel
and highly sophisticated acts in a way that a Behaviourist account
cannot. However, a Behaviourist world-view is essentially a causal
one, in that certain aspects of the physical environment are seen as
causally shaping an organism's responses. Thus, the (somewhat
light-hearted) characterization of autistic children as aralagous to
Radical Behaviourists is consistent with the prediction that their
concept of physical causality is unimpaired. This is tested in the
next experiment.
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Chapter 5: First, Second, and Third-Order Representation.
5.1: First-order representation in autistic and normal children.
As discussed in Chapter
	
a deficit in one's thecry of mind
implicates a deficit in the capacity for second-order
representation. One prediction from such a hypothesis is that those
domains which do not require more than a first-order
representatiorBl capacity should not be impaired in autism. One
question, then, is to determine which domains in our understanding
of the world only require first-order representations.
In Piaget's theory (Piaget and Inhe].der, 1969), the infant is said
to show evidence of a representatior2l capacity at the end of the
'sensorimotor' period (at about 8 months of age), when s/he "can
evoke persons or objects in their absence" ( p .3). Thus, acquisition
of the 'object concept' is considered to require first-order
representations. This can be considered as definitiorl of
first-order representations: they represent the physical world, Ic:
objects, events, and relationships beten objects. In contrast, as
discussed In Chapter 4, second -order representations re pre sen t the
mental world, Ic: other representations.
Post-Plagetlan developmental psythology has tended to argue that a
(first-order) representatiorl capacity is present long before 8
months of age, since Infants of a few weeks old are able to
discriminate beten familiar and novel stimuli; indeed such an
assumption is the basis of the 'habituation' paradigm. How much such
young infants understand about the different aspects of objects (eg:
object Identity, object permanence, causality, etc.) Is still a
matter of debate, but since they have the capacity for
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representation very early on (and perhaps from birth), it is likely
that such knowledge of objecthood is present at earlier ages than
Piaget estimated (Bower, 1975; Gratch, 1975).
On the above definition, a child could be said to have a
"ful1yfledg&" first-order representatiorl capacity if s/he
understood the basic attributes of the 'object world', Ic: that
objects exist independently of oneself over time and space, and that
they interact causally with eachother. If the postulated
second-order representatiorl deficit in autism Is a specific
deficit, then one prediction is that knowledge of the object world
should be unimpaired. Certainly, there are a number of studies which
have found that autistic children do have an object concept which is
not impaired relative to MA, and this runs counter to the once-held
view that autistic children do not reach the end of the
'sensorimotor' stage (Anthony, 1958; Betteiheim, 1967; Thatcher,
1977).
Serafica (1971) studied 8 "deviant" children (CA = 1t_8 yrs) who were
variously diagnosed (infantile autism, symbiotic psychosis, and
childhood schizophrenia). She found that, using the Uzgiris-Hunt
(1975) Scales of Object Permanence, all the children were successful
when a "preferred" object was used (ie: an object to which the child
was emotiorally attached), although only 2 subjects were successful
when a "neutral" object was used. Serafica's subjects' performance,
although inconsistent, does show that they could represent invisible
displacements of objects. However, the inclusion criteria for her
subjects are not adequate to be able to make generalizations about
autism, and nor does her study show the relationship between object
knowledge and MA.
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The same criticism applies to the study by Curcio (1978), In that
although his subjects (n = 12, CA = 1 :9_12:O yrs) all achieved at
least Stage 5 on the Uzgiris-Hunt Object Permanence Scale, no MA
data were included • Nevertheless, the results from these 2 studies
are consistent with the hypothesis that autistic children 'a ability
to represent the physical world of objects is not Impaired. Curelo's
study further found that autistic children performed very highly on
the 'causality' scale (with 67% of subjects scoring at Stage 1 or
above (max = 6)), and the 'means-ends' scale (83% of subjects
scoring at Stage 5 or above [max = 6)). The 'causality' test
included trying to activate a mechanical object, and the
'means-ends' test Included using a rake to obtain an object, for
example. This ceiling performance suggests that not only do young
autistic children have a concept of 'object permanence' but they
also understand the basic (causal) relationships that can exist
between objects.
The question of the relation between such first-order
re pre sen ta tio rm 1 capacity and MA in autism was addressed in a more
recent study by Signan and Ungerer (1981). Their sample of 16
autistic children (mean CA = 51.7 months, sd = 10.7) was assessed
using Cattell's general IQ test (mean MA = 2L8 months, ad : 5.1) as
well as the Merrill-Palmer performance MA test (mean MA = 33.1
months, ad : 7.8). The general IQ test was used as the matching
criterion with the normal control group, so that the autistic group
would not be matched with normal children who were far more advanced
in their language skills. Using the Casati and Lezine (1968)
Sensorimotor Scales, they found that their autistic subjects passed
the majority of the ubtests at Stage 6 (ie: ceiling); all the
subjects showed Stage 6 level skills on the 'Search for Hidden
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Objects' subtest. 5 children failed the highest level visible
displacement problem, where the object is moved under eth of 3 pads
and left in the last location. However, these children went on to
pass the invisible displacement problen, in which the object is
moved invisibly. Thus, while their object kmwledge seemed somewhat
unstable, they showed clear evidence of representatiorl capacity
(of the 'first-order' type). These autistic subjects were however
less good at the 'means-ends' subtests, although many of them were
capable of using tools etc., without trial-and-error manipulations.
Poor performance was found to correlate with MA and CA, but nct with
language level. The overall conclusion from Sigman and Ungerer's
study is that autistic children 'a 'sensorimotor skills' are not
delayed relative to their developmental level. These authors also
confirmed Serafica's (1971) result that object permanence is
demonstrated only when 'preferred' objects (such as sweets or rood,
in this study) are used, rather than 'neutral' objects such as small
toys.
Sigman and Ungerer's (1981) result has been replicated by Wetherby
and Gaines (1982) on a small sample of autistic children (n = 6; CA
range 1I:8_15:2 yrs, mean = 8:5). Their MA was assessed using the
Leiter Scale (mean = 5.0 yrs, ad : 3.2). All 6 subjects showed
correct performance on the tests of Object Permanence, Causality,
and Means-Ends, although their ability to show conservation of mass,
liquid, and number wes inconsistent. Thus, these autistic subjects
also showed their 'sensorimotor knowledge' was intact, although
their non-conservation suggests not all were at the level of
'concrete operations'. This wes not out of line with their MA. In
another experiment (Lancy and Goldstein, 1982), autistic children (n
12, retarded IQ range, no MA data reported) passed both object
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permanence and conservation tasks. Hanmes and Langdell (1981) found
that their autistic sample (n = 8, mean MA 14.6 years) showed
"anticipatory gaze shifts" on a Bower, Broughton and Mocre (1971)
type test of object permanence. This implies that they possessed an
internal repesentation of the object.
The consistent success at understanding object permanence and
causality in the studies reviewed suggests that, with an MA of at
least 2 years old, autistic children's first-order representatiorel
capacity is unimpaired. This is consistent with the hypothesis that
their impairment is specific to second-order representatiorl
skills. Other evidence that autistic children understand causality
is in their frequently noted interest in the mechanical world
(Karner, 19143; Betteiheim, 1967). Recent studies of autistic
children's ability to use computer games (Jordan, 19814; Panyan,
19814), at least at the simpler levels, also corifirma the presence of
these skills.
bthat of the more sophisticated levels of causal understanding?
Studies of normal preschool children have sho that many specific
causal principles are understood. For example, Bullock and Ge].man
(1979) demonstrated that the principle 'cause always precedes
effect' is part of 14-5 year old normal children 'a knowledge, and
Bullock (19814) demonstrated that children at the same age can also
infer mechanisme to explain how a cause brings about an effect. This
is contrary to Piaget's (1950) belief that children under 7 years
old are "phenomenistic" Ic: lack the knowledge that a mechanism
(inferred or visible) is necessary in causal events.
This discrepancy between Piaget's view and that from more recent
studies derives mainly from how understanding of causality has been
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assessed. Piaget mainly asked 'why' questions and noted the absence
of children 'a coninents about how a cause brings about an effect. The
more recent studies in contrast have used paradigms which are less
dependent on verbal responses, so as to tap the child's implicit
causal knowledge, even if this knowledge is unarticulable. For
example, Shultz (1982) found that 3 year olds select as potential
causes those events which offer a plausible causal mechanism (for
actions such as wind generation, sound production, and light
generation) over ones which do not. As such, their causal knowledge
is not simply based on cues such as temporal contiguity, but is
'mechanistic'. That 1I5 year old normal children understand physical
causality is now supported by many other studies in which children
could predict which factor uld cause an event to happen (Bullock,
Gelman and Baillargeon, 1982; Kun, 1978; Brom and French, 1976).
Nevertheless, the age at which children first demonstrate their
causal knowledge remains a point of controversy (Sophian and Hubler,
198 14; Leslie, 198i4).
Whilst such studies have been done which demonstrate normal
children 's understanding of causal principles, autistic children 's
understanding of causality has not yet been experimentally tested
beyond the sensorimotor level, described earlier. Since one
prediction from the second-order deficit hypothesis is that autistic
children's understanding should be unimpaired (being a 'first-order'
representational skill), it is necessary to test that autistic
children 's causal understanding at the higher levels is at least as
good as that which has been shobai to be present in normal $-5 year
olds. This is tested in Experiment 5.
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5.2: Experiment 5: Attribution of physical causality in autism.
A picture sequencing task was chosen to test autistic children's
understanding of causality. This paradigm was chosen for several
reasons: First, it demanded non-verbal as well as verbal responses
from the child, and this was useful not only because many of the
clinical subjects had very little language, but also because the
research into normal children's understanding of causality had
demonstrated that a lack of appropriately used causal ter in
language does not necessarily imply a lack of causal understanding
(Bullock, 198 14). Secondly, it allowed comparison with the Picture
Experiment (14), since the paradigm was the same, and only the story
content differed. Thirdly, a number of studies with normal subjects
have successfully used a picture sequencing paradigm to test causal
understanding (Kun, 1978; Bro and French, 1976; Geiman, Bullock
and Meok, 1980; FeIn, 1973), so there were independent grounds for
predicting that this task was within the repertoire of subjects
whose MA was above 14 years old. This paradigm has even been used
successfully with chimpanzees (Premack, 1976).
The picture sequencing task used in Experiment 5 differed from those
used by others in certain ways: First, other studies had only used 3
pictures, and from pilot studies this was considered too easy for
the present sample. In Experiment 5 therefore, as in the Picture
Experiment (14) previously, 1 pictures are used. (It should be noted
that in the WISC Sequencing Subtest, up to 5 pictures are used, so
this increase in complexity to 1$ pictures is still below that used
in an IQ test). Secondly, the content of the pictures was different:
for example, in the study by Ge].man, Bullock and Meck (1980), one
typical trial consisted of 3 cards: (1) an intact cup; (2) a haner;
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(3) a broken cup. These pictures however only depicted the 'before'
and 'after' events, and the 'causal agent', but did not actually
depict the change occuring. In the pictures used in the present
'Causality' Experiment (5), both factors were included. Thirdly, the
demands on the subject were different: in the Gelman et al (1980)
study, the subject was given 2 out of 3 of the pictures, and had to
complete the sequence by choosing one from 3 other cards, only one
of which was 'correct'. This meant that in their experiment the
subject did not have to actively sequence the pictures; thus, a
correct response could be obtained simply by using an
'associationist' strategy (eg: 'hanirier "goes with" broken cup')
without the subject necessarily understanding that the sequence of
cause preceding effect is important.
For these reasons, the task in the Causality Experiment (5) was
designed to test causal knowledge about both temporal sequence and
mechanism. This is described below.
Design:
The child's ability to arrange the individual pictures into a
coherent story was assumed to depend on the subject applying a
causal explarmtory schema which iuld conoect the separate actions
depicted in the pictures. In order to assess whether knowledge of
physical causality was equal in competence when applied to both the
physical and social worlds, 2 conditions were used:
CAUSAL 1: Objects interacting causally on each other.
CAUSAL 2: People and Objects acting causally on each other.
This thus allowed a test of the hypothesis that the inclusion of
people was not per se confusing to autistic children. This design is
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similar to that used in the Picture Experiment (II), in which
autistic children 's good performance on the Scriptal Corit ions
showed that not all social events are equally difficult fbr them.
Procedure:
The procedure and the scoring system for the Picture and Causality
Experiments (4 and 5) were the same, and these were described on
p.128-13 1. In addition, both of these experiments were carried out
at the same time, and are reported together elsewhere (Baron-Cohen
et al, to appear).
The exact order of the placing of the 4 pictures in each story was
noted dowi, as well as any self-corrections. Each child had only one
attempt at each of the 6 stories. As in the Picture Experiment (4),
the rErrations (protocols), spontaneous and elicited, of the stories
they created were tape-recorded and transcribed. These are shoi in
Appendix 7, and their arlysis will be discussed in the Results
section.
?'terisls:
The pictures were dra on white cards, 5 inches X 5 inches. The
images had simple black outlines, and 4 colours were used
throughout. They were similar to those used in the Picture
Experiment (4). They are sho	 pictorially in Appendix 8, and
described in Figure 5.1, below.
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Fig. 5.1: Picture Stories used in Experisnt 5.
1	 2	 3	 1$
cAUSAL 1:
1. Rock on hill Rock topples Rolls dow	 Knocks tree over
2. Egg on table Egg rolls 	 Egg falls	 Egg sushes
3. Balloon	 Balloon flies Hits tree	 Bursts
CAUSAL 2:
1. Man walking	 Trips over	 Falls do	 Leg bleeds
2. Rock on hill Rock topples Rolls do	 Knocks man over
3. Man with rock Pushes rock	 Rolls doba	 Falls in water
Subjects:
The subjects re the same as in the Picture Experinnt ( ii). The MA,
CA, and Language Ages can be found in Table t.2, p.131.
Results:
Table 5.1: Group Mean Scores for each Condition in ExperIment 5.
Conditions
	
CAUSAL 1	 CAUSAL 2
x	 sd	 x	 sd
Normel	 3.3 1.7	 3.7 2.0
Doei's	 2.8 1.9
	
2.7 1.2
Autistic 5.7 0.7
	
5.8 0.6
Max = 6; Mm = 0
An ANOVA was performed on the scores from this experiment. There was
no effect of Conditions (F1,60 = 0, p ) 0.98), thioh suggests that
the presence of people in the stories did not affect perfornnce for
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any of the groups. There was also no Groups x Conditions interaction
(P2,60 = 0.12, p ) 0.88). However, there was a significant effect
between groups (F2,60 = 28.23, p < 0.001), with the autistic group
performing significantly better than the other 2 groups on both
conditions (Post-hoc Sd,effe test, p < 0.05). The Dow's and the
Normal groups were not significantly different to eaThother (Stheffe
Test, p > 0.05). The Between Groups difference remained significant
even when L.eiter MA was used as a covariate (P1,35 = 33.25, p <
0.001) or BPVT (FI,35 = 145.76, p < 0.001), or CA (F2,59 = 19.23, p <
0.001).
Protocol Analysis:
As in the Picture Experiment ( Ii), 10 autistic and 7 Doi 's Syndrome
pAca v'c&J L5Ci-th.-w'S .fv
children	
A 
all or almost all 6 pictured sequences. The minimum
requirement was that the thild should have given narrations in at
least 14 out of the 6 trials. In addition, protocols were gathered
from a randomly selected one third of the normal children.
The narrations were rated by the same raters as had judged the
protocols from the Picture Experiment (14). Using strict criteria
narrations were judged to fall into the following categories: causal
or descriptive. For each picture story a narration, regardless of
length, was categorized into only 1 of the 2 classes. The score was
determined on a 'priority' basis: ie, an utterance was scaried for a
"causal" expression (see below) and the default category was
"descriptive". Interestingly, there was no disagreement between the
raters at all. The protocols are shobn in Appendix 7.
The causal category was applied only when the utterance contained at
least one of the following:
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a) because clauses: eg. "the egg broke because it fell off the
table"; or
b) explicit mention of agent - causal verb - object, or passive
construction with by-phrase, eg: "The boulder broke the tree"; or
"The man was hit by the rock"; or
c) causal verb phrase, Ic: made...happen, eg: "The rock made the man
fall doi".
Some examples were considered to be too equivocal to qualify for the
causal category, eg: "He tripped over and his foot bleeded"; or "It
popped on tree"; or "The ball hits the man and he falls dom". All
these utterances were placed by default Into the descriptive
category together with the utterances such as "It broke on the
floor"; or "It smashed"; or "He tripped over the brick".
For each child the ratings were turned into percentages relative to
the total number of trials where verbal responses were made. The
results of this classification are shoii In Table 5.2:
Table 5.2: Percentage of utterances classified as causal In
Experiment 5.
GROUPS	 CAUSAL UTIERANCES
AUTISTIC	 x	 78
(n:10)	 sd	 20
DOWNS	 x	 17
(n7)	 d	 111
N0}4AL	 x	 39
(n : 9)	 sd	 16
The protocol ratings data were sufficiently mrmally distributed to
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allow ANOVA with post-hoc Scheffe tests. The autistic children used
more tausal teri than the other t groups who did not differ from
eachother (F2,21 = 10.33, p < 0.001). This is consistent with
performance on sequencing and suggests that success on this implies
an understanding of physical causality.
Discussion.
The autistic children in the present sample performed significantly
better than both of the control groups on both conditions and
performance did not differ between conditions for any of the groups.
This demonstrates that the inclusion of people per se does not
impede autistic children's ability to sequence physical-causal
stories.
Can the autistic children 's high performance be interpreted to imply
that they have a concept of physical causality, at least at the
developmental level expected in this task? Their sequencing
performance alone does not allow this interpretation unambiguously,
since it is possible that the children used purely perceptual cues
(e.g. closeness of similarity) as a sequencing strategy. However,
the results of the protocol arlysis rules out this explamtion: 9
out of 10 of the protocols from the autistic children used causal
terii in their verbal descriptions of the stories in both
Conditions. For example (Subject number 2):
"The balloon is gassy. The gas came out because the tree
made it POP."
and (Subject number 3):
"The egg broke because it fell off the table."
It is therefore possible to ascribe an understanding of physical
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causality to autistic children with confidence. Since the autistic
children produced correct sequences as well as causal language, this
is evidence that they understand both the tK, principle of temporal
sequence and mechanism in causality. The autistic children 's
competence in this area is consistent with results from other
investigators (Sigman and Ungerer, 1981; Wetherby and Gaines, 1982;
Curcio, 1978; Hanries and Langdell, 1981). Furthermore, the Causality
Experiment (5) extends the results train other studies in
demonstrating autistic children 's causal understanding at levels
beyond the sensorimotor stage.
A separate question surrounds the interpretation of the performance
differences between the three groups. Although the autistic group
were significantly better than the normal group when CA was used as
a covariate, and better than the D0MI 's Syndrome group when MA was
used, it is nevertheless possible that their superiority is due to
their higher MA avereged over the group. A high MA matched normal
group uld be necessary in order to settle this question, since the
Doie 's Syndrome subjects may have had specific probleme with
sequencing per se.
The implications from the autistic children 's high performance are
important, in that it suggests that their understanding of' the
physical world, as tested here, is perfect - Ic: at ceiling
performance. Exactly how it relates to MA, however, remains to be
seen. In any case, the result highlights the specificity of the
deficit found in the Puppet and Picture Experiments (3 and U.
Furthermore, given that the Picture and Causality Experiments (i4 and
5) used an identical paradigm (picture-sequencing), the autistic
children's poor performance in the Picture Experiment (is) and good
163
performance in the Causality Experiment (5) can only be attributed
to the story-content differences, Ic: 'mental' versus 'causal'. In
representatior2l terms, this distinction suggests that, as
hypothesized, autistic children 'a first-order representatiorl
capacity is unimpaired.
5.3: Discussion of the Puppet, Picture and Causality Experiments (3,
I and 5).
It is rth drawing together the results from Experiments 3,$,and 5.
The first 2 of these identified a deficit in 16 out of 20 autistic
children's theory of mind, and this was argued to implicate a
deficit in 'second-order' representatiomi capacity. The Causality
Experiment (5) confirmed that their 'first-order' representatior2l
capacity was unimpaired in all the present autistic sample, as
demonstrated in their understanding of physical causality. The
specific second-order deficit thus seems to apply to a large
majority of the present autistic sample (80%), but not all of them.
What of the remaining 20% who passed on the Puppet Experiment (3)
and who, if their correct performance was not due to chance, may
well have a theory of mind? Is this the top 20% that have been
identified in other studies as being a high-functioning sub-group
(Bartak and Rutter, 1976; L.ockyer and Rutter, 1970; DeMyer, et al,
197i4)? These children were among the brightest and oldest of the
sample, yet there were other autistic children of an equivalent CA
and MA who failed to demonstrate a theory of mind. Thus, they are
not distinguished by either CA or MA.
One explartIon could be formulated as follows: in about 20% of
cases, a high CA and MA may allow an autistic child to develop a
theory of mind at the simplest level (le: a theory of mind that
would at least be expected of a normal 1 year old). This could be
seen as a sort of cognitive compensation' explartion, and posits
that with their general cognitive advantage, a theory of mind
develop in some bright autistic teenagers, although it is not
present at the normal time (Ic: at preschool age). This type of
explartion has been used by Hermelin and O'Cormor (1985) and
implicates a deviant and delayed course of development, whereby
normal competence is achieved via an 'alternative' cognitive route.
Let us assume, then, that there Is a subgroup who may have a theory
of mind at the simplest level (Ic: one that requires second-order
representations such as "I believe you think I'm rich"). Is this
subgroup capable of using a more advanced theory of mind (ie: one
that requires 'third-order' representations such as "I believe you
think I think you're rich")? Such a third-order representatior2l
capacity has been shobm to be within the repertoire of normal 6-7
year old children (Perner and Wimaer, 1985). This question is
explored in Experiment 6, and the literature surrounding this more
advanced theory of mind is reviewed below:
5.1$: Third Order Representation in normal children: literature
rev jew.
As described in Chapter 3.2.(ii), p.96-7, Flavell et al (1968)
observed that 11 or 12 year old subjects are capable of third-order
belief attribution (or what he called 'Level 2 operations'), as
demonstrated in the 'coin game' in which subjects reasoned as
follows: "I think he thinks I want the dime, so I'll choose the
nickel". Miller et al (1970) also found that 12 year olds could
describe embedded "think-bubble" cartoons such as "Johnny is
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thinking of !ddy thinking of Ptiy", etc. Both of these studies
have tailed to elicit such third-order belief attributions from
younger subjects, which suggests that the paradigms used were rather
difficult fbr the younger subjects to follow. In addition, the
think-bubble paradigm has the flaw that correct responses do not
demonstrate "understanding" of beliefs beyond a syntactic exercise
of matching embedded sentences with embedded think-bubbles. Perner
and Wier (1985) poInt out that a.ilts might be able to give a
correct description of even a ten-fold embedded think-bubble, but
would find it imposSIble to understand the 'meaning' of such a
belief or why it might be used.
Shultz and C].oghesy (1981) used a card-game paradigm in which normal
children aged 3:0-9:9 years had at times to actually deceive their
opponent, and at other times pretend to deceive their opponent. In
other words, they had to reason either 'I want him to think I'm
deceiving him', or 'I want him to think I'm not deceiving him'. They
found that 5 year olds could win at this game, and thus suggested
that "recursive awareness of intention" (p. l 69) begins to appear at
that age. However, it is difficult to prove that this game did
actually involve third-order belief attribution and not just
second-order beliefs, since the verbal descriptions that some 9 year
olds gave of their strategies were usually of the type 'I know which
one you think I'm going to point to' etc. This might be third-order
(eg: 'I know which one you think I am of..'), but a
better-designed experimental paradigm would guarantee that success
in the task urmbiguously required third-order belief attribution,
and would make this clearly distinguishable from second-order belief
attribution.
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Perner and Wier (1985) took just these precautions. The essence of
their experimental design is that second and third-order belief
attributions result in different responses respectively, and thus
make it relatively straight forward to 'diagnose the level of
complexity of the subject's thecry of mind.
Their test story is based around the following episodes: 2
characters (eg: John and Mary) are interested in the location of a
critical object (eg: the icecream van, which is either in the park
or the church). In the first episode, both characters are informed
that the van will stay in the park all afternoon. In the second
episode, only Mary is informed about a sudd change in plans, that
the van will move to the church and stay there for the rest of the
day. In the third episode, John unexpectedly finds out about the
van's new location, but Mary does not know that he was told. In the
fourth episode, Mary goes over to John's house where she is told
that he just went out to buy an Icecream. The subject has to employ
a third-order representation to answer the Test Question 'Where does
Mary think John has gone to buy an ioecream?' (answer: to the park,
since Mary thinks John thinks the van is still in the park). The
subject need only use a second-order representation to answer the
control question 'Where has John gone to get an icecreazn?' (answer:
to the church, since John knows the van is at the church).
Thus, in their experiment, a second-order belief attribution results
in the subject pointing to the church, whereas a third-order belief
attribution results in the subject pointing to the park. (Use of a
first-order representation would also result in the subject pointing
to the church, since that is where the van really is). Thus, only if
a child uses a third-order reasoning strategy does this result in a
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correct response. This is because the subject has to represent t
false beliefs, ie: 'Mary thinks that John thinks that the van is in
the park, when in fact both John and Mary (independently) know that
the van is at the thurch'. (Here, the term 'think' is used to denote
a false belief, and 'know' to denote true knowledge).
Perner and Wininer found that many 6 year olds and almost all 7-9
year olds were able to give correct answers, although the younger
subjects were only able to do this under optimal conditions when
inferences of third-order beliefs were prompted: for example, by
such questions as 'Does Mary know the icecream man talked to John?'
(answer: no, since she was still in the park). Furthermore, in
answer to a Justification Question, many subjects explicitly
articulated their third-order representation leg: "She thinks that
he thinks that the icecream man is still in the park"). Such
justifications rule out any explanation of responses in terni of
guessing. In addition, subjects who gave wrong answers to the Test
Question tended in their Justifications to reveal their
inappropriate second-order strategy leg: "Because John had talked to
the icecream man") or first-order strategy leg: "Because the van is
at the thurch").
Perner and Winzner's (1985) experiment thus comes closer to being a
reliable test of third-order representational capacity than the
other studies. Landry and Lyons-Ruth (1980) argue that their
experiment tested the same ability, in that the subject had to
represent ly brother thinks that I am afraid of dogs'. However, as
Perner and Wimaer point out, there is no evidence that this is more
than a second-order belief attribution, in that the subject merely
represents another person's representation of a true state of
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affairs in the world ('being afraid of dogs') rather than a
propositioral attitude. 'Being afraid' is a mental state in one
sense, but need rot be represented as such (since it can have a
behavioural description), whereas 'thinking' must be represented as
a mental state.
Since Pemer and Wininer's task is the best paradigm available to
test third-order representatioml capacity, it was decided to use it
with the 14 autistic subjects who had previously passed the
second-order belief attribution test (Experiment 3). This Experiment
is reported below:
5.5: Experiment 6: Third-Order representation in autism and Do 's
Synd rome.
The assumption behind this experiment is that In this autistic
subgroup there has been a delayed and possibly deviant onset of a
second-order theory of mind (as manifested in the Puppet Experiment
(3]), and the question is posed whether they have also progressed to
a third-order theory of mind. The contrast group were the tst able
Domi's Syndrome controls who had previously passed the Puppet
Experiment (3). If the Doim 's Syndrome subjects should show a
third-order capacity, despite having lower MA, and if the autistic
subjects did not, then the specificity of the theory of mind deficit
could be strongly confirmed.
Procedure:
Each child was tested individually in a smell room. The experimenter
laid out a toy village on the table in front of the child. The
materials are described overleaf. This scene is illustrated in Fig.
5.2 (overleafi:
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Figure 5.2: The layout of the toy village used in Experiment 6.
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First, the child was asked to name all the toys, which all the
subjects could do easily. The experimenter the told the following
story, moving the characters and the icecream van acccrdingly.
Story:
This is John and this is Mary. They live in this village.
(Naming Question).
Here they are together in the park. Along comes the
iceoream man. John would like to buy an icecream but he
has left his money at home. He is very sad. 'Don't worry,
says the icecream man, 'You can go home and get your money
and buy some icecream later. I'll be here In the park all
afternoon..'
'Oh good,' says John, 'I'll be back in the afternoon to
buy an iceoreain'.
Prompt Question (1): 'Where did the icecream man say to
John he would be all afternoon?'
So John goes home...he lives in this house. Now, the
icecream man says 'I'm going to drive my van to the church
to see if I can sell my icecreasis outside there.'
Prompt Question (2): 'Where did the icecream man say he
was going?'
Prompt Question (3): 'Did John hear that?'
The icecreani man drives over to the church. On his way he
passes John's house. John sees him and says 'Where are you
going?' The icecream man says 'I'm going to sell some
icecream outside the church.' So off he drives to the
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church.
Prompt Question (II): 'Where did the icecream man tell John
he was going?'
Prompt Question (5): 'Does Mary know that the icecream man
has talked to John?'
Now Mary goes home. She lives in this house. Then she goes
to John's house - she knocks on the door and says 'Is John
in?' 'No,' says John's mother, 'He '5 gone out to buy an
icecream.'
Test Question: 'Where does Mary think John has gone to get
an icecream?'
Justification Question: "Why?"
Reality Question: 'Where did John really go to buy his
icecream?'
At the end of the story, the child's responses to the 5 Prompt
Questions, the Test Question, and the Justification Question were
noted do. Then the whole experiment was repeated (: Trial 2), this
time reversing the locations (ie: the children and the icecream man
start off playing behind the church, then the van moves to the park,
etc). Again, the child's aniers re noted dobm. The responses to
the Justification Question are sho in Appendix 9.
Materials:
The toy village comprised 2 houses, a church, a fence to separate
the park and the road, lê 'playpeople', and an icecream van. In
addition, there was a row of trees, so that it was not possible for
a story character to 'see' the church or John's house from the park
(or vice-versa). The buildings ire about 5 inches high. The whole
village fitted onto a table-top 2 feet square.
Subjects:
The l autistic subjects who passed the earlier Puppet Experiment
took part in this experiment. In addition, £ Dom'a Syndrome
children who had also passed in the Puppet Experiment and who re
of similar CA were used as a control group. The autistic group had
the advantage of a higher MA (both verbal and non-verbal). Details
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of these 8 subjects are given in Table 5.3 ( cieoW ). Normal
subjects were not included since data existed elsetere which
indicates that this task is within the competence of 6-7 year olds
(Perner and Wlniner, 1985), and the non-autistic retarded control
group was adequate to test the hypothesis.
Table 5.3: Subjects' Variables in ExperIment 6.
MA(Leiter)	 CA	 MA(BPVT)
Autistic (n = ii)	 x	 9.0	 114.7	 5.5
ad 1.5	 2.1	 1.7
Do's	 (n = 4)	 x	 6.7	 ¶3.6	 3.2
ad 1.2	 11.1	 0.6
[The Mental ages are all from the time of initial testing, one year
earlier, and not from the time of running this Experiment. It can be
assumed however that change in MA's, if any, will be uniform for all
subjects over this period).
Pesults:
All subjects, except 1, passed the naming question, the prompt
questIons (1-5), and the reality question. Differences emerged on
the critical Test Question, and this is shobal In Table 5.4
(overleaf). The results from Trials 1 and 2 were identical, and so
are collapsed in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.1: Subjects' performance on the Test Question in Experimant
6.
PASS	 FAIL.
Autistic	 0
Down's	 3	 1
A Fisher Exact Probability Test shod that the autistic and Down 'a
groups differed significantly from eachother (p < 0.025).
The other data collected in this Experimant were responses to the
Justification Question. (This is transcribed in Appdix 9). All
subjects who passed the Test Question correctly demonstrated their
third-order reasoning by answering the Justification Question with
uoh explartions as "Cuz she don't know the icecream man talked to
him", (Ic: they saw the usefulness of Prompt Question [5)), or more
explicitly with "Cuz she thinks he doesn't know it's at the church".
In contrast, those subjects who failed the Test Question
demonstrated that they inappropriately used a secorx!-order reasoning
strategy by answering the Justification Question with "Because he
knows the icecream man is at the church". (The response of one
autistic boy could have been a first-order type, since he simply
said "The van Is at the diurch").
Discussion:
The results show very clearly that the autistic group, as predicted,
failed to demonstrate a third-order representatioral capacity,
whilst 75% of the Down's subjects did. In the case of the Down s
subjects, this was amply supported by their answers to the
Justification Question, which were either implicitly or explicitly
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of a third-order type. Of the autistic subjects, 3 failed because
they employed lower level reasoning (first or second-order), and one
subject failed because he had too little language oomprehision to
follow the task. In this respect, he carrot be said to have been
adequately tested.
It is important to emphasize that the sample size in the Village
Experiment (6) comprised only II subjects in each group. It is
therefore not statistically a very robust result, but unfortunately
the initial autistic sample (n = 20) only yielded subjects who
were eligible to be included in the Village Experiment (Ic: those
who had passed the Puppet Experiment). The lack of a third-order
theory of mind in these Ls subjects is a strong reminder of their
social impairment, in that normal children of CA > 6-7 years can
manage mentalistic reasoning of this complexity, and it is precisely
this ability which allows them to participate in sophisticated
social interactions. The fact that the Do's Syndrome subjects
showed a third-order theory of mind confirme that their social
cognitive skills are in line with their non-verbal MA. (It
Incidentally shows that these skills are relatively independent of
their verbal MA, since in the Dom's case the mean was only 3.2
years).
Combining the results from the Puppet and the Village Experiments (3
and 6) creates the proper focus to view these results. The picture
that emerges is that most autistic children (80%) show no evidence
of being able to employ a theory of mind at the simplest level (Ic:
that Which requires second-order representation), whilst the
remaining 20% of autistic children who do have a theory of mind at
that level fail to show evidence of one at the next level up (Ic:
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one which requires third-order representation).
To suarize this chapter, the Causality and Village ExperIments (5
and 6) have supported two predictions which emerged from the Puppet
and Picture Experiments (3 and 1). The first prediction was that If
most autistic children were impaired In their second-order
representational skills, this should leave their first-order
representational capacity unimpaired. This was demonstrated in their
ability to sequence causal stories correctly, both In the 'personal'
and the 'non-personal' world (ExperIment 5). The second prediction
was that if the few autistic children who passed the Puppet
Experiment (3) had somehow compensated for their deficit and here
showed delayed development In their theory of mind, then they should
be impaired in the more advanced levels of this (requiring
third-order representation). This too was confirmed (Experiment 6).
The strong effect beginning to emerge from the last 4 experiments
(3-6) is that the difficulty in autism hinges specifically at the
second-order level of representation. In the next two chapters
another skill which requires second-order representation, namely
pretend play, is Investigated in autism.
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Chapter 6: Pretend play in normal and abnormal development.
Since most autistic c*iildren are impaired in their ability to employ
a thea'y of mind, then (as was discussed earlier (Section $.1]) the
possibility exists of a deeper underlying deficit, namely, their
capacity for second-order representation is impaired (Leslie, to
appear; Dennett, 1978a; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Wininer and Perner,
1983).
Leslie's account of the development of second-order representation
in normal 12-18 month old infants is based on two important findings
infant studies - both relatively uncontroversial:
First, that from birth infants have a capacity for "primary
representation", and this is gradually developed and refined during
the first year of life. This capacity allows the infant to
faithfully represent objects, events, states of affairs and
situations in the world. This capacity is equivalent to what was
referred to earlier as "first-order representation" [Section 5.1].
Secondly, only from the second year of life, infants have the
capacity to "pretend". (This capacity is described in Section 6.1.,
p.177). Leslie argues that this presupposes a special cognitive
mechanism. A primary representatiornl capacity is sufficient for
representing the world as it actually is, but the 12-18 month old
infant's ability to pretend that one thing is another could not by
definition occur if the infant's representatiorml capacity only
allowed representation of the world as it actually is. The question,
then, is to account for how the infant's cognitive system is
sinultaneously able to represent the actual world and the pretend
world. Leslie proposes that the capacity for second-order
representation makes this possible.
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His claim is that a second-order representatiorl capacity first
gives rise to the ability to pretend play, and later to the ability
to form a theory of mind. Both abilities not only involve the same
representatioral structures, but 'pretend' is itself a mental state
term. Thus, in pretend play, Leslie argues, the infant represents "I
(Cr you) pretend that...", and this is equivalent to what Is
represented when employing a theory of mind, eg:"I (or you) believe
that...". In this respect, 'pretend' has the same logical properties
as 'believe' (see 3.2.(i), p.86; this will be expanded in 6.3,
later). The essential difference is that in pretend play an infant's
theory of mind Is expressed before s/he can speak. Thus, whereas the
earliest evidence of a theory of mind that is expressed in language
is found around 214 months of age (Bretherton, McNew and
Beeghly-nIth, 1981; Bretherton and Beeghly, 1982; Shatz, Weilman
and Zilber, 1983), evidence of pretend play is found almost a year
earlier.
Leslie's model therefore allows a very specific prediction: namely,
that if autistic children 's impaired ability to attribute the mental
state of belief (Experiments 3 and 14) is an indication of an
impaired second-order representatioml capacity, then a deficit
should also be observed in autistic children 's ability to engage in
pretend play. There is already some evidence from several studies on
autistic children 's pretend play that this is the case (Siginan and
Ungerer, 1981; Wing, Gould, Teates, and Brierley, 1977; Gould, in
press; Riguet et al, 1981), although there are methodological
shortcomings in all these experiments. (These will be discussed in
6.2). For this reason, it was decided to collect fresh evidence, and
this is reported in Experiment 7 (see 6.14). In the next section, the
development of pretend play in normel children Is reviewed.
177
6.1: The rormal development of pretend play: literature review.
The question of defining 'play' (as opposed to 'not play') is
notoriously difficult. Since this review is only Concerned with
'pretend' play, the definition of play will not be discussed here.
Nor will the various thecries about the function of play be
discussed. Interesting as these issues might be, they are not
relevant here (and a good review of this subject already exists: see
Rubin, Fein and Vandenberg, 1983). Instead, the focus is exclusively
on 'pretend play'. In what follows, the term 'pretend play' will be
used to refer to what has also been called 'imaginative play',
'make-believe play', 'fantasy play', 'dramatic play', and 'symbolic
play' (Fein, 1981). A definition of this will be presented in 6.3.
Piaget (1962) proposed that pretend play reflects the development of
the 'semiotic function', that is, the understanding that one thing
(a signifier) can stand for something else (that which is
signified). For Piaget, the key to pretend play is "the separation
of 'signifier' fror 'signified' which ...constitutes symbolism"
( p . 1 23). He argued that pretend play is just one aspect of the
semiotic function, others being language, drawing, etc. Piaget
suggested that pretend play develops out of imitation: imitation
allows the infant to represent things externally, and "interiorized
imitation" allows the infant to create mental images or
'signifiers'. This relationship between imitation and pretend play
remains as yet, however, purely speculative. In structural terma,
Piaget proposed that pretend play was the 'opposite' of imitation:
"If every act of intelligence is an equilibrium between
assimilation and acconodation, while imitation is a
continuation of acconodation for its oa sake, it may be
said conversely that play is essentially assimilation, or
the primacy of assimilation over acconodation" (p.87).
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This stresses how in pretend play the infant igrcres (rather than
accomodates to) the stig lus' real properties, instead assimilating
them to his or her o internal schema. Thus, in pretend play an
object can become almost anything else. According to Piaget, by
Stage 6 of the sensorimotor period, the infant produces pretend
play:
"In the case of J...'make-believe' first appeared at
1:3(12)...At 1:3(30) it was the tail of her rubber donkey
which represented the pillow!...Similarly, at 1:6(28) she
said "avon" (savon = soap), rubbing her hands together and
pretending to wash them (without any water)..At 1:7 she
pretended to drink out of a box and then held it to the
mouths of all who were present" (pp.96-97).
Host studies agree that pretend play first appears at 12 or 13
months of age (Fein and Apfe]., 1978; Rosenblatt, 1977; Kagan, 1978;
Lowe, 1975). Before this, play is either 'sensorimotor' (ie:
banging, waving, and mouthing an object), observed during the first
7 months, or 'functiovl' (Ic: appropriate actions in keeping with
the specific functions and social usages for an object), which is
present between 9-15 months (Rosenblatt, 1977; Fein and Apfel, 1979;
Ze]azo and Kearsley, 1980). These patterns appear to be universal:
they have been observed in French children (Inhelder et al, 1972),
Guatemalan children (Kagan, 1978), Japanese children (Shimeth, Kal
and Sam, 1981; Shinuth, Sano arid Peig, 1979), as well as American
arid English children from all social classes (Feiri and Apfel, 1979;
Fenson et al, 1976; Rosenblatt, 1977).
When pretend play does appear, it appears quite abruptly: Bates et
a]. (1977) reported this development over a 3 month period: that 8%
of children produced at least one pretend gesture at 9.5 months, Z$11%
did so at 10.5 months, 72% at 11.5 months, and 96% at 12.5 months.
The earliest form of pretend behaviour appears when the child
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produces a familiar behaviour (such as drinking) "in the void"
(Rubin et al, 1983). It is identifiable as pretend
(1) because of its "as If" quality (eg: head tilted, c	 tipped,
synchronized in timing as if liquid was diminishing in volume); and
(2) because it is detached frocn its ordinary situatiorl context
(eg: mealtime); and
(3) because it is detached from the outcome with which it is
normally associated (eg: quenching thirst).
Thus, 2 frequent key rds used in the definition of pretend play
are 'siimilative' and 'non-literal' (Fein, 1981; Reynolds, 1976).
Whereas much of pretense in 12 month olds is self-referenced, at 18
months most pretend play incx'porates self-other relationships (eg:
the child feeds a doll with an emptv bottle (Fein and Apfel, 1979;
Lowe, 1975; Watson and Fischer, 1977; Nicolich, 1981]). Fenson and
Rameay (1980), following Plaget (1962), call this developmental
trend 'decentration'. At this level, the child is the active agent
and the 'other' (eg: the doll) is a passive recipient object of
the child's action. At a more advanced level (30 months), the child
manipulates the 'other' as if it were an active agent (Lowe, 1975;
Watson and Fischer, 1977).
Which objects can substitute for others in pretend play? In 12-19
month olds, pretend play occurs with miniature replica objects (eg:
toy cups) as well as a&lt-sized objects (Fein ar Apfel, 1979;
Lowe, 1975; Fenson et al, 1976; Kagan, 1978), provided that the
objects resemble their real counterparts. From 19_21 months the use
of a substitute object (eg: a moden block for a doll) is frequent
(Fein, 1975; Ungerer, Zelazo, Icearsley and O'Leary, 1981; Watson and
Fischer, 1977). For example, at 2 months, 75% of the children in
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the Watson and Fischer study demonstrated substitution behaviour.
Fein (1975) found that at 21i months old, 93% of the children
pretended to make a realistic toy horse drink from a ct, 79%
pretended using a 'single' substitution (eg: make a toy horse drink
from an egg-shell), but only 33% could 1rge a 'double'
substitution (eg: make a piece of metal drink from a shell).
Jackowitz and Watson (1980) further found, as one would predict,
that an object with ambiguous function (eg: a block) is easier to
substitute than one with a clearly conflicting function (eg: a car).
The latter type of object is easier, in turn, to substitute than a
condition in which r object is present.
In geral, the infant is described as being capable of increasing
decontextualization. S/he can use increasingly less realistic (Ic:
prototypical) objects as symbols. FeIn (1975) described this as "the
child 's growing capacity to create arlogies (or symbols) which are
Increasingly independent of external stimulation" (p.292). In other
words, the symbols show increasing "distancing" (Werner and Kaplan,
1963) or "emancipation" (Vygotsky, 1933/1976). This developmental
trend is supported by a number of other studies (Ungerer et al,
1981; Jackowitz and Watson, 1980; Bretherton et al, 1981). To
illustrate, Bretherton et al (1981) give the example of a child who
initially pretends to telephone using a particular toy telephone,
then later does so with other toy telephones, and finally with other
objects, such as pretending a spoon is a telephone.
Fein (1975) suggested that pretend could be thought of as involving
'transformations' of real situations
	 oi'	 objects.	 Such
transformations can involve role-shifts (eg: the infant pretends to
be someone else), aniiting inanites, attributing absent
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characteristics to objects (eg: pretending a toy cooker is hot) and,
as mentioned earlier, object substitutions. This is clearly an
important quality of pretend. Another is that it is generative:
pretend play is not Limited to one or t topics but, like language,
it is highly productive. These issues will be discussed later, when
formulating an operatiomi definition of pretend (in Section 6.3).
Both Piaget (1962) and Nicolich (1977) observed that length of
pretend acts follows an invariant sequence, from single pretend
gestures to combined pretend gestures, and finally to 'announced'
pretend gestures, in which the child indicates that a pretend
sequence is planned before being executed (Field, deStefano and
Koewler, 1982). Another developmental trend was identified by
Overton and Jackson (1973): they asked children (CA = 3-8 years) to
pretend that they were using comon objects in action sequences (eg:
given a real comb "Pretend you are combing your hair").
Subsequently, the children were asked to demonstrate the same action
sequences but without physical props. At 3 and years old, the
predominant strategy was to use a body part to desigrte the
referent object (eg: finger used as comb). At 8 years old, the
predominant strategy was to use iiginary objects. They conclude
from this that pretend play becomes more 'ideatioral' with age, and
this also supports Werner and Kaplan's (1963) hypothesis.
In Piaget's (1962) theory, "Level 1" symbolic play (1-2 years) is
exclusively solitary, whilst "Level 2" (2-3 years) is social or
interactive. This sequence has been confirmed by Nico].ich (1977) and
Smith (1977). Another stage ("parallel pretend play") has been
identified between these 2 levels, in which pretend play occurs when
children are in close proximity to (but are not interacting with]
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others (Hetherington et al, 1979). Dale (1983) questions the
validity of the category of 'solitary' pretend play, arguing that
pretend play has a social function right from the outset. Social
pretend play will not be reviewed here as most of the studies of it
tend to include older children, and the focus of this chapter is on
the earliest manifestations of pretend play. However, it is worth
noting that in social pretend play children not only pretend but
also conriunicate to others that "this is play" (Bateson, 1955),
using such markers as smiles and laughter, attenuation and
exaggeration (Garvey, 1971; McCune-Nicolich and Fenson, 198Z).
Garvey and Berndt (1977) noted explicit verbal 'metaconinunications'
in all diads of their 3-5 year old sample, of the form 'You be the
bride', and 'Pretend you hate fish', etc. Macnamara, Baker and Olsen
(1976) have confirmed that 4 year olds clearly understand the
indirect logical implications of' the word "pretend".
Individual differences in styles of' pretend play have been studied
longitudinally as part of Harvard 's Project Zero (Wolf and Gardner,
1978). Two types of pretend players have been identified: those
whose play is focussed primarily on objects ("patterners") and those
whose play is focussed primarily on people ("dramatists"). These
stylistic differences are reported to emerge at about 12 months of
age and become more pronounced over the next year. However, this
study has only used a very snail sample size, so generalized
conclusions can only be made with caution. This object-person
difference in play styles has however also been found in an
independent study (Jennings, 1975).
It is important to look closely at the diverse thodological
approaches these various studies of pretend play have used. Fenson
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et al (1976) observed eh thi].d individually, and allod 10
minutes for 7-9 month olds, and 20 minutes for the 13-20 month olds.
The mother s present but non-participating. They used a wide range
of toys, including a metal tea-set, dolls, wooden blocks, a cowboy
hat, and a wooden rabbit. Two observers coded play episodes into 3
classes of responses: 'relatiorml acts' (ie: combining a relating 2
objects), 'symbolic acts' (in this study this included drinking,
pouring, stirring and spooning imeginary substances from one
container to another), and 'sequential acts'.
This contrasts with the methodology used in Fein's (1975) study:
Again the c*ild's mother s present, but not actively involved.
Toys were different to the last study, and included a range from
highly prototypical (eg: a detailed, plush toy horse, and a plastic
egg-cup) to highly 'unprototypioal' (eg: a metal horse shape and a
clam-shell). The procedure was different, too: Each child observed a
'display trial', a 'modeling trial' (ie: the experimenter pretended
to teed the horse), and a 'suggestion' trial (Ic: the experimenter
said "Let's pretend he's still hungry. You give him something to
eat"). The thud was given 10 seconds to respond after eh
presentation. Fein's definition of pretend centred on whether the
child would pretend using the 'substitution' objects (Ic: the
'unprototypical' objects). The fact that Fein's study used only 10
second episodes, and used modeling, whereas Fenson et al 'a study
used 10-20 minute episodes and only involved spontaneous (Ic:
non-modelled) play shows the )i.ige task differences at work. On the
question of play duration, Lo's (1975) study also allod the
child up to 30 minutes.
Jackowitz and Watson (1980) used diildren of 2 age groups (mean CA's
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= 15:9 and 23:3 months). Toys included a real telephone, a play
telephone, a plastic banana, a plastic walkie-talkie, a wooden
block, and a toy car. The children were videotaped, unlike the
previous studies, and the camera was hidden behind a one-way mirror.
This study, like Fein's, also used modeling, in which the aóilt
demonstrated pretend behaviours, following which the child was
allowed 3 minutes to pretend. As in the other studies, the child's
mother was present but uninvolved, but the experimenter left the
room during the 3 minute play episode. Pretend play in this study
was defined only if it involved object substitutions (eg: using the
car as a telephone was scored as pretend, but pretending to drive a
car was not). Two observers scored the videotapes. The inclusion of
modeling in both this study, the previous one, as well as others
(Watson and Fischer, 1977; Overton and Jackson, 1973) sheds doubt on
what the children were actually doing: were they pretending a'
merely Imitating?
Shimeda, Sano and Peng (1979) longitudinally observed a smell sample
(n = 11) using miniature toys, a doll, and "junk material" (such as
twigs and crumpled paper, which the other studies did not use). The
subjects were tested in the presence of their mother once a month
from aged 12-211 months. The toys were presented for 5 minutes and
the spontaneous behaviour of the child was scored for any symbolic
play. This was defined in terme of object substitution (eg: eating
with a twig as a spoon) and gesture (eg: taking an imaginary candy
out of a paper and eating it). Other behaviour was simply
categcrized as non-symbolic 'manipulative play', either 'relational'
or 'non-relational'.
As a f1nal Illustration of the lack of consistency between
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methodologies in studies of pretend play with normal children, it is
worth citing an experiment by Takhvar, Gore and Smith (198 14). They
found that by giving the children the oppertunity to cocinent or
interpret their owi actions, many behaviours which were initially
scored as 'functiorl' or 'constructive' were rescored as 'dramatic'
(Ic: pretend). For example, "Some children are sitting on a barrel,
kicking their feet on the sides, without vocalizing; when asked,
they say it is a galloping horse" (p.12). These authors argue that
the conventioml procedure of non-interactive observers rating the
child 's play significantly underestimates how much of it is pretend.
Mocune-Nicolich and Fenson (198 14) have discussed the probleme which
stem from the diversity of procedures adopted by different studies.
The main points to be noted are the following: (1) Studying play at
home (Fein and Apfel, 1979; Dunn and WoodIng, 1977) or In laboratory
settings results in sindlar descriptions; (2) An observation period
of 5 minutes is a minimum for meaningful data collection; (3) The
mother's presence can have a critical effect on results, depending
on whether she is allowed to respond actively to the child (Dunn and
Wooding, 1977); and (14) Eliciting procedures such as modeling are
not mandatory for studying pretend play, although they do enhance
it.
Given the range of variables that have been rioted, careful design
was required for the design of Experiment 7, testing pretend play in
autistic children. This is discussed later. In the next section, the
various studies that have already been done on autistic children's
pretend play are reviewed.
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6.2: Experimental studies of pretend play in autism: literature
rev jew.
Eisenberg and Kanner (1956) described autistic children 's
preoccupation with repetitive activities and fascination with
objects, but their early records do not coiinent on whether this
repetitive, ritualistic activity had a pretend quality or not.
Tilton and Ottinger (196z ) found that in their sample of 13 autistic
subjects (CA range = 3:7-6:7 years, all of whom are reported to be
"untestable on standard psychological tests" ( p .969)), only 5
demonstrated any combining of toys, and instead most spent a higher
proportion of their play in "repetitive manipulations" (such as
patting, sucking, shaking, twirling, and spinning toys) than either
normal or non-autistic retarded children. This replicates Icanner's
earlier observation (Eisenberg and Kanner, 1956), and this has also
been found by DeMyer et al (1967), using maternal questionaires, by
Black, Freeman and Montgomery (1975), and by Strain a Cooke
(1976). Again, however, 'pretend play' was not included among the
behaviour categories in any of these studies.
Wing, Gould, Yeates and Brierley (1977), using a structured
interview schedule with parents of retarded autistic and
non-autistic children in the Camberwell area of South Lorxlon,
obtained information about symbolic play in the home. The children
were also observed at school. The definition of symbolic play in
this study included, for example, making appropriate noises while
pushing a toy car along, or pretending to drive it; holding dolls as
if they were real babies, and brushing their hair, or tucking them
up in bed. However, these behaviours do not show any unambiguous
object substitution, and thus cannot really be called 'pretend'. In
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a more rigcrous scheme they	 uld instead be considered as
'functiorl play', since they are appropriate to the toys.
Nevertheless, the results of this study were as follows: rio retarded
children below MA = 20 months showed any symbolic play, the autistic
children showed 'stereotyped play' (ie: a preoccupation with one
activity), and none of the autistic children showed any symbolic
play, even given the lenient scoring scheme. This result confiru an
earlier prediction made by Ricks and Wing (1975), on the basis of a
theory of symbolic deficit in autism. (This is discussed further in
Chapter 8.3).
In Curcio and Piserchia's (1978) autistic sample (n = 2Z, CA range
5: 10-15:7 years, mean Verbal MA = 5:6 years), it was found that
pretend gestures could be elicited under verbal instructions or
following modeling; however, most responses consisted of "low-level"
substitutions of a body-part in place of the absent object. This has
also been found by Attod (198 1 ). This may be evidence that
autistic children are capable of some "primitive" object
substitution - primitive, in the sense that normal children of the
same MA are capable of more abstract pantomimic representation
(Overton and Jackson, 1973). Curcio and Piserchia's result is
difficult to Interpret, since this was not spontaneous baviour and
thus may have been either the result of instruction or imitation,
and also because there was no non-autistic control group in this
study. However, Attod 'a inclusion of a non-autistic control group
demonstrates this failure to produce more abstract gestures is
autism-specific.
A study which did investigate both the spontaneous and the
modeling-elicited play of autistic children (n = 10) In comparison
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to Do's Syndrome (n = 10) and normal preschool children (n = 10)
was by Riguet, Taylor, Beiaroya and Klein (1981). All 3 groups of
children had a Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test median MA of 2.5
years, and the Doi 's Syndrome group had the same CA range as the
autistic group. The autistic group also showed a mean non-verbal MA
of 5.3 years on the Leiter Scale. Each child had a 14 minute free
play period, followed by various modeling sessions, followed by a
final 4 minute free-play period. The children's play was then scored
for whether it was symbolic a' not. Symbolic play was defined in
terms of' object substitution. Their results showed that none of the
autistic children showed any symbolic play during the free play
sessions, and during the modeling period some symbolic play was
elicited, but this was confined to a literal imitation of' the
demonstration. In contrast, the control children showed symbolic
play in the free play period, and higher level symbolic play in the
modeling condition. This study thus clearly shows the effects of
modeling, and the deficit in autistic children 'a spontaneous pretend
play. It should be noted, however, that this study used a somewhat
limited definition of pretend play, this being object substitution
exclusively. In other words, while this is certainly an impartant
criterion, no other indexes of' pretend were considered. This
limitation is discussed later.
Ungerer and Sigman's (1981) study also looked at both spontaneous
and modeled play. 16 autistic children (mean CA = 14.14 years, mean MA
(Cattell Scale) = 2.1 years; mean MA [Merrill Palmer) : 2.9 yrs)
were compared to a normal control group of' comparable MA.
Unfortunately, no retarded non-autistic control group was included
in this experiment. They categcrized the autistic children 'a play
into either "simple manipulation", "relatiorBl play", "functiorel
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play" or "symbolic play". The first t are essentially sensorimotor
activities. Funct1orl play was defined as appropriate use of an
object, or the conventiorl association of 2 or more objects such as
placing a teacup on a saucer. Ungerer and Sigman see functiorl play
as the earliest manifestation of' symbolic play, but such a view
blurrs the conceptual boundaries and, as is evident from their
definitions (below), these tc types of play are mutually exclusive.
Another problem with this study is that eh play session began with
the experimenter modeling 1 different symbolic acts with the toys.
The child was then permitted to play alone for 16 minutes. This
condition was called the "unstructured setting", although the
initial modeling made it far from completely spontaneous. The other
condition ("structured setting") was experimenter-directed
throughout, using verbal instructions such as "feed the baby with
the bottle" etc, plus modeling if necessary.
Apart from the criticisms concerning the distinction between
functiorl and symbolic, and concerning the use of a modeling
procedure, Ungerer and Sigman's definition of pretend play is very
thorough and rth quoting:
"Three categories of symbolic acts were recorded:
substitution play, defined as the use of one object as if'
it were a different object (eg: using a tea-cup as a
telephone receiver), agent play, defined as the use of a
doll as an independent agent of action (eg: propping a
bottle In a doll's arms as if it could feed itself), and
imaginary play, defined as the creation of objects or
people having no physical representation in the inmediate
environment (eg: making pouring sounds as imaginary tea is
poured from a teapot into a cup)" (p.32J4).
Their results showed that, in the 'unstructured condition', the
autistic children's play fell into the categories of manipulation,
relatior2l, and functior2l, but symbolic play occurred extremely
rarely. The fOrm of' simple manipulation which occurred most
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frequtly was that of exploring an object with the fingers. The
existence of a high frequency of 'relatiorEl play' (Ic: combining
toys) contradicts the earlier finding by Tilton and Ottinger (19611)
that most autistic children do not combine objects in play. However,
relatlorEl play was found to ccrrelate with higher language levels,
and this may explain the discrepancy between this study and the
earlier one by Ti].ton aid Ottinger. The presence of some
object-directed functiorEl play also refutes the claim by Despert
and Sherwin (1958) that this is absent in autism. In the functioml
play categcry, Ungerer aid Sigman repert that the most frequent acts
were directed towards objects (eg: putting a spoon into a cup), and
in the 'structured condItion s , functiorBl play was positively
correlated with overall MA.
Only 14 of the autistic children demonstrated any symbolic play. Of
this group, 2 performed completely rovel acts aid 2 performed their
om variations of the symbolic acts modeled by the experimenter.
Thus, only 12.5% of the autistic sample can be said to have produced
spontaneous pretend play. These children were in the higher level
receptive language group (n = 7), using a test of picture
vocabulary, but clearly rot all autistic children in this group
produced pretend play. 3 other children produced direct imitations
of the modeled symbolic acts. In the 'structured condition', the
verbal cueing and modeling procedures increased the number of
different acts observed in all 14 play categories, but this does rot
necessarily reflect anything more than the effects of imitation.
One final result from Ungerer aid Sigman's study was that autistic
children's doll play was impoverished, compared to object play, in
the functioral category. They explain this as being due to autistic
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children's impaired ability to differentiate objects and actions,
but there is no evidence to support this explanation. A better
explanation for this result might be in terms of autistic children's
impaired theory of mind, found in the Puppet and Picture Experiments
(3 and ), reported earlier. The argent would be that such an
impairment would not impair functional object play, but might impede
functional doll play of the sort "Mary wants to make some tea and
thinks the other dolls want some too", etc.
Hanines and Langdell (1981) tested whether their sample of autistic
children (mean MA = 14:6 years, mean CA = 9:10 years) could imitate
pretend actions which varied in terms of their 'abstractness'. They
found that when the task did not require any imaginary objects (eg:
copying the modeled action of giving a doll a drink) all the
autistic children could do this. When the task required having to
imitate the use of objects (eg: haninering a nail), again all the
children could do this, although the autistic children performed the
act in a "real" manner, with rio pretend quality at all. In the third
task, 6 out of 8 of the autistic children did not copy deled
pretend use of an imaginary object (such as pouring tea from an
empty pot into an imaginary cup), whereas all the retarded
non-autistic children (matched on MA and CA) did. This difference
was highly significant (p < 0.0003, Fisher Exact Test). Finally, in
the tburth type of action, children had to copy purely pantomimic
bthaviours (eg: the del pretended to pour tea but neither teapot
nor cup was present). Again, the 2 groups of subjects differed. The
difference lay in their ability to show "empty gestures" on at least
3 of the 5 possIble occasions: whereas 7 out of 8 of the retarded
children did, 6 out of 8 of the autistic children did not.
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In a test of' object substitution (in which the children had to copy
the model's activity but were given the "wrong" object with which to
do so) Haxies arid Langdell found that the retarded children
virtually always gave some symbolic response, but 5 of the autistic
children failed to t°spond on at least half of' the occasions, and
those who did respond did so with "proper" (ie: non-symbolic),
functiorl uses of the objects. This interesting set of experiments
demonstrate clearly that autistic children of this MA (14:6 years)
can only imitate 'concrete' actions but fail to imitate modeled
pretend actions which require any symbolic (ie: substitute)
elements. The results after careful matching with a mn-autistic
retarded control group shows that this deficit is not due to
retardation but is autism-specific. A similar pattern of results was
obtained by Attod, (19814) in a test of mime production and
comprehension.
Gould (in press) tested "socially impaired" children using the Lowe
and Costello (1976) standardized test of symbolic play development.
In this test, sets of' miniature objects arranged in predetermined
patterns are presented. No expressive speech is required, and the
subject's uses of' the toys are scored as age-equivalents based on
norma established with normal children up to 3 years old. The
socially-impaired group (n = 31) was compared to a group of
"sociable" children (n = 29) who were retarded In language
comprehension and use, and of similar age (CA range = 5-12) arid IQ
to the socially-impaired group. "Sociable" was defined in terma of
the children showing social interaction appropriate for their MA
(although no standardized instrument is mentioned as having been
used to test this). 18 out of 31 of the socially impaired group (and
none of the sociable group) had a history of' classic Kanner's
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syndrome (Ic: autism).
The 2 groups did not differ on vIsuo-spatial scores, but the social
group had a significantly higher play test age. Even so, 9 of the 31
socially-impaired thildren were rated as showing symbolic play,
since they scored 3 or more on the Lowe and Costello scale. These
subjects, however, failed to show any elaboration or creativity in
their use of the materials. In contrast, the pretend play of the
sociable thildren was in line with their MA, and their use of the
materials was varied and flexible. The socially impaired group also
showed less observed spontaneous play than the sociable group. Play
test ages and language comprehension were positively correlated to a
moderate degree in all the thIldren who scored on the test at all.
Gould's study concludes that the retarded socially impaired group,
58% of whom had been diagnosed autistic, showed less pretend play
than would be expected from their MA, but nevertheless some autistic
children did show some pretend play, albeit unelaborated and
'unimaginative'. This co-occurence of social and symbolic skills is
in line with the other studies reviewed above, showing an
autism-specific deficit in pretend play. It is of interest that this
pattern also applied to those socially-impaired thildren who had not
been diagnosed autistic. This supports the idea that deficits In
these t skills, social and pretend, depend on the same underlying
mechanism, whether it is found within the classically autistic
population or not. (This same correlation between poor social
interaction and impoverished pretend play in autism has been found
In t other, more recent studies, [Mundy et al, 198 i ; Wetherby and
Prutting, 198k), although these unfortunately included no
non-autistic retarded control group thta, and the second of these
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scored 'functional' play as pretend).
The main criticism of Gould 'a study is that it accepts the Lowe and
Costello definition of pretend: This includes such b&aviours as
combing or brushing one's om or arEther person's hair, placing toy
tea-cups onto saucers, placing a toy knife and fork next to a plate,
wiping cutlery with a cloth, wiping one's face with a cloth, putting
a cloth on a toy table, putting a miniature thair next to it, or
attaching a toy trailer to a toy tractor. Unfortunately, all of
these actions are appropriate for the objects, and as such
constitute 'functional play'. There is nothing necessarily pretend
about them. The problem in the Lowe and Costello Test is that it
assumes that play with miniature objects (toys) is necessarily
pretend, since miniature objects are symbols of real-size objects.
However, this assumption is not reliable, since for the thud the
miniature object may be perceived simply as a small but real object.
Thus, this study may well overestimate the incidence of' pretend
play, through the use of inadequate criteria.
The studies on pretend play in autism can be surarized as follows:
All studies to thte suggest that there is a deficit in pretend play
in autism, either in terma of its absence in uost cases or its
limited form in those who do show it. However, all of the above
studies have methodological short-comings which prevent any
conclusions about autistic children's pretend play from being made
without qualification. These methodological problema are of t'
types: (1) either that spontaneous play was not studied (Curcio and
Piserchia, 1978; Ungerer and Sigman, 1981; Hamaes and L.angdell,
1981), and/or (2) that the definition of pretend was inadequate
(Wing et al, 1977; Gould, to appear; Riguet et al, 1981). The first
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of these probleme may overestimate the amount of pretend play in
autism (ie: by counting imitation as pretend), while the second of
these problema could either overestimate it (Ic: by counting
tunctiorl play as pretend) or underestimate it (Ic: by overlooking
bchaviour which should be included as pretend). An attempt is made
to avoid these methodological problema in Experiment 7.
The other major finding of these studies Is that pretend play is not
deviant in non-autistic retarded children, but is 'normal' relative
to their MA (Hu].me and Lunzer, 1966; Wing et al, 1977; Riguet et al,
1981; Hanines and Langdell, 1981; Gould, to appear). This Is also
confirmed in specific studies of Dowt 'a Syndrome children 's pretend
play (Hill and McCurie-Nicolich, 1981; Cunningham et al, 1985).
Mogford (1977) and Quinn and Rubin (198 i1) have reviewed the
literature on play in a variety of handicapped populations
(retarded, speech impaired, blind, deaf, autistic) and concludes
that play abnormalities are most pronounced in the autistic group.
The relationship between deficits in language and pretend play
remains a subject of controversy: Piaget (1962) argued that they are
t aspects of the 'semiotic function' and therefore necessarily
interlinked. However, Rutter, Bartak and Newman (1971) found that
only 3 out of 1 autistic children showed any pretend play, in
contrast to 9 out of 11 aphasic children who did pretend, which
suggested that language and pretend play are indepedent. (No
details of how pretend play was evaluated are give in this study).
Sinan and Ungerer (198 14b) also found that language and pretend play
deficits were independent of each other, in that the autistic
children with more advanced receptive language showed less pretend
play than the non-autistic mentally retarded children with less
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advanced language skills. They argue that the pretend deficit in
autism is thus not simply a result of delayed language development.
Before describing Experiment 7, it is important to present a
thorough definition of 'pre tend', and this will be derived from a
consideration of its cognitive properties, in the next section.
6.3: Cognitive aspects of pretend play:
Certain qualifications are perhaps required before presenting a
aralysis of pretend play, since it is likely that pretend
play serves 'non-cognitive' functions as well. Indeed, Vygotsky
(1933/76) is in no doubt over this:
"If play is to be understood as symbolic, there is the
danger that it might turn into a kind of activity akin to
algebra in action;...I feel that this...stresses the
importance of the cognitive process while neglecting not
only the affective situation but also the circunstances of
the child's activity" (p.540).
The affective and social aspects of pretend play are very important,
and initial investigations into this exist (Dunn and Wooding, 1977;
Dale, 1983; Connol].y and Doyle, 198k). However, these will not be
discussed in this thesis, since it is only the cognitive aspects of
pretend play which are predicted to be related to autistic
children's deficit in their theory of mind (Chapters 3 and ).
What are these cognitive features of pretend? The first distinction
to make is between pretend play versus 'reality play'. Reality play
can be defined as responding to the actual properties of objects and
persons, and exercising a variety of appropriate action schemes
(Leslie, to appear). At an early level, this would include
sensorinxtor play, (ie: manipulation of objects and exploration of
their physical properties) and, at a higher level, functioral play
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(ie: acting out the conv&ltiorBl use of objects, such as setting out
a tea set properly). A working definition of reality play is when
the infant treats the object as being what it actually is. Thus, a
plastic cup is treated as being plastic, or a cup, or hard, etc. In
contrast, pretend play can be defined as when the infant treats the
object as being what it is not. Thus, the plastic cup is treated as
if it contained fluid, or as if it were a space-ship, etc.
This working definition has certain cognitive implications: namely,
that for a person to be pretending s/he must simultaneously know
both what the object actually is, and what the object is now
represented as being (Goloinb and Cornelius, 1977). This ensures that
the person is pretending rather than simply being mistaken a'
confused (Austin, 1961; Leslie, to appear). Some authors have termed
these	 simultaneous	 representations	 "double	 knowledge"
(McCune-Nicolicb, 1981; Rosenblatt, 1977). Leslie adds the
qualification that the pretender must be able to tell the difference
between the pretence and reality at the time the pretence takes
place. Thus, to borrow an example from Piaget (1962), the thud
might pretend by using a donkey's tail (x) to represent a pillow
(y), and for this to count as pretend, the thud must be able to
discriminate x's from y's. Stern (192 1$) proposed the "ignorance"
hypothesis, which viewed pretend play as due to mistakes by the
child, but clearly this does not meet the definition adequately,
since ignorance and pretence are conceptually distinct.
How pretend play is cognitively achieved has received relatively
little attention since Plaget (1962), with the exception of a recent
arlysis by Leslie (to appear). As mentioned briefly earlier
(p.11$9), in Leslie's model, the real world is represented by
i98
"primary representations" and, whilst in 'pretend mode', primary
representations are "decoupled" from their normal input-output
relationships. He postulates that this Is performed by a cognitive
mechanism called the "decoupler". This is necessary so that, as
Austin (1961) expresses it, "Pretence is always insulated...frcm
reality" (p.253), and, in Leslie's terre, the system has some way of
"quarantining" pretence from reality. This ensures that during
pretend play, one's knowledge about the real world does not get
interfered with or "abused". This idea is also expressed in an
earlier paper by Reynolds (1976):
"The essential feature of the simulative mode is that the
system, while functioning normally, is uncoupled from its
normal consequences vis-a-vis the other systeme. However,
the feedback consequences within the acting systema are
unimpaired" (p.621).
Thus dec oup led from their normal use, primary re pre sen ta tio ns become
"second-order" representations, or "metarepre sen tations" (Pylyshyn,
1978).
Leslie identifies 3 logical properties of pretending:
(1) Deviant reference, in which objects are substituted fbr one
another (eg: "this barna Is a telephone");
(2) Deviant truth, in which 'false' properties are attributed to
objects (eg: "this doll's (clean) face is dirty");
(3) Deviant existence, in which absent objects are present (eg:
"this (empty) cup is full of tea").
Leslie points out that these 3 logical properties of pretending are
identical to the 3 logical properties of mental states, noted by
Brentano (187$), 	 discussed earlier (see p.86). These are:
"referential	 opacity";	 "non-entailment	 of	 truth";	 and
"non-entailment of existence", respectively. These 3 features can be
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handled by the cognitive system precisely because prifiBry
representations have been 'decoupled' from reality. This again
parallels the cognitive requirements for representing mental states
(see p.1iU6).
The cognitive significance of this, therefore, is that in reality
play (such as 'functiorl play') only a prinBry or 'first-order'
representatiorl capacity is required, whereas pretend play employs
second-order representations.
Having discussed some of the important logical and cognitive
properties of pretend play, it is possible to formulate a definition
of pretend play which (with the exception of Sian and Ungerer's
[1981]) goes further than that used in the previous studies with
autistic c*iildren. This is the definition which will be used in
Experiment 7.
Definition:
Pretend play can be said to occur if' there is evidence that:
(1) The subject is using an object as if it were another object,
and/or
(2) The subject is attributing properties to an object which it does
not have, and/or
(3) The subject is referring to absent objects as if they are
present.
Even with this definition, it is the case that some pretence will be
missed, since this definition is expressed in purely behavioural
term and, as discussed earlier, pretence in principle can be
totally "in one's head", with no outward, visible indeces (Austin,
1961). This is therefore a definition of visible pretend play, and
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is used so that it can be independently identified. Along with this
definition also runs the possibility that some pretence will be
attributed when there is none, eg: a thud might look at a wooden
brick and say the word "car", and this would meet the third part of
the definition above of pretend play, even though the thud may have
no intention to refer to the brick as a car. Sxh erra's, hover,
will be a feature of all definitions of pretend play. The strength
of the one above is that it includes more forms of substitution than
just object substitution, and it allows pretend play to be
distinguished from other types of play, and these are described in
Experiment 7, in the next Chapter.
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chapter 7: An empirical investigation of Pretend Play in autism.
To suimnarize the argtEents so far, the Puppet and Picture
Experiments (3 and 4) have suggested that autistic children's
ability to understand other people's mental states, an ability which
involves second-order representations, (Dennett, 1978a; Leslie, to
appear; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Wimer and Perner, 1983) is impaired,
whilst the Causality Experiment (5) suggested that their ability to
understand physical causality, which requires first-order
representations (Ic: representations receiving Input from and
referring to external stimuli), is intact.
According to Leslie, pretend play may be the earliest manifestation
of a second-order representatiorBi capacity in human development.
Therefore, a theory of autism which posits a 'second-order
representatiorBl deficit' should also predict that pretend play is
impaired in autism, but nct in other mentally handicapped groups who
can attribute mental states to others. Thus, the predicted contrast
should again be beten Down's Syndrome versus autistic children.
Experiment 7 tests the hypothesis that autistic children do not show
any spontaneous pretend play, and this experiment is designed to
overcome the methodological and definitioral shortcomings of earlier
studies (Ungerer and Slgman, 1981; Wing et al, 1977; Riguet et al,
1981; Gould, in press), as discussed in chapter 6.2.
7.1: Method:
Sub jec ts:
The subjects once again were drawn fro!n special schools in the
London area, in the case of the clinical groups, and From a nursery
school in the case of the mrmal group. It was decided to use a
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different sample of subjects from the previous experiments, on the
grounds that it was expected that pretend play was more likely to be
elicited in as young a sample as possible. This sample selection
thus increased the chances of finding some pretend play, since it
might mt be expected in an older age-group. The background data for
individual subjects is shown in Appendix 11.
Table 7.1 shows that the Down's Syndrome and the autistic children
are matched as groups on mean chrorx,logical age, mental age
(nn-verbal) as well as on IQ and language age (BPVT).
Table 7.1: Subject Variable5 in Experiment 7.
Group	 N Chrorx logical Age 	 Sex
x	 sd	 Range	 Male Female
Normal 10 1L1 0.7 3.0 - 5.1	 7	 3
Down's	 10 7.5 2.9	 2.5 -12.2	 5	 5
Autistic 10 8.1 2.6	 4.3 -12. 1 	7	 3
Group	 MA (LEITER)	 IQ
x	 d	 Range	 x sd Range
Normal - -	 -	 - -	 -
Down's 3.8 1.7	 1.9- 5.8	 59 20.6 30- 89
Autistic 1 .9 2.9	 2.3-10.2	 58 25.6 35-106
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BPVT
x	 sd	 Range
Normal -	 -	 -
Down's	 2.5	 0.6	 1.7-3.7
Autistic 2.5	 0.9	 1.7-3.1$
Non-verbal MA was measured using the Leiter Internatiorl
Performance Scale. Verbal MA was assessed using the BPVT, which
resulted in 6 subjects (3 Down's and 3 autistic) being classed as
'non-verbal' in that they produced no score at all on this scale.
They were nevertheless included in this experiment on the grour11s
that no a priori assumptions were being set up regarding the
relationship between pretend play and language; as stated above, the
hypothesis being tested focussed on the relationship between
diagmstic group and pretend play. The individual subject thta is
shown in Appendix 11.
Procedure:
Each child was filmed for 15 minutes individually, using 3 different
sets of toys (5 minutes each). The choice of materials used was
decided on the basis that as wide a variety of toys as possible
would increase the likelihood of eliciting pretend play. Having 3
sets of different toys also meant that novelty wnuld be introduced
at regular intervals, if one set of toys was less attractive to a
particular child. Limiting it to 3 sets of toys was thought
necessary because pilot studies had shown that more than this was
beyond the child 's concentration span, and this was limited enough
to be easily standardizable. The 3 toy sets were:
a. 5 different stuffed animals, (namely, a crocodile, a snake, a
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cow, a frog and a mouse, each between 2-6 Inches long), and wooden
building bricks (of different shapes and sizes, of the sort
frequently found in nursery schools). The inclusion of toy animals
was because pretend play with these would be very easily
identifiable (eg: animating them, making animal noises, etc). The
wooden bricks were available to be Incorperated either into any
'animal play', and/or because they lend themeelves very easily for
use as object substitutes (eg: house, train, etc);
b. A toy kitchen stove (made of plastic), with miniature pots, pans,
spoon, 2 dolls, small pieces of green sponge, and a toy telephone.
The pieces of sponge were included so as to provide the child with
material which was clearly non-functiorl but which could be
incorperated as substitute objects in pretend cooking. The pieces of
sponge were the essential part of' this second set of toys, since
other studies which have used cooking a' domestic-type toys usually
only elicit functiorally appropriate use of them, whereas If the
child inca'perated the sponge as food, this would clearly be an
example of' pretend. Similarly, it was hoped the telephone might
encourage construction of a pretend conversation with an imaginary
listener;
c. A set of 'play people' (corinercially available) - ie: small
plastic people (approximately 3 inches high), in a playground
setting (swings, climbing frame, bench). This third set of toys was
included because it was more conventiorally something to 'play with'
(eg: pushing a swing, assembling a climbing frame, eto). It did not
contain any materials of ambiguous function, as the other 2 sets of'
toys had deliberately done. As such, it was not expected to lend
itself particularly to pretend play, but it was included in a'der to
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be used for other types of play, discussed below.
The child was seated at a smell table, away from other children, and
the experimenter presented one set of toys at a time. Another
experimenter videotaped the child in each of the 3 corditions for 5
minutes continuously. The order of presentation of these 3 sets of
toys was randomized, but each child played with all 3 sets. The
experimenter simply said to each child: "Here are some toys. Would
you like to play with them? Good. You can do anything you like with
them." Following these instructions, the experimenter only spoke to
the child if the child initiated any interaction leg: asked
questions, etc.,). For long periods, and for most of the time, the
focus was on the child's solitary spontaneous play. There was no
modeling at all.
Subjects who did not interact with the nmterials at all , ie: who
could not be described even mininnlly as "object-directed", were
excluded from the experiment. This resulted in 1 Dow's Syndrome and
1 autistic child being excluded. After 30 children who had met the
inclusion criteria had been tested, their video-films were examined.
Video Film Coding Scheme.
The children 's toy-directed behaviour was coded into any one of
mutually exclusive categQ'ies:
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1. Sensorimotor:
Definition: banging, waving, sucking, throwing, rolling,
'twiddling', or sniffing objects, with no attention paid
to their 'function'.
Example: child sucks brick.
2. Ordering:
Definition: a more 'intelligent' behaviour involving the
child imposing some pattern onto the objects, such as
lining them up, piling them up, puting one inside another,
arranging them in systematic ways, but still with no
regard for their 'function'.
Example: child piles up bricks.
3. Punctiorl Play:
Definition: Using the objects 'appropriately', that is,
according to their intended function.
Example: child dials telephone, picks up receiver, and
says "Hello".
J4 Pretend Play:
Definition: ild uses an object as If it was another
object, (eg: using bits of sponge as food), or attributes
properties to an object which it does not have (eg: acting
as If the toy stove was hot), or refers to absent objects
as if they are present (eg: pouring water when there is
none).
These lj categories were found to encompass all toy-directed
behaviours of interest produced. The object-directed behaviours
above are numbered 1 to 14 because they also represent a
developmental sequence, from simple to complex, concrete to
abstract, in the first few years of child development (Fein, 1975;
Sigrnan and Unger'er, 19814b).
All the films were arlysed and the behaviour categorized
accordingly, and strict criteria were used throughout. This was
achieved by having 3 measures of certainty for eh category:
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1. Very sure;
2. Quite sure;
3. Ambiguous;
If the behaviour was very ambiguous, It was 'relegated' to the
simpler, developmentally earlier behaviour categcry. For example, a
child sucking a brick could be taken as a very ambiguous example of
pretending the brick was food. In our strict coding scheme however,
this would be scored as sensorinotor. Similarly, piling up bricks
could be taken as pretending the bricks were a tower etc., but in
the absence of any other supporting evidence for a pretend
interpretation, this would be coded as 'ordering'.
Given the limited range of play materials presented, there was a
limited range of behaviours elicited. In order to clarify the nature
of the coding scheme, the entire list of' behaviours generated by
these toys is sho below, for the Ii object-related categories.
Table 7.2: Toy-type x behaviour category interaction, in Experiment
7.
(Overleaf)
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BEHAVIOUR CATEGORY
Toy-Type	 1	 2	 3
Sensorint Ordering Functiorl Pretend
Animals	 Sizking, Lining up	 -	 Animating animals
throwing, animals. 	 eg: making animal
banging,	 walk, eat, bite,
waving,	 fight, etc.;
rolling,	 Making animal
'twiddling'	 noises
or sniffing
the animal.
Bricks	 Same	 Lining up	 -	 Name pile of
actions	 bricks;	 bricks as house,
as above Piling up	 etc.;
on bricks, bricks;	 Using a brick as
Arranging	 another object,
them by	 eg: a knife, or
colour,	 a train, etc.
size,
shape, etc.
Telephone	 Same	 -	 Nandng	 Adapting telephone
actions	 telephone; conversation as if
as above	 dialing;	 someone else was at
on	 picking up other d.
telephone;	 receiver,
making	 replacing
It ring.	 it, holding
it to ear,
saying
'Hello'.
Cooker Set	 Same	 Putting Turning	 Putting sponge
actions	 pans	 dials on	 into pan; putting
as above inside	 cooker;	 pan with sponge
on	 one	 opening	 inside in/on to
pans,	 another. cooker	 cooker; stirring
spoon,	 doors;	 sponge In pan with
sponge,	 assembling spoon; stirring
dishes.	 parts of
	
empty pan with
cooker;	 spoon; serving
placing	 sponge from pan to
empty pan	 dishes; feeding
in/on to	 dolls with sponge
cooker.	 from spoon;animates
dolls eg: making
doll cook.
Play People Same	 Lining	 Sitting	 Giving people
actions	 up play people on	 roles other than
as above people. bench; 	 those related to
on play	 putting	 actions
people;	 people in	 appropriate on a
Pushing	 swing arxl	 climbing frame or
swing	 pushing it; swing. (Ic: not
without	 making	 functiorEl).
people	 people
in it.	 climb up
ladder.
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As Table 7.2 above shows, there were 5 separate toys within the 3
conditions, and ii object-related behaviour categories. This
gerated 14 x 5 20 Toy x Category combinations. However, as the
chart shows, 3 toy x behaviour combinations were exclud& so as to
preserve their mutually exclusive rture:
1. In the aninals condition, 'functioral play' was in principle
impossible, since this would have been indistinguishable (and
therefore not mutually exclusive) from pretend play.
2. Similarly, the bricks could not be used functiorally' without
also being 'ordering behaviour'.
3. Finally, the telephone, by its very design, could not be acted on
such that the behaviour could be classified as 'ordering'.
Apart from these 3 exceptions, the remaining 17 other toy x
behaviour category interactions were in principle possible (ie:
distinguishable) and indeed did arise.
7.2: Video Analysis.
(1) All the video films were analysed first by the experimenter,
noting do and transcribing all different (ie novel) examples which
fell into each behaviour category for each type of toy. Each was
also scored for whether the category judgement was very sure, quite
sure or ambiguous. Repetitions of the same behaviour on the same toy
were not scored. The transcriptions of these films are shoi in
Appendix 10. There is no objective definition of what counts as a
distinct behaviour, but the way in which the stream of action has
been 'chunked' is clear from the transcriptions in Appendix 10. The
subjective guideline used was that one act on one object or one act
relating 2 objects together constituted a unit of behaviour (eg:
'puts dish in oven'), unless the next action was not separated by
any 'noticeable' pause in time (eg: 'puts dish in oven and takes it
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out again'). Because of the unreliability of counting behaviours,
all of the analyses which were done were qualitative (Ic: does the
subject show this type of behaviour or not) rather that quantitative
(Ic: how much of this type of play does the subject show).
(ii) The experimenter then watched all the video films for a secoril
time and recoded whether each child produced behaviours of each
type, as a test of reliability of his judgement about each child's
behaviour.
(iii) An Independent judge then analysed all the films, as a test of
reliability both of the first judge, and of the scoring method for
each diagnostic group. This was done by using Table 7.2 as
operational definitions of each play categcry, and the films were
randomized so that all 3 groups of children were mixed up together.
Whilst this does not entirely prevent knowledge of diagnosis from
influencing ratings, it makes It more difficult to guess the
diagnosis of each child. This second judge simply scored each child
for whether they produced any of the I play behaviours, and whether
these judgenients were ambiguous, quite sure, or very sure.
(iv) Finally, 1 independent judges (drawn from psychology
postgraduate students) were asked to rate films of 3 subjects play
(1 normal, 1 Down 'a Syndrome, and 1 autistic child) for unambiguous
instances of pretend play only, in the animal condition. The Down's
Syndrome and the autistic child were selected at random from those
who could be matched for non-verbal MA, verbal MA, and CA.
Results:
It was decided to analyze the experimenter's first reting In terms
of the number of children in each group showing each behaviour at
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different levels of certainty. These 3 levels (very sure, quite
sure, and ambiguous) are not mutually exclusive for any one subject
(although they are for any one action), as at different tines the
same thud .ght produce behaviours at more than one level of
clarity. The reason the arlysis was in terme of the number of
subjects producing each type of behaviour was because this is a far
more reliable measure than the number of behaviours produced of each
type, since, as discussed earlier, it is not possible to say where a
behaviour begins and ends with any reliability. These results are
showi in Table 7.3. A subject was rated as showing the behaviour if
it occurred at all with any of the 3 toy sets.
Table 7.3: First judge's (experimenter's) ratings, expressed as
percentage of each group showing each play behaviour.
Pre tend
Very Sure
	 Quite Sure	 Ambiguous
Autistic	 20'	 20	 liD
Down's	 80	 50
Normel	 90	 50	 50
( = significant)
Functioral
Very	 Sure	 Quite	 Sure	 Ambiguous
Autistic	 80	 0	 20
Dowi's	 90	 10	 30
Normal	 100	 0	 10
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Sen sor imotor
Very	 Sure	 Quite Sure	 Ambiguous
AutistIc	 100	 30	 10
Do's	 80	 10	 20
Normal	 0	 10	 0
Ordering
Very Sure	 Quite Sure	 Ambiguous
Autistic	 10	 10	 0
Dois	 20	 0	 0
Normal	 10	 0	 0
These results are from all 3 conditions combined. A Fisher-Yates
Test of Significance for 2x2 matfIoes was performed on these thta,
resulting In a significant difference being found only between the
Autistic and the 2 control groups in the pretend category (p
0.025). All other group differences were rDn-sigriificant (p > 0.05).
Furthermore, the difference in the pretend category was unaffected
when only mn-verbal pretend acts were considered. There was an
effect of condition, in that the play people condition elicited
functional and sensorimotor play from all 3 groups, but no
unambiguous pretend play. In contrast, the other 2 conditions did
elicit pretend play to an equal extent. There was no effect of sex
on pretend play (12/ 19 males pretended, and 7/11 females pretended
[Chi2 = 0.599, df:1, p ) 0.3)).
The experimenter further analysed the pretend play category by
considering the number of unambiguous pretend actions made, and the
number of children making them, for each diagnostic group. Table 7.li
overleaf shows this comparison: This particular analysis was done
despite the problen in deciding how to count behaviours. This was
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because it was impertant to determine how much pretend play is
produced by each group, at an approximete level. The measures (none,
few, and many) are sufficient to show the group differences:
Table 7.11: Number of subjects in each group producing different
quantities of unambiguous pretend play.
None	 Few	 Many
Autistic	 8	 2	 0
Down's	 2	 5	 3
Normal	 1	 3	 6
(FEW = Less than 10 instances; MANY More than 10 instances).
Analysis of Table 7.11 showed that there were significantly more
autistic children who produced no pretend play at all (Fisher Exact
Probability Test, p 0.025). The 3 groups were not significantly
different in terma of the number of children producing a 'few'
pretend actions (Fisher Exact Probability Test, p > 0.05). There
were significantly more normal than autistic children who produced
'many' pretend actions, (Fisher Exact Probability Test, p = 0.01),
but there were not significantly more normal than Down 's, or more
Down 's than autistic children in the 'many' category (Fisher Exact
Probability Test, p > 0.05, in both).
Measures of reliability:
The experimenter's test-retest reliability for rating each child as
either showing each behaviour or not was calculated by using Cohen 's
Kappa (Cohen, 1960), and is shown in the following table:
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Table 7.5: Test-Retest Reliability Measures for each unambiguous
play category by the first judge:
Pretend Function Sensory Order
Coefficient of
Agreement:
(Cohen's K, n=30) 1.0	 0.71	 0.81	 1.0
The inter-rater reliability for the 2 Judges for each group x play
categcry is given in the following table:
Table 7.6: Inter-rater reliability measures for each unambiguous
play category.
	
Pretend	 Function	 Sensory	 Order
Coefficient of
Agreement:
	
(Cohen's K, n:30) 0.86 	 0.71	 0.92	 0.92
Since both the test-retest reliability measures and the inter-rater
reliability measures were all above 0.70, this is considered to be
within the range of acceptability.
The third test of reliability was from the ll judges rating 1 of
each type of child for pretend play: ill out of ill rated the ri,rmal
child as having unambiguous pretend play (100%), 12 out of 114 rated
the Down's syndrome thild as showing this as well (85.7%), but mne
of the 114 Judges scored the autistic child as showing any
unambiguous pretend play at all (0%). This difference was highly
significant (Fisher Exact Probability Test, p < 0.005).
Analysis of Background Variables:
Further analysis of subject variables was performed to ascertain if
those childen who did show pretend play were different along any
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dimension from those who did not show any pretend play, other than
in terms of clinical diagnosis. Table 7.7 shows the background
variables of those thildren who, on the basis of' both judges'
ratings, did (P) a' did not (P') show unambiguous pretend play.
Table 7.7 was analysed with a Mann rTh1tney (Small Sample) Test,
since the distribution of' scores In the autistic group who shod
pretend play (henceforth referred to as the 'pretenders') and the
Doim's Syndrome group who did not show pretend play (henceforth
referred to as the 'non-pretenders') was obviously non-normal (n = 2
in both).
Table 7.7:
	
Background	 Variables in	 'Pretenders'	 (P) and
'Non-Pretenders' (P'), In Experiment 7.
CA
	
n	 x	 sd
Aut (P)
	
2	 8.6	 1.0
	
Aut (P') 8	 8.0	 2.8
	
Dor (P) 8	 7.9	 2.6
	
Dom (P') 2	 5.8	 3.3
MA (non-verbal)
	
n	 x	 sd
Aut (P)	 2	 7.	 0.3
	
Aut (P') 8	 3.11	 1.8
	
Down (P) 8	 14.3	 1.5
	
Down (P') 2	 1.8	 0.1
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BPVT
1	 X
Aut (P)	 2	 3.5	 0.95
Aut (P') 8	 1.1	 1.2
Down (P) 8	 2.2	 1.5
Down (P'). 2	 0	 -
IQ
	
n	 x	 sd
Aut (P)
	 2	 100	 6
	
Aut (P') 8	 9
	
Down(P) 8	 62	 20
	
Down (P') 2	 13
The autistic pretenders differed significantly from the autistic
non-pretenders in terms of their non-verbal MA (U = 1, p = 0.0IU,
their verbal MA (U = 1, p = 0.0'l$), and their 10 (U = 0, p = 0.022).
The autistic pretenders were not different in CA to the autistic
non-pretenders (U 6, p 0.356).
The Down's pretenders had significantly higher non-verbal MA (U =
0.5, p = 0.O'4) compared to the Down's non-pretenders, but did not
differ in CA (U' = 6, p = 0.356), IQ (U' = 3.5, p : 0.2),	 verbal
MA (U = 3, p = 0.133). Finally, the autistic non-pretenders did not
differ significantly from the Down's pretenders in terms of
non-verbal MA (U = 12, p : 0.16 11), verbal MA (U t 19.5, p : 0.117),
CA (U: 33, p = 0.118), IQ (U: 17.5, p = 0.08). This is clarified
by the use of the graph overleaf.
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CA MA(LTR) BPVT
• = Significant
AUTISTIC NON-PRETENDERS
- AUTISTIC PRETENDERS
DOWN'S PRETENDERS
DOWN'S NON-PRETENDERS
FIG 7.1: BACKGROUND VARIABLES IN 'PRETENDERS' AND
'NON-PRETENDERS' (1ST JUDGE'S RATINGS) IN
EXPERIMENT 7
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7.3: Discussion:
Experiment 7 shows that significantly fewer autistic children
produced any spontaneous pretend play, and that the few 'autistic
pretenders' produced significantly less pretend play than both
normal and Down 's 'pretenders'.
Furthermore, the autistic pretenders, identified by the first judge
only (n = 2), are distinguished from the autistic non-pretenders (n
8) in that the pretenders had a higher non-verbal and verbal MA
and a higher IQ. However, the 8 Down's pretenders were not
distinguished from the 8 autistic non-pretenders in any of the
background subject variables. Therefore, while these variables do
explain in what way the 20% of the autistic group who did pretend
were different from the autistic non-pretenders, neither age,
general cognitive, or language level can account for why 80% of the
autistic group did not pretend, since matched Down's Syndrome
subjects did pretend. This strongly suggests the conclusion that it
must be an autism-specific deficit. This confirir previous rk
(Ungerer and Siginan, 1981; Gould, in press; Riguet et al, 1981).
Within the Down 's Syndrome group, the pretenders (n = 8) were
distinguished from the non-pretenders (n = 2) only In terra of
non-verbal MA. This result Is not unexpected In that the mean MA of
the Down's Syndrome non-pretenders was 1:8 yrs (see Table 7.7), and
the onset of pretend play in normal children is between 12_211
months. Clearly, the Down 's Syndrome group of non-pretenders are at
the slow end of the normal range, but not outside of it. As regards
the one normal child who did not show pretend play, no other
background variables apart from CA were available, which makes
explartion of her result difficult.
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Of interest is the discrepancy of the 2 raters for unambiguous
pretend play. The coefficient (K) of 0.86 was the result of 2
autistic children being classed as pretenders by the first judge but
not-pretenders by the second judge. These 2 cases are of course of
paramount importance. The second judge added the report that her
decision not to score these 2 cases as pretenders was based on two
reasons: First, the bthaviours in question involved one autistic
child saying "Don't touch it. It's hot", referring to the toy
cooker, and while the first judge scored this as pretend attribution
of absent qualities, the second took this to be possibly "word
association" or echolalia, Ic: producing words that he had been used
to hearing in the context of cookers. Similarly, the autistic child
who was scored as a pretender by the first judge because he said
"Are these potatoes? I don't know. They might be peas" was scored as
a non-pretender by the second judge for the same reasons, ie: just
"free-association" with green bits of sponge, without the subject
appearing to decide that x would stand fbr y. Secondly, the
nonverbal instances which were classed by the first judge as pretend
(Ic: putting sponge In dish in oven) were seen as possibly
fortuitous positioning by the second judge, because the child did
not extend this action into any pretend cooking.
To summarize the second judge's reasons for why she scored these 2
autistic subjects as at best 	 jous pretend, it Is best to quote
her impressions in her owo words:
"These children lacked any sign of having planoed or
decided to let one thing stand for another in a
deliberately created pretend situation. In contrast, all
of the other children classed as pretenders, however
visibly retarded and non-verbal, produced actions which
were unambiguously pretend because it was immediately
obvious how, for example, putting the sponge into the dish
and the dish Into the oven was not a random or fortuitous
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act, because it was then brought out of the oven, served
into another dish, stirred, repeated and extended into a
whole planned cooking story.
Furthermore, all the other (non-autistic) pretenders
showed adequate evidence of their ability to pretend by
producing it in the 'animals' condition as well as in the
'cooker' condition - ie: by producing it with more than
one object. In contrast, the 2 ambiguous pretending
autistic children did not produce any pretend play in the
animal condition, but only an isolated instance in the
cooker condition".
This last point is important, since part of the definition of
pretend play is that it is highly productive and generative. Thus,
in the second judge's opinion, no autistic children produced any
unambiguous pretend play, and the first judge's scoring of 2
autistic subjects as pretenders was only possible through more
lenient criteria.
This result is in line with that found by previous studies in this
area, and it strengthens these findings by examining spontaneous
pretend play only (where others have examined modeled play (Curelo
and Piserchia, 1978; Ungerer and Sigman, 1981; Haiimes and Langdell,
1981;]) and by using a definition of pretend play which is more
rigorous than in some previous studies (Wing et al, 1977; Gould, to
appear; Riguet et al, 1981). Experiment 7 also found that pretend
play is 'normal' in non-autistic retarded children, relative to
their MA, and this replicates the results of other studies (Hulme
and Lunzer, 1966; Wing et al, 1977; Hill and McCune-Nicolich, 1981).
Whether the autistic subjects in the Pretend Play Experiment (7)
also have a deficit in their theory of mind, as tested in the Puppet
and Picture Experiments (3 and 1) is another question, since
different subjects took part in Experiment 7 as against Experiments
3 and . In this respect, whilst both a theory of mind aid pretend
play are second-order representatioml skills, aid whilst a deficit
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in eh of these skills has been observed in 80% of e&th autistic
sample separately, this is insufficient evidence to conclude that a
deficit in one necessarily implies a deficit in the other; they mey
be a different 80% in eath case.
Two case studies:
Whilst none of the autistic children in the theory of mind
Experiments (3 and 1$) took part in the Pretend Play Experiment (7),
it was decided to test for a theory of ndnd in the 2 autistic
children from Experiment 7 who alone showed some pretend play, at
least acccrding to the first judge. It was predicted on the basis of
the second-order representation theory that they would possess the
cognitive prerequisites for a thory of mind. Accordingly, these 2
children, [subject numbers 5 and 6 - see Appendix 11] were tested on
the Puppet and Picture procedures (Experiments 3 and U. Both
subjects succeeded in sequencing the Scriptal stories correctly, but
whereas the younger child (CA 7: yrs) with a lower verbal MA (2:8
yrs) and non-verbal MA (7:2 yrs) failed either to attribute a false
belief by pointing to the correct location (despite passing control
questions) [Experiment 3), or to sequence the 'Mental' Condition
stories correctly tExperiment 11), the older, more able child (CA =
9:8 yrs, Verbal MA = 4:3 yrs, non-verbal MA = 10:2 yrs) passed on
all tests. In addition, the older of these 2 children alone used
appropriate mental state terme in his narrations.
The result of this 'mini-study' is not intended to be the basis of
any conclusions, since without testing all other subjects on both
Pretend play and theory of mind, it is not possible to discuss the
empirical relationship between these two skills. Unfortunately, the
other subjects from the Pretend Play Experiment (7) had too low a
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verbal MA to test for the presence of a thecry of mind, whilst the
subjects from the Puppet and Picture Experiments (3 and U were too
old to be tested for pretend play. However, the results from these 2
subjects can be Interpreted as tentative evidence that the ability
to pretend play in combination with a verbal MA higher than Li years
will result In the development of a theory of mind In an autistic
child. This fits in with Leslie's (to appear) formulation, discussed
earlier, that pretend play occurs developmentally earlier than a
theory of mind. It would be expected that if the younger of these 2
subjects has a higher verbal MA when he is older, then he too should
develop a theory of mind. It would be of value to follow up this
prediction in the future.
In conclusion, the results of the Pretend Play Experiment (7)
support the notion of the separation of first and second-order
representation, in that autistic children showed a deficit in
pretend play deficit but not in other 'functiorl' play. This notion
of a cognitive dissociation or independence between pretend play, on
the one hand, and knowledge about the real world, on the other,
echoes what was found in the Picture and Causality Experiments (LI
and 5), Ic: that autistic children understood the physical but not
the mental world, and has also been proposed by Sigman and Ungerer
(198 1 b): In their studies, they have demonstrated autistic
children 'a intact object concept In the face of impaired pretend
play, and they take this as an indication that "representatioral
thought may be manifested In t systeme, only one of which is
Impaired in the autistic child" (p.293). They consider this second
system to be the ability to form and manipulate symbols, a view also
proposed caner by, among others, Ricks and Wing (1975). They do
not, however, link this to the autistic child's social deficit, as
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has been done in this thesis, via the 'thecry of ufind'.
The final chapter will discuss the rotion that a geral 'symbolic
deficit' exists in autism, and will relate this both to the
experimental results from this thesis, arid to the formulations found
elsehere.
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Chapter 8: Conclusions and Implications:
8.1: Simnary of experimental results:
A care concept in social cognition is, as discussed in Chapter 1,
the distinction between self and other. As the experiments in this
thesis have shown, this conceptual distinction has many levels,
ranging from concrete to abstract, and postulated to require
different levels of representation in the cognitive system.
At the most concrete level, that of visual self-recognition,
autistic children whose MA was in the normal range were shown to be
unimpaired (the Mirrcr Experiment [1)). In the terminology used
earlier, they can be said to have a concept of "self-as-object".
At a more abstract level, that of attributing different perceptions
to another person, the same autistic children were show to be
unimpaired (the Vision Experiment [2)). In the terminology used
earlier, they can be said to have a "thect-y of sight".
At a yet more abstract level, that of attributing mental states such
as different beliefs to another person, the autistic children were
shown to be severely impaired (the Puppet and Picture Experiments [3
and J). In the terminology used earlier, they can be said to be
impaired in their "thecry of mind".
Thus, the level of their self-other differentiation which is
undeveloped is the level of conceptual role-taking. This deficit was
found in contrast to Do s Syndrome children of a lower verbal and
non-verbal MA, and clinically normal children of a lower CA. It thus
appears to be autism-specific. This deficit was found in 80% of
autistic children tested. The 20% who did have a thecz-y of' mind at
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the level tested in the Puppet and Picture Experiments [3 and 'I)
(Ic: at the level appropriate for a normal 1$ year old) were found to
lack a theory of mind at the level appropriate for a normal 6-7 year
old (the Village Experiment r6)). Again, Down's Syndrome children of
equivalent MA did not. It was argued that such deficits (at both
levels of their theory of mind) could account for autistic
children 'a impoverished comaunication skills and social
relationships. This will be expanded upon In some detail in Section
8.2.(i).
The Causality Experiment (5) resulted in a dramatic demonstration of
the same autistic children's unimpaired non-social cognition, in
their ability to attribute physical causality to mechanical type
events. A similar contrast was shown in their ability to understand
certain social situations, namely those for which a descriptive,
bavioural understanding s sufficient (the Picture Experiment
[14), Scriptal Conditions). These twn results serve to highlight that
(a) the impairment is specific to the domain of social cognition and
(b) within this domain, it is not understanding people per se which
is of difficulty, but understanding people's mental states.
The final Experiment (7) found just as pervasive a deficit among a
younger sample of autistic children in another domain, that of
pretend play. This s consistent with the hypothesis that perhaps
their cognitive deficit was not confined purely to their theory of
mind, but was a type of damage which uld affect both their theory
of mind and pretend play, whilst leaving their knowledge of physical
causality intact. This s predicted on the basis of a proposed
cognitive explanation, namely, an impairment In the capacity for
'second-order' representations. As was expected, the autistic
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children in the Pretend Play Experiment (7) did produce other,
so-called 'functiorBi' p lay , indicating the deficit was specifically
in pretence.
The various levels of autistic children 's self-concept which were
investigated are represented in Figure 8.1, in crder to clarify the
location of the deficit.
Figure 8.1: Evidence from Experiments 1-7 implicating intact and
impaired cognition in autism.
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As schematized in Figure 8.1, the 'second-order' representatiorBi
L
deficit thecry Is proposed to explain the Impairments found in both
autistic children 'a thecry of mind and 	 pretend	 play. This
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formulation has parallels with one proposed by Gould (1982), in that
social and pretend deficits are assumed to be caused by one
underlying mechanism. Gould 'a "Triad theory of autism" i5 shon in
Figure 8.2. The second-order representatiorl deficit theory allows
Gould 'a model to be modified to take into account the experimental
evidence from the Puppet and Picture Experiments (3 and ). This
modification is also ahom in Figure 8.2.
Figure 8.2: Modification of' Gould's Triad Theory.
GOUlD'S TRIAD
OF AUTISTIC
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ABILITY
IMPAIR..
ThEORY
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ORD ER
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REPRESENT- 	 ABILITY
ATIONAL
	
IMPAIRED.
CAPACITY
IMPAIRED.
SYMBOLIC
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IMPAIRED.
To suxarize Figure 8.2, Gould 's Triad theory is supported by the
results of the Puppet, Picture and Pretend Experiments (3, i, and
7), to the extent that the social, cotanunicative and pretend
deficits are found to co-occur. Hover, it required modification in
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that her theory leaves unspecified which impaired cognitive
mechanism might give rise to these observed deficits.
8.2: Implications from the second-order representational deficit
theory.
8.2.(i): How does the theory relate to Kanner's description of the
social impairment?
It is worthwhile to consider the explanatory power of the
second-order representational deficit theory. It has already been
used quite 'economically' in order to link t observed deficits
(le: theory of mind and pretend play) in terms of one underlying
cognitive mechanism. Both of these can be argued to require
second-order representation in that (1) attributing mental states to
another	 person	 involves	 representing	 another	 person's
representations; and (2) pretence involves simultaneously
representing an object as it is and as if it is something else. In
the first part of this Section an attempt will be made to show how
the second-order representational deficit theory relates to the 15
aspects of the autistic child's social impairment, as extracted from
ICanner's (19 1 3) description and outlined in Chapter 1 (p.11-13).
In order to save turning back to Chapter 1, the 15 aspects of the
social impairment are relisted here, and discussed in turn:
(1) Lack of positive emotional expression:
It is worth noting that not all positive emotional expression is
absent in autism: laughter, smiles, etc, are often observed (Ricks
and Wing, 1975), so the idea of a permanently 'blank expression' is
probably a fiction. However, such laughter and smiles are probably
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rarely observed as a social response. The second-order
represeritatioral deficit theory would account for this absence of
colTnunication of emotioral state as follows: For one person (A) to
smile with another person (B) assumes that A thinks that B thinks
the same event/thing is amusing. This particular type of emotional
expression, then, may require a second-order theory of mind.
• However, this first aspect of the social impairment is only
partially accounted for by the second-order representatioral deficit
theory in that, whilst some emotional expression (such as humour)
may require a theory of mind, others (eg: some types of empathy) may
not. This 'symptom' may turn out to be better accounted for by
Hermelin and O'Cozy or's (1985) notion of a disturbance in the
"affective system", although this construct still needs to be
'unpacked' much further.
(2) Withdrawal from people:
The second-order representational deficit theory would account for
the withdrawal from the social world not in terms of avoidance of a
hostile parent (Betteiheim, 1967), but rather as due to a lack of
comprehension of other people's behaviour. This is based on the
premise that a theory of mind is a second-order representatioral
ability which allows one to explain and predict the behaviour of
others (Dennett, 1978a), and lacking a theory of mind would render
one unable to make sense of all social behaviour, with the exception
of highly routine, 'scriptal' events (of the type used in the
Picture Experiment (11]). This might, additionally, go some way
towards explaining the 'insistence on sameness' symptom in autism,
in that such a strategy which resulted in other people's behaviour
becoming highly 'routinized' would compensate for lack of a theory
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of mind.
(3) Disinterest in people:
Autistic children are not disinterested in the physical aspects of
other people, and indeed speaking autistic children frequently
ooament on details of other people's appearance. They are
specifically 'disinterested' in the ntal aspects of other people
(Ic: what they think, Iaxw, feel, eto), and this can also be simply
explained as being due to lack of a theory of mind.
() Non-social use of language:
A 'social use of language' can be defined as the pragmatic aspects
of language. Very little needs to be said about this here since, in
the literature reviews earlier, 'pragmatics' was discuased in
cormection with both autistic children (Section 1.1.iv) and normal
children (Section 3.2.iv). That literature indicated that autistic
children's pragmatic competence was impaired, although much sore
detailed arlyses are still needed to constitute a proper
investigation of this area. In contrast, normal children's pragmatic
competence was reviewed and found to be present from as early as 3
years old, as show in their ability, for example, to repair
misunderstood messages to make them more appropriate to suit the age
or state of their listener.
This pragmatic deficit, or mn-social use of language, in autism is
consistent with the second-order repreaentatiorml deficit theory, in
that a Speech Act view (see Chapter 3) argues that much pragmatic
competence requires both participants to be able to attribute
intentions to eh other for a oounicative exchange to be
effective and appropriate to the context (Grice, 1957; Seine, 1965;
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Bates, 1971$). To the extent that a aecood-order thecry of nd is
minimally required in order to attribute intentions, this 'symptom'
is entirely consistent with the theory. It may also turn out to be
an important fOcus from a treatment intervention consideration,
since comunication improvement can only be expected if this
pragmatic deficit is tackled directly.
(5) Abnormal non-verbal cotimunication:
Attwood (1981$) found that autistic thildren rarely, if ever, used
'expressive' gestures which refer to mental states, although they
did use gestures of other types (eg: 'instrumental'). As mentioned
above, a Speech Act theory of coiiunication argues that in every
conmunicative exthange both participants must have a second-order
re pie sen ta tb in 1 capacity in order to represent each other '5
comnunicative intentions. This would apply whether the thanoel of
comunicatbon is rntural language, sign-language, gestures, or
anything else. This would explain Attwood's findings, arid is
consistent with the observation that not only production but
comprehension of another person's gestures are impaired. A
second-order theory of mind is thus viewed as an essential piece of
cognitive development for this ability.
(6) Non-social response to other people's language:
Whereas the 1 th symptom referred to the pratics of speech
production, this symptom refers to the pragmatics of dialogue
marngent aix! speech comprehension. However, a global pragmatics
deficit is expected if one's theory of mind is impaired, as
explained wider the th symptom, so no additiornl explarntory
assumptions are required here.
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(7) Responding to part! of people and not wholes:
This symptom is not well explained by the second-order
representatioral deficit theory, except (as with the 3rd symptom) in
terme of selective responding to particular physical details of a
person rather than their mental states. However, this may turn Out
to be related to an entirely different cognitive exp]aMtion,
perhaps linked to autistic children 'a superiority at Fzbedded
Figures Tasks (Shah and Frith, 1983).
(8) Lack of differential response to people and objects:
The second-order representatioral deficit theory can account for
this symptom in that lack of a theory of mind would result in a
failure to distinguish people from objects by their most human
characteristic: their mental states. Hence people frequently report
that they feel autistic children 'treat them like objects'. This is
not inconsistent with the next symptom.
(9) Preferential response to objects over people:
Again, the second-order representatiorml deficit theory can explain
this as being due to the tact that most b&iaviour of objects can be
understood without a theory of mind, whereas most of people's
baviour carnot. Hence, autistic children are often reported to be
more interested in machines than in people.
(10) Inappropriate use of persormi pronouns:
Lack of a theory of mind uld mean that autistic children could not
appreciate speech as 'intentiorml cosmunication' (Grice, 1957;
Searle, 1965). This also means that they may tail to distinguish who
of tc speakers wee intentiormlly 'sending' the massage, and who was
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receiving' it (Mackay, 1972). This in itself might result in
inappropriate use of personal pronouns. Bartak aM Rutter (19711) saw
this symptom as echolalia which occurred due to lack of
comprehension, and this is also consistent with the theory of mind
explanation.
(11) Lack of eye-contact:
Mirenda et al (1983) have reported that autistic children do not use
eye-contact to intentionally signal turn-taking in a dialogue.
Normally, eye-contact during speech allows a speaker to indicate to
a listener "I want you to recognize my intention to pause to let you
speak at this particular point", whilst absence of eye-contact
allows a speaker to indicate "I want you to recognize my intention
to continue speaking uninterrupted" (Argyle, 1972). A theory of mind
is therefore necessary to be able to attribute suoh intentions to a
speaker, and lack of a theory of mind would interfere with such
non-verbal comnunication as appropriate eye-contact. This symptom
thus also fits into the second-order repr'esentatiornl deficit
theory.
(1 2) Lack of b&aviour appropriate to cultural norma:
Insofar as biaviour appropriate to cultural norma depends on
detecting what implicit, shared beliefs members of the same culture
hold, a theory of mind is a requirement. Thus, autistic children may
be able to learn the explicitly sanctioned cultural norma (eg:
punishment ensues if you drive on the right-hand side of the r'cmd in
Britain) but would be unable to appreciate the re subtle, implicit
cultural norma, eg: In Britain, strangers do not stare at each other
or invade each other's 'personal space'. Normally, unspoken shared
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beliefs about what such behaviour represents prevents this. This
symptom is therefore also consistent with the second-order
representatioral deficit theory.
(13) Selective attention to non-social features of people:
This symptom is interpreted by the second-order representatiorl
deficit theory in the same way as symptom 3.
(i ll) Lack of empathy:
e prediction from the present theory is that attribution of fl
mental states, (not only beliefs but also desires, hopes, tears,
etc), which require second-order representation should be impaired
in autism. HofThan (1983) separates pathy into cognitive and
affective types, and argues that these are different categories.
Hence, it is wise to limtt the application of the theory to only the
cognitive aspects of empathy. Autistic children should be able to
learn that certain observable facial and bodily features indicate
that someone is happy, sad, angry, and frightened, in that because
they have outward manifestations these need not be represented as
mental states. However, such states as desire, believe, expect,
being surprised, pretend, know, think, eto, must be represented as
mental states because they all point to a mental content, eg: fear
that, / expect that, / pretend that, / desire that, / believe that,
/ be surprised that, / know that, etc.
Certainly, there are rumerous reports that autistic children lack
the ability to empathize (Newson, Dawson and Evezerd, 19811; Newson,
1979; Dewey and Everard, 19711; Kanoer, 19113), but this term may be
too vague to be useful at this stage. More detailed investigation of
attribution of mental states other than belief need to be done to
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assess ir comprehension of all
	 ntal states are of equal
(second-order) complexity.
(15) Lack of 'savoir-faire':
This symptom is interpreted by the second-order representatiorni
capacity deficit theory in the same way as symptom 12.
Thus, of the 15 aspects of the social impairment in Karrer's (1913)
original description of autism, only 2 of these (numbers 1 and 7,
above) are not well explained by the second-order representatiorBi
deficit theory. All the others can be seen as a consequence of an
inability to employ a theory of mind, itself a second-order
representatioral skill. The theory therefore has wide explartory
por when it comes to linking disparate apsects of the social
impairment.
8.2.(ii): Other implications from the second-order representatior2l
deficit theory.
What other skills, apart from those included in Karrier's
description, require second-order representation? And is there any
evidence to suggest that these too are impaired in autism, as the
theory predicts they should be?
It is possible to argue that second-order representations are also
required In the ability to (1) produce and comprehend figurative
langage; (2) introspect; and (3) show embarrassment. These 3 skills
shall be considered in turn, both in order to *rmlyse if
second-order representations are completely necessa for their
competence, and so as to briefly review any evidence from the autism
literature relevant to these predictions.
236
(1) Figurative Language:
Figurative language is characterized by a discrepancy bet'een what
is said and what is meant, and a discrepancy beteen what is said to
exist arid how things really are. Demorest et al (1983) have shoiii
that in different types of figurative language (eg: euphemism,
•etonyniy, aynecdoch e, sarcasm, me taphcr, urid ersta temen t, hyperbole,
irony, etc), the dree of this discrepancy varies, but nevertheless
the discrepancy always exists. In contrast, in non-figurative (or
'literal') language, there is no discrepancy betimen what is said
arid what is meant, and there is no discrepancy eteen what is said
to exist arid how the world really is (ie: its truth value).
Therefore, in order both to produce figurative language arid
comprehend its use by others, it is necessary to be able to
represent siultaneously the utterance and the discrepant intention
bind it, and be able to represent slisiltaneously the described
state of affairs and the actual state of affairs. This suggests that
second -order representations are necessarily involved in
understanding arid producing figurative language. One example from
the domein of metaphor will suffice to clarify this armlysis:
"The surgeon is a butcher".
Since the surgeon is not really a butcher, comprehension of this
metaphor requires the listener to represent aiiiltaneously both the
surgeon as a surgeon arid the surgeon as a butcher (Step 1]. In
addition, the listener needs to represent the utterer's intention
(eg: "The surgeon is clumsy arid unprecise when he outs, like a
butcher is...") (Step 2]. Demorest et al (1983) argue that the first
step is a logical task, ie: recognizing that the truth value of the
statement is discrepant from the facts of the situation. It may be
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that a simple aatch-misnmtch decision is ill that is involved in
this first step, and no second-order representation is required.
However, the second step involves recognizing the discrepancy as
intentioral, thus distinguishing the figurative utterance fran a
mistake or from a lie. Demorest et al (1983) found that fran the age
of 11 years old children recognize a speaker's intention in using
figurative language, although this seeme quite late. A number of
other authors (Winner et al, 198 1$; Billow, 1975; Vosniadou and
Ortony, 1983) argue that children as young as i$_5 years old
frequently produce genuine metaphors (ie: not overextensions) in
language. Vosniadou et al (198 1$) showed that task complexity
influenced the age at which metaphor ms understood, and that under
the right conditions even preschoolers show evidence of metaphor
comprehension.
Thus, figurative language is arguably a second-order
representatiorml skill and is within the competence of young normel
children. If it is a second-order skill, it should be conspicuously
absent in speaking autistic children 's utterances, and in their
comprehension of other people's language. Is there any evidence of
this? There have been no experimental investigations of this area in
autism to te, but numerous anecdotal and clinical descriptions
exist which are consistent with this prediction. For example, Karrer
(191$3) wrote in his first case history:
RWords to him had a specifically literal, inflexible
meaning. He seemed urable to generalize, to transfer an
expression to another similar object or eituation. W (p.1$).
In his stary of the eleven cases, Kanoer (19 1 3) raised this to the
status of a symptom of speaking autistic children: Apparently the
meaning of a word becomes inflexible and camot be used with any but
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the originally aquired ooriotation" (p.35). This is not inconsistent
with his later description of autistic children 'a language as
"metaphcrical" (Kanoer, 1916), since the examples of taphcrical
language he cites are all instances of either delayed cholalia or
vord-aasociation', but not evidence of an intention to create a
metaphor. This rigid, literal quality in autistic language has also
been reported by others (Dewey and Everard, 197k; Taylor, 1976;
Ricks and Wing, 1975). The flavour of this abnormality is captured
in the following quote, and is very typical:
"Some literalness is based on a phrase or sentence rather
than a word of several possible meanings. This was the
case when a young autistic man (of normal IQ)... would
aner such questions as 'Do you have a hobby?' with a
simple 'Yes'. No sore, unless another question followed. A
different question might bring out a longer aner than
was wanted • For example, somebody asked an autistic
teenager how he learned to type. Instead of just
indicating the source of his instruction, he said 'For the
first lesson I practiced the letters f and j'. No doubt,
he would have covered the entire keyboard if he had not
been stopped after he had described several lessons in
detail." (Dewey and Everard, 197, p.31$8).
This literal interpretation of an utterance suggests an Inability to
comprehend the figurative aspects of language, and as argued
earlier, this may stem from an inability to impute intentions to a
speaker to use language in a non-literal way for a particular
purpose. In other words, the failure to understand figurative
language may itself be ae to lack of a theory of ind. This
prediction from the second-order r'epresentatiozl deficit theory
seema to have some clinical reality and thus deserves further
research.
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(2) Introspection:
The ability to introspect is syncnymous with the ability to be
self-reflective or self-conscious, and Involves thinking about
oneself thinking. In this respect, it involves a thecry of mind, ie:
one's	 Evidence has already been presented which suggests
autistic children carmot attribute beliefs to others (the Puppet and
Picture Experiments (3 and II)), and on the assumption that
attribution of mental states to oneself involves the same
process(es) as attribution of mental states to others, the
prediction is that they should be unable to introspect. Normal
children show evidence of being able to talk about rotion.s of their
ow mind and brain from as young as lj years old (Johnson and
Wellman, 1982), and this is the same age as they are ahon to be
able to talk about other people's inner states (Wlmaer and .Perner,
1983).
If this prediction is correct, autistic children could certainly be
said to have a severe impairment in their concept of self, at the
level of self-consciousness. Using the framework discussed in
Chapter 2, this would be at the level of their self-as-subject;
their concept of self-as-object has already been donstrated to be
unimpaired (the Mirror Experiment (1]). There are m studies of
introspection in autism at present with which to assess this
prediction, but this area should be relatively straightforward to
test in speaking autistic children. If it should turn cut in fact to
be the case that autistic children lack the ability to introspect,
would this mean that they lack "consciousness"? Suh a term is rot
particularly useful, in that it is too general: Autistic children
are 'conscious' of the physical world, but are rot conscious of the
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mental world.
(3) Embarrassment:
This phenomenon is closely related to possession of a thecry of mind
and the ability for introspection. Embarrassment requires being able
to imegine how arother person thinks of oneself and, although this
is not all that is involved (Ede].man, 1981), it is an essential
part.
Buss, Iscoe and Buss (1979) used a questiorriaire study and found
that the onset of blushing wee at approximetely 5 years of age,
although other authors (Kagan, 1982) put it as early as 2-3 years
old. Again, this is an unresearched area in autism, but plenty of
anecdotal evidence suggests that autistic children are rot inhibited
from performing actions which would be experienced as
aocially-einbarassing by normal people (Karrter, 19143; Dewey and
Everard, 19714). This is clear in the example cited on p.80, earlier.
In some mirror self-recognition studies in autism (Spiker and Ricks,
19814; Neuman and Hill, 1978; Experiment 1, this thesis), there are
reports that autistic children do not show the 'coynese reaction
when confronted by their mirror-imege, which control children
typically showed, and which is reported train studies of normel 20
month old children (Amsterm and Greenberg, 1977). Both of these
sources of evidence suggest that it would be of value to investigate
more thoroughly whether autistic children really do differ in this
respect.
Apart from the above predictions being possible, it is also worth
discussing a particular ambiguity surrounding the interpretation of
some of the results in this thesis. One coon contusion steme from
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a person's thecry of mind also being referred to as
"Intentiormlity". In these terme, the Puppet and Picture Experints
(3 and 14) suggest that autistic children are not capable of
'Intentiorality", but this does not mean that they themeelves do not
have intentions. To have intentions does not require a theory of
mind, and only requires a first-order representatioral capacity.
Piaget (1953) proposed that intentions first appear around 8 months
of age, after the stage of "secondary circular reactions", when
infants begin to understand means-ends relations. This view is also
held by Frye (1981) and is evident in the distinction iade between
'intentioral behaviour' and 'intei tioral co!runication' (Bre therton
and Bates, 1979). For behaviour to be intentioral it simply needs to
be non-autometic and goal-oriented (Wellman, 1977). However, only
when children can coordinate their oi actions with someone else's
can they be said to have a theory of mind, or to have
"Intentiorality". Frye (1981) calls this "the criterion of mutual
intentiorality" (p.328).
8.3: Relationship between this and other cognitive theories of
cut isa.
8.3.(i): Different cognitive theories:
Whilst the dichotomy of 'first' and 'second order' representation
may seem novel, the notion of "first and second aigr*l systeme" has
a 50 year old history in Soviet psychology (Vygotaky, 1960/79;
L.eont'ev, 1975/79; Van der Veer and Van Ijzendocrn, 1985). Whether
it is appropriate to equate this notion with first and second order
representation is too big a question to explore here, and
furthermore, it will be argued below that the ideas behind the
second-order Tepr'eaentatioral deficit theory of autism are similar
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to the mejor cognitive theories of autism.
As wee discuased earlier (chapter 1.i.(v), p . 38-si], there are 3
other major cognitive thecries of autism. The 'central language
deficit' theory (Rutter, 1968; 1978b) was found to be refutable
using thta from other language-handicapped groups who are not
autistic. The 'central encoding deficit' theory (Herme]in and
O'Connor, 1970; Frith, 1970a & b) constituted an advance over the
previous theory in recognizing the deficit as
'non-modality-specific' and in steering research in autism towards
the domain of 'meaning'. Finally, it was argued earlier that the
'impaired symbolic capacity' theory (Ricks and Wing, 1975; Wing et
al, 1977; Richer, 1978; Hames and Langdell, 1981) deserves more
attention, since it has received experimental support from a number
of studies into autistic children 's pretend play. However, t main
criticisme ware raised in connection with this theory: (1) that the
definition of 'symbol' had been somewhat loose and unclear, and (2)
that the theory had rot specified how pretend play aid social
impairments were related to each other. These points shall be taken
up in more detail here:
Ricks aid Wing (1975) use the following as a definition of 'symbol':
"something that stands for, represents, a' denotes
something else, not by exact resemblance, but by vague
suggestion or by some accidental a' conveitioral
relation." (p.192)
Their definition was wide enough to include all non-echolalic crds,
as wall as all concepts, gestures, representations, etc. Rermelin
(1978) highlighted the need to restrict the term 'symbol', since,
for example, concept aid "image" formation was found to be within
autistic children 's competence. However, no alternative definition
A
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was proposed. Haes and Langdell (1981) argued the case for a
symbolic deficit in autistic children on the basis of their
inability to perform abstract pantomimic actions, but still did not
offer any general definition of 'symbol'. Nor did Richer (1978) or
McHa].e et al (1980), both of whom also argued in support of the
'impaired symbolic capacity' theory.
Regarding the second criticism of the theory, all of its proponents
suggest that a symbolic capacity must be necessary for comnunicatlon
(both verbal and non-verbal) in that all language systeme involve
the menipulation of symbols such as rds, gestures, braille dots,
etc. This is left as an explartion of how the pretend play and
social deficits are related. Again, the inadequacy of this
formulation bee omes apparent, for example, when trying to so ecu nt
for speaking autistic children.
This absence of definition or theoretical eoriections is evident
even in the sost recent of articles using this theory (Wuift, 1985).
However, the question remains whether, if these prob].eme were
tackled, the 'impaired symbolic capacity' theory is useful, how it
relates to the 'second-order representatioral deficit' theory
(discussed earlier), and whether the results of the experiments
reported in this thesis support it or not.
8.3.(ii): Is there a general "symbolic deficit" in autism?
As argued above, any attempt to aner this question must begin with
a definition of what constitutes a 'symbol'. If a symbol is simply
taken to mean a representation of something else, then autistic
children can create symbols: The possession of an object concept and
all that this entails (object identity, object permanence) and their
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understanding of physical causality are adequate indications that
autistic thildren can represent the physical world (Seretica, 1971;
Curcio, 1978; Sigman and Ungerer, 1981; Haies and Langdell, 1981).
Furthermore, there is evidence that autistic cthildren can produce
albeit 'concrete' mim-gestures to represent other wtions (Attiod,
198I; Haes and Langdell, 1981). So, if these are symbolic, then
autistic thildren can produce symbols.
And yet, the results from studies into autistic thildren's pretend
play indicate a lack of symbolic elements (Ungerer and Siginan, 1981;
Wing et al, 1977; Riguet et al, 1981; Gould, in press; Experiment 7,
this thesis), and there are reperts that autistic children camot
produce the more 'abstract' mime of representing absent objects
using "open-hand gestures" (Attod, 198 l ; Haisnes and Langdell,
1981). What do these impairments mean? It will be argued that, using
a different definition of 'symbol', these impairments do implicate a
deficit in the autistic child's "symbolic capacity".
Susan Langer (19 1 2), in her now classic arlysis of symbolism,
distinguishes	 from 'symbols', and this distinction is found
elsewhere (Werner and Kaplan, 1963; Cassirer, 1972). Langer writes:
"A sign indicates the existence - past, present or future
- of a thing, event, or condition. Wet streets are a sign
that it has reined... (A sign) is a symptom of a state of
affairs." (p.57).
This is an example of a "naturel sign". An "artificial sign" can be
produced out of purely arbitrary events, eg: a whistle is a sign
that the train is about to start. She continues:
"The logical relation beten a sign and its object is a
very simple one: they are associated, somehow, to form a
pair; that is to say, they stand in a one-to-one
correlation. To eenh sign there corresponds one definite
item which is its object, the thing (or event, or
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condition) signified. All the rest of that important
function, signification, involves the third term, the
subject, which uses the pair of iteme.' (p.57).
Dogs as much as humans are capable of being the •saential third
term, the 'interpretant", in finding meaning in a sign. Pavlovian
Classical Conditioning is evidence that both human and ron-human
species have this capacity. In contrast,
'Symbols are rot proxy for their objects, but are vehicles
for the conception of objects ...it is the conception, not
the things, that symbols directly 'mean'." (p.60-61).
Langer uses the example of a word to illustrate the distinction
between signs and symbols: The word 'James" represents a certain
person in the physical world, and in this capacity it functions as a
sign. However, the word 'James" can also represent my concept of a
certain person, and in this capacity it represents something in the
mental world and functions as a symbol. Thus,
"If you say "James" to a dog whose master bears that name,
the dog will interpret the sound as a sign, and look for
James. Say it to a person who knows someone called thus,
and he will ask "What about James?" That simple question
is forever beyond the dog; signification is the only
meaning a name can have for him - a meaning which the
master's name shares with the master's smell, with his
football, and his characteristic ring of the doorbell. In
a human being, however, the name evokes the conception of
a certain man so-called, and prepares the .nd for further
conceptions in which the notion of that man figures;
therefore the human being naturally asks: 'What about
James?' '. (p.62).
This distinction i.e formalized as follows:
"In an ordinary sign-function there are three essential
terme: subject, sign and object. In a.. symbol-function,
there have to be four: subject, symbol, conception, and
object.' (p.61').
A symbol, then, i.e not just a representation of an object, as the
initial definition proposed. That is a sign. A symbol, under
Langer's definition, is a representation of a concept (which itself
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refers to an object). In other irds, a symbol is a representation
of a representation a', in the terminology used in earlier parts of
this thesis, it is a second-order representation.
Langer distinguishes these t types of meaning (of signs and
symbols) still further, by using their traditiorBl names: The
relationship between a sign aix! its object is called denotation,
whereas the relationship beten a symbol aid its concept is called
connotation.
To return to the case of autism: Autistic children can represent
objects in the physical world. In this respect they show evidence
that they have the capacity to produce signs. In Chapter 5.1, these
were called "first-order representations". But autistic children
o arino t represent other representa ns in the mental world • In this
respect the evidence suggests that they do not have the capacity to
produce symbols, at least not if Langer's definition is accepted.
They are capable of denotation but they are not capable of
connotation.
This is consistent with the Experimental results fran this thesis:
they have a first-order representatiormi capacity (they can
represent physical causality (the Causality Experiment (5)) and
people's beiaviour (the Picture Experiment ( el), Scriptal
Conditions)) but they do not have a second-order representatiorBi
capacity (they carmot represent mental states (the Puppet arE!
Picture Experiments (3 arE! 11)] a' pretend one object is another tthe
Pretend Play Experiment (7))).
A sceptic might object to this view as follows: If autistic children
lack a "symbolic capacity", how are they able to produce drawings of
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objects (Selfe, 1977) Surely such an ability is evidence of the
capacity to create symbols? The symbolic deficit thecrist could
anier this objection in terse of Langer's definition: The drawings
autistic children produce would be expected to be first-order
representations, or signs, ie: representations of the actual object,
whereas the drawing a normal child produces would be expected to be
a symbol, or a second-order representation, ie: a representation of
the child 's concept of the object. This prediction fits in with at
least one person's view of an autistic child's drawings:
"Gombrich 'a considerations (were) that (normal) children
draw what they 1aw not what they see. Nadla (an autistic
girl)...drew what she perceived. Like the camera, she
reccrded a tootballer with a massive foot because this was
extended towards the viewer - no allowance (and reduction)
was made fbr what she knew about the size of the Iaman
foot in relation to the }iiman body. This adjustment is
automatic in the...(normal) mind". (Selfe, 1977, p.126).
One line of argent, then, is that autistic children 's drawings may
not be symbolic', but may instead be 'signal', to use Langer's
(19i2) terse. This would be consistent with the characterization of
autistic children as possessing first-order representational powers
only.
The attraction of the symbolic deficit theory is that, if a symbol
is defined as above, ie: as a second-order representation, it
accounts for both the impairment in theory of mind and in pretend
play. This is because (as discussed in Chapter 11. l ), to have beliefs
about beliefs requires a second-order representational capacity, as
does the ability to pretend a thing is what it is not (see Chapter
6.3). It furthermore provides a bridge to earlier cognitive
theories, as discussed in Section 8.3.(i).
Is the theory really valid for all autistic children? What of the
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autistic thildren of high IQ who are competent mathematicians, etc.?
The symbolic deficit therist might find this objection more
difficult to counter, because whilst a certain level of mathematics
might be possible if the subject used the rotations only as signs
(Ic: as representations of specific physical objects) aid not as
symbols, the limits of such a mathematical strategy would soon be
reached (how could 'infinity' be represented as an object aid no t as
a concept, for example?). It would have to be conceded that not all
autistic dIldren could lack a symbolic capacity, aid this superior
group would be expected to possess a thecry of mind. In fact, 20% of
autistic subjects tested in the Puppet and Picture Experiments (3
and t) responded in such a way as to suggest they did indeed have a
theory of mind at the level of second-order representation (although
no further than this, as the Village Experiment (6) demonstrated).
Thus, the symbolic deficit argent, if it is valid at all, may
apply only to the 80% of autistic diildren who failed to show a
theory of mind or any pretend play, but not to all autistic
thI]dren. This suggests the idea of two subgroups within autism, aid
this hypothesis irrants further research.
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APPENDIX 1: Assessment Sheet (Circled scores : Autisa).
CHILD'S NAME:
AGE__________ years, and ____________________ nths.
Please consider the following questions. en answering them, you may
find it helpful to think of the child as you have seen hia/hex in a
variety of different situations, both in and out of the classroom.
The scoring system is as follows:
0 - NEVER 1 = SOMETIMES 2 = FRECJThY 3 ALWAYS
Please circle the appropriate number next to every question. If you are
unable to answer because you don't know about that aspect of the child,
&iiiply leave that particular question unscored.
1. SOCIAL IMPAIRM'T:
a) Ebes the child seem to look past rather than at you ? 0
b) es the child seem aloof and indifferent to other
people, especially other children ?
	
0
c) Ibes the child have inappropriate emotional
reactions ? (eg: lack of fear of real dangers, but
excessive fear of some harmless objects or situations) 0
d) Is the child unable to play imaginatively with
objects or other people ?
	
0
e) es the child select minor ox trivial aspects of
a person (eg: an earing) instead of the whole person ? 0
1) Ies he make naive and embarassing remarks ?	 0
g) es the child point things out to other people and
want them to look ?
h) tes the child show any response to people's feelings? (9
Extra coiiments (if any):
126?
l2
12€)
12?
12
1	 2	 3
1	 2	 3
2. LANCJAGE DIPAI	 'T:
a) Is the child naite ?	 Yes______ No	 . (If yes, go straight to
the next section).
b) es the child have problems in comprehension
of speech ?
c) res the child produce immediate echolalia (le: a
parrot-like repetition of words the child has just
heard) ?
c) Ibes the child produce delayed echolalia (ie:
repetition of words or phrases heard in the past) ?
d) 1:bes the child use words arid phrases in an
inflexible, repetitive stereotyped way ?
e) tbes the child seem confused in the use of pronouns ?
1) Tbes the child have poor use 5rid comprehension of
counicative oestures ?
g) Are the child's r'ucstions re1'titive and stereotyped'
3. RESISTANCE TO CiANGE, AND ATACH1 TO OBJECTS AND ROJTINES:
a) Ees the child cairy out rituals ? 	 0
b) es th. child insist upon exact repetition of
or all of the daily prograzmne? 	 0
c) .s th. child arrange objects in special ways (eg:
in certain patterns or in long lines) ?
	 0
d) es the child replace things in the exact position
frog which they	 e, down to the smallest detail ? 	 0
289
l2
12&
12
12
e) Is the child attached to partioilar objects which
ast accoany him/her verywhere ?
f) es the child collect particular objects obsessively?
g) les the child have an obsessive, repetitive interest
In certain subjects ?
0 12(9
0 12®
0 i27
h) Is the child's play repetitive and stereotyped (eg:
does the child continually manipulate the same objects
in the same way; or play the same record again and
again; or perform the same series of actions over and
over again) ?
	 0 1 2
Extra coimients (if any):
4. SPECIAL 9(ILLS:
a) Is the child good at sic ? 	 Yes:_________ No:_______
b) Is the child good at aritetic ? Yes:_________ No:_______
c) Is the child good at dismantling
and assling mechanical objects? Yes:_________ No:_______
d) Is the child good at fitting
together jigsaws or constructional
toys ?	 Yes:_________ No:_______
(Please tick).
e) es the child have any other
special skill(s) 7
If yes, please specify:
1) Les the child have an unusual
form of memory 7
Yes:__________ No:________
Yes:___________ No:_________
Extra coents (if any):
5. ESTIMATE) AGE OF (TSET OF PR06LDS (If known):
Thank you for providing this information. Please complete the last section
(below), and return the sheets tcf Simon Baron-Cohen.
Your flame:____________________________ Relationship to child:_____________________
Date:	 ____________________________	 (Tccher, ri4xcnt, etc.,
$
$
+
290
Appendix 2: Individual Background Data of Subjects in Experiments
1-6.
All subjects re tested in Experiments 1-5, except where Indicated
as follows:
+ = Not in Experiments 1-3.
• Not in Experiments 11&5.
$ = Tested in Experiment 6 as iell.
MA and CA are shobE In nths.
AUTISTIC SUBJECTS:
Plumber Initials Sex CA MA(Leiter) MA(BPVT) EXPT
1
2
3
14
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
11;
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
JM
P4
A
C
PM
AH
D
JM
Pw
JH
PT
SH
V
N
NF
A
N
J
NR
S
MA
G
P4
P4
H
F
H
P4
F
P4
H
H
H
P4
F
F
H
'4
H
F
F
F
'4
H
137
131
127
198
173
1118
159
176
176
203
171
179
73
82
120
132
135
135
139
1119
190
78
118
106
90
189
101$
128
116
122
127
180
119
92
79
79
124
120
93
102
109
914
125
61$
89
69
36
77
77
36
811
80
65
1149
88
62
61
79
81
51
66
53
66
28
33
39
$
+
$
+$
$
$
$
1
2
3
1$
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
113
15
H
E
C
N
C
G
D
B
J
B
T
B
D
JG
C
67
61
80
79
57
63
66
102
83
69
613
67
72
65
65
157
913
178
90
79
122
138
17$
2014
89
8g
75
89
102
201
F
F
F
F
M
M
F
N
F
M
F
F
F
N
M
30
20
32
30
313
142
31;
138
131
30
1313
25
130
32
313
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DCMN'S SYNDROME SUBJECTS:
Number Initial Sex CA MA(Leiter) MA(BPVT) EXPT
292
N014AL SUBJECTS:
Number Initial Sex	 CA
	
EXPT
I
2
3
II
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
hi
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
214
25
26
27
28
29
30
J
N
L
N
D
Il
N
A
N
J
A
0
J
R
H
0
S
H
C
V
R
D
D
S
S
H
A
T
V
C
M
F
F
H
F
H
F
F
F
F
F
H
H
H
H
H
F
H
F
F
N
F
H
N
N
N
F
F
M
F
514
149
55
544
57
115
55
60
68
614
69
611
53
147
146
544
146
55
55
50
145
146
60
63
61
146
148
148
ill
143
+
+
+
I
*
I
12311
1 2311
1231$
12113
12311
12311
12311
12311
1321$
12311
12314
12311
1 231$
1 231$
1 2311
1 2311
12311
1231$
1231$
1 2113
1231$
1231$
12311
12311
13112
12311
12311
12311
12311
12311
12311
12311
12311
1231$
11123
13112
13112
11123
13112
12113
11423
11132
1231$
12311
12311
1231$
1231$
1231$
1231$
13112
13112
1231$
12311
12311
12311
1231$
13112
13112
13112
12113
12314
13211
1231$
1231$
1231$
1231$
1231$
1231$
12311
1231$
13214
1231$
1231$
12314
1231$
1231$
13112
1231$
1231$
1231$
1231$
12311
12314
12311
12311
13112
12113
1231$
11132
1231$
1231$
12143
1231$
12311
12311
1231$
1231$
1231$
12311
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APPENDIX 3: Individual Raw Socres in Experiment 1•
Key:
Script.al. 2 Story (1) = Icecream; (2) = Cooking; (3)
	
Shop.
Mental Story (1)	 Sweets; (2) Chocolate; (3) = Teddy.
Scriptal 1 Story (1) = Shoier; (2) = Digging; (3) Dressing.
Autistic Subjects:
Star y
Sa Number
1	 1
2
3
2	 1
2
3
3
	 1
2
3
14	 1
2
3
5	 1
2
3
6	 1
2
3
7
	 1
2
3
8	 1
2
3
9	 1
2
3
10	 1
2
3
11	 1
2
3
Scriptal 2	 Mental	 Scriptal 1
2914
12	 1	 12143
	 11123	 12314
2	 12314
	 13142	 1 243
3	 13112
	 11332	 12314
13	 1	 12314
	
11132
	
12314
2	 12143
	 13142	 1231$
3	 132)4
	
1l23
	
12113
iii	 1	 13214
	 11332	 12314
2	 12314
	 11423	 1321$
3	 11432
	
13142
	
12314
15	 1	 13112
	
12143
	
1231$
2	 13214
	 13142	 13142
3	 12314
	
11123
	
1231$
16	 1	 12314
	
13142	 12314
2	 12311
	 11432	 13214
3	 12314
	
12143
	
12314
17	 1	 12311
	
12143
	
1 2143
2	 12143
	 12423	 1)332
3	 12314
	 13142	 12314
18	 1	 12314
	 11423	 12314
2	 12314
	 11432	 12314
3	 11423
	 11323	 12143
19	 1	 13214
	 13142	 12314
2	 12113
	 11423	 13211
3	 11432
	
1233
	
12143
20	 1	 11432
	
11432
	
13211
2	 11423
	 13142	 1231$
3	 11432
	 12123	 11332
21	 1	 13214
	 11132	 12311
2	 12314
	 13142	 1231$
3	 12314
	 11323	 12314
Do's Syrxroe Subjects:
1	 1	 13142
	
1232$
	
11132
2	 12314
	 13142	 13214
3	 12314
	
1231$
	
12314
2	 1	 123i4
	
13112
	
1321$
2	 12314
	
1231$
	
12314
3	 12314
	
13214
	 13112
3	 1	 12314
	
12311
	
13211
2	 12311
	 11423	 11423
3	 12314
	 13142	 1231$
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11
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
114
15
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
12311
12113
1231$
11132
12314
12314
12113
12314
1231$
12314
11132
13112
12143
12113
12113
13112
13142
11123
13112
11432
11123
12311
11432
1231$
1231$
11123
12314
13112
13112
11132
12314
11123
11123
1342
11123
12314
13214
12311
1231$
12314
12113
12311
13112
1234
1231$
12311
11432
13112
11132
11423
12311
13214
1l23
123l
13142
11132
13214
12143
1231$
13112
11123
12313
13211
13214
1231$
1 2143
1231$
12113
13142
13142
13214
12311
13142
12314
13142
12311
11432
12311
1 2113
12113
1231$
12314
12314
13132
12314
13112
12314
13211
13214
12314
123l
11132
13142
11132
13214
13112
1231$
1321$
11332
1'432
11132
13142
13214
12143
1 2113
13214
1231$
11123
Nor1 Subjects:
1	 1	 1231$	 12314	 1231$
2
	 13214	 12314
	
1231$
3
	
13l2
	 12314
	 11123
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2
3
14
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
114
15
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
12311
13142
12113
12314
11423
12113
12143
11423
12113
11432
1 3214
12143
12311
13142
1234
12314
12314
12314
12314
12314
12314
12314
12314
12314
12314
12314
12314
12314
12314
12314
12314
11423
12314
13142
12314
12314
12314
1231$
13214
12314
12314
12143
12311
11432
12143
12314
1231$
12314
13211
11123
13142
12314
13112
12314
12314
1231$
13214
12311
12314
1231$
12314
12314
12314
12314
11423
11432
12314
12314
12314
12314
12314
12311
1231$
1231$
12311
12314
11132
1231$
1231$
12l3
1231$
12314
1231$
12311
13214
12311
11423
12113
13214
1231$
11323
13211
13142
12314
13142
1231$
13142
12314
1321$
1231!
12314
12113
1231$
12314
12344
12318
12314
12311
1231!
123$
13224
12314
12314
1232!
12432
123$
1231$
123$
12143
12314
12143
12143
12314
12314
1231$
12143
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16	 1
	
I 23i4
	
12314
	
12314
2
	
12314
	
12314
	
1231$
3
	
1 23i4
	
12311
	
12311
17	 1
	
1 2311
	
12314
	
12314
2
	
12311
	
1 231
	
1231$
3
	
12314
	
12314
	
12311
18	 1
	
11423
	
12314
	
12314
2
	
13214
	
13112
	
12314
3
	
12113
	
12314
	
13211
19	 1
	
12311
	
12314
	
12311
2
	
1231$
	
12314
	
12311
3
	
12314
	
12314
	
12314
20	 1
	
1231$
	
12314
	
12311
2
	
1231$
	
12311
	
1321$
3
	
12314
	
12314
	
12314
21	 1
	
13214
	
12311
	
1231$
2
	
13214
	
12314
	
12143
3
	
12314
	
12314
	
1231$
22	 1
	
11132
	
12314
	 13142
2
	
12314
	
12314
	
13214
3
	
13214
	
12314
	
12311
23	 1
	
1231$
	
1231$
	
1231$
2
	
12314
	
12311
	
1231$
3
	
12314
	
12314
	
12311
2l	 1
	
1231$
	
12311
	
123$
2
	
12311
	
12314
	
12113
3
	
12314
	
12311
	
1234
25	 1
	
12314
	
12311
	
12314
2
	
12314
	
12314
	
12314
3
	
1231$
	
12314
	
1231$
26	 1
	
12143
	
12311
	
13214
2
	
1 2143
	
12314
	
1231$
3
	
12314
	
1231$
	 11423
27	 1
	
12311
	
12314
	
1231$
2
	 11432	 12314
	
12311
3
	
12311
	
12314
	 11423
Retested seguces of those autistic aubjects tho were inconsistent
in Experiments 3 and 1$.
2	 1	 11423	 11323	 12314
2	 123l	 13142	 13211
3	 12314	 12113	 12311
I
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
298
1$
5
11
21
1231$
12314
1231$
12314
1231$
12324
1231$
12314
1 231$
1231$
12314
12314
1231$
12314
12311
1231$
12314
1231$
12314
1231$
12314
12314
1231$
12314
12311
12314
1 231$
12311
I 231
1 231$
1 2314
1231$
1 231$
11123
12314
1232$
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Appendix 14: Protocols from Experiment ii.
Key:
(P) : Passed puppet experiment;
(F) = Failed puppet experiment;
(C) = Correctly sequenced pictures.
EM) = Mental Rating.
ED) Descriptive Rating.
C....) Experimenter.
Protocols of 10 autistic subjects:
Subject Number (1): (F)
SCRIPTAL 2:
Cc) (1) She goes to the sweetshop. She opens the door. She buys the
sweets. She goes out. ED]
(C) (ii) The boy is eating icecream. The girl sat on the bench and
eats an icecream. ED)
(How did she get an icecream?)
She stole it off the boy.
(C) (iii) Baking a cake. Cutting it. A birthday cake. ED]
MENTAL:
(C) (i) The boy bought some sweets. He dropped them out of the hole.
ED)
(What is he doing at the end?)
He is eating his sweets.
(Is the bag empty a' full?)
pty a' full.
(11423) (ii) The boy puts his chocolate in the box. He eats his
chocolate. He goes out to play. His grandmother eats a chocolate.
(What is the boy saying in this picture?)
I like chocolates, chips, gravy and rcastbeef. ED]
(13142) (iii) The girl has a teddy. She picks a flor. It is raining
on Sunday. The boy has a teddy. ED)
SCRIPTAL 1:
(C) (i) Getting dressed. ED)
(C) (ii) Washing the feet. Jainie, wash your dirty face. ED)
(C) (iii) He has a shovel and a bag. He puts the seeds in. He covers
it up. ED]
Subject Number (2): (P)
SCRIPTAL 2:
(12143) (1) He has an icecream and she wants some. She eats his
icecream and then gives it back to him. (H]
(C) (ii) She goes into the sweetshop. She buys some sweets. She goes
out again. ED)
(C) (iii) Cooking a pie. ED]
(What's this?)
Vegetables.
(And this?)
300
A knife.
PITAL:
(13 1 2) Ci) The boy buys some sweets. He walks home. He eats hi.s
sweets. He goes to arother shop. ED)
(13112) (ii) The girl has a teddy and she picks a flolder, and the
teddy is gone. The boy stole it. ED)
(11123) (iii) The boy has chocolate and he eats it. The he goes out
to play and his mother claps her hands. He is frighteed and went
outside. ED]
(What is he saying here?)
A mars a day.
SCRIPTAL. 1:
(C) (1) Having a bath. He is drying himself. ED]
(C) (ii) Going getting his clothes on. First his shoes, thei his
shirt, the he is dressed. ED]
(13211) (iii) The men has a spade and a bag. He puts the seeds into
the hole. He digs a hole and he pushes the soil in. (D)
Subject Number (3): (F)
SCRIPTAL 2:
(C) (iii) Cooking. We do the cooking on Mondays. ED]
(132 2$)
 (ii) The girl is ilking and she is going into the sweetshop.
She buys winegtins and goes out. ED)
(C) (iii) The girl takes the icecream from the boy. ED)
(Is he happy a. sad?)
Happy a sad. Good boy.
MENTAL:
(12113) (1)
(11123) (ii) (Nothing)
(11132) (iii)
SCRIPTAL 1:
(C) (i) Getting dressed. ED]
(C) (ii) Washing his arms. Drying his arms. ED]
(C) Ci) Man holding spade and a bag. Good boy, good boy. ED]
Subject Number (11): (F)
SCRIPTAL 2:
(C) (i) She stole the icecream. ED]
(Good. Is he happy a' sad?)
Sad.
(C) (ii) Baking a pie. Put it in the ovi for half an hour. Tha eat
it. ED]
(C) (iii) The girl walks along. She buys some sweets, the she comes
out of the shop. ED]
(What is she doing here?)
Closing the door.
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M4TAL:
(C) (i) The girl puts her teddy dowi, and the boy takes it, and the
girl picks the flower. (D]
(What does she say?)
The boy took the teddy.
(C) (ii) The boy's sweets dropped out of the bag.
(What does he say?)
The sweets are on the rcad. (D]
(C) (iii) The boy puts the thocolate in the box, thai his mother
eats it, then he comes back, and the box...
(Yes?)
Yes.
(What does he say?)
Nothing.
(Why does this picture go last?)
Because here the diocolate is here, then the uther eats it, then
the chocolate is gone. [DI
SCRIPTAL 1:
(C) (1) Boy's got no clothes on. He's having a shower and now he's
drying himeelf. [D]
(13112) (ii) Digs a hole. Thai he pours the seeds in. Thai he fills
it up again. (D]
(C) (iii) The boy is getting dressed. ID)
Subject Number (8): (P)
SCRIPTAL 2:
(C) Ci) The men cooks a pie for his school. ID]
(C) (ii) She goes in the door, bs sweets, and then goes out
again.	 ID]
(C) (iii) The boy is sitting on the bench, eating an icecream. The
girl sits on the bench. The girl takes the icecreain and she eats the
icecream. ID]
(Is he happy a sad here?)
Sad, cuz the girl took his icecream.
MENTAL:
(C) Ci) (What did the boy say?)
Oh, my sweets are gone! (MI
(C) (ii) (What did the boy say in this picture?)
Oh, it's gone! [H)
(13112) (iii) (What happened here?)
The girl put her teddy doti, and then she lost it.
(why?)
Because she did.
(How did she lose it?)
I don't know. ID]
SCRIPTAL 1:
(C) (1) The boy has a shower. ID)
(C) (ii) The boy gets dressed. ID)
(1 1132) (iii) He digs a hole. He puts the treasure in there and then
he covers it with soil. Thai he digs. ID]
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Subject Number (5): (F)
SCRIPTAL 2:
(C) (1) The girl walks into the shop and she buys some sieets and
w she's bought some. ED)
(C) (ii) The n cooks a cake. U)]
(C) (iii) The boy is eating an icecream. The girl sits doi. The
girl snatched the icecream. ED]
(Is he sad?)
Yes.
MENTAL:
(C) (1) The girl puts her teddy on the grass, and the boy takes it.
(What does she say?)
The boy took the teddy. ED]
(C) (Ii) The boy put the chocolate in the box and the woman ate it.
(What did he say?)
Why did you eat my chocolate? (I)]
(C) (iii) The boy buys some sweets and he drops them on the roed.
Then there are ro re.
(What does he say?)
Nothing. ED]
SCRIPTAL 1:
(C) (1) The boy has a shower. ED)
(C) (ii) The boy gets dressed. CD)
(C) (iii) Digging. Putting the seeds in. Filling the hole in. ED)
Subject Number (7): (P)
SCRIPTAL 2:
(C) (1) The girl's got a long ribbon. She's walking to the
sweetahop. I've got this one wrong. I could pretend that's me and
that I'm wearing a yellow teeshirt. EM)
(What happens then you pretend?)
it's acting.
(C) (ii) She's taking the boy's icecream and the girl's got it and
the boy's very upset because the girl took the icecream. Imagine if
the girl was me and Rodney took my lcecream then I'd be the
same.	 CM)
(121 3) (iii) Making a pie. CD]
(What happens?)
Here he puts the vegetables on. Then he puts it in the oven. Then he
gives it to the children. And then she cuts it.
MENTAL:
(C) Ci) The boy
chocolate.	 (MI
(C) (ii) 'Where 'a my
(C) (iii) He dropped
(What did he say?)
Pr sweets are gone.
was surprised c	 he couldn't find his
teddy gone?' CM]
all his sweets.
ID]
SCRIPTAL 1:
(C) Ci) Washing hiielf. CD)
(121e3) (ii) Dressing by himeelf. CD]
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(13 142) (iii) The men is digging and he pours in seeds and pushes all
the soil back and digs it again. ED]
Subject Number (9): (F)
SCRIPTAL 2:
(C) Ci) She goes into the sweetshop. She buys sweets. She comes
out.	 ED]
(C) (ii) Cooking a Pizza in the Pizza Express in West Acton. ED]
(13 112) (iii) She took his icecream. ED]
MENTAL:
(12143) (1) The girl is standing and she has a teddy. Then she picks
a flower and her teddy is there, the boy has got it. ED]
(What does she say, here?)
Hello.
(13 112) (ii) The boy buys sweets with money and then he comes out and
goes home. He eats his sweets. They fall out of the bag. ED]
(Is he happy?)
Yes.
(13142) (2ST) (iii) The boy has a chocolate. He puts it in the box.
Then his mother eats it and then he eats one too. He goes out of the
door.
(What is he doing here?)
Eating his chocolate. He's got his mouth opei. ED]
SCRIPTAL 1:
(C) (1) Getting dressed. ED]
(C) (ii) Having a wash on Tuesdays and Thursdays. ED]
(Is that your bath night?)
Yes.
(12143) (iii) He has a shovel. He puts the seeds in and he puts soil
in to meke the seeds grow, then he digs the garden. Where do you
live? ED]
(Islington)
You can get the number 73, 30, 19, or Bi to Kings Cross and then
change to the buses along Marylebone Road no standing on the top and
change buses in Hanrimersmith for Ac ton Tom.
Subject Number (10): (Not in puppet expt).
SCRIPTAL 2:
(C) (i) She walks to the shop. Goes in. Buys sweets. Goes out. ED]
(C) (ii) The men akes a pie. Then they eat it. ED)
(C) (iii) She stole his icecream. That's naughty. CD]
MENTAL:
(13211) Ci) The boy didn't know she pinched his chocolate. EM)
(C) (il) Oh! My sweets are gone! EM)
(C) (iii) (What does she say?)
He atole my teddy. ED)
SCRIPTAL 1:
(C) Ci) He is having a shower. ED]
she 'a getting some
Is she a girl?
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(C) (ii) The boy is dressing. Now he's dressed. ED]
(C) (iii) He has a spade and a bixket. He digs a big, big hole. He
pours in the water. The he tills in the hole again. ED]
Subject Number (15): (F)
SCRIPTAL 2:
(13112) Ci) The men eats his icecream and the lady
thd girl eats it. Thei he eats arther one. ED]
(13211) (ii) Cooking a pie. They eat it. ED]
(C) (iii) That lady's walking into the shop and
sweets and she's ccxiiing cut of the shop. (Dl
Is it chips today? They only have eggs at school.
(No, it's a boy).
snatches it, and
MENTAL:
(13112) (i) The sweet is in the box,
sweet's missing, and Muniny eats the
(What is the boy doing here?)
He is shouting?
(What is he shouting?)
Shut the box. ED]
(11123) (ii) She has a teddy. Th
the teddy. ED]
(What is she saying here?)
Nothing.
(12'13) (iii) The boy buys some more
the rcd. ED]
(What is he saying here?)
My sweets are in my tuy.
(But here they are on the road!)
Yes.
and the boy goes out, and the
sweet.
it's raining. The boy plays with
sweets. The sweets tall out on
SCRIPTAL 1:
(C) (i) Getting dressed in the morning. (D]
(13 11 2) (ii) He digs a hole and pours the soil, in there. ED]
(C) (iii) The boy washes in the shower. He puts soap on his tunlny.
He dries himee].f. ED]
Protocols of 7 Doi'i's Syndrome Children:
Subject Number (10):
SCRIPTAL 2:
(1 1 23) (i) Buying sweets. (Dl
(11132) (iii) Lunchtime. ED]
(13112) (iii) She wants his icecr'eam. EM]
MENTAL:
(13112) (1) -
(11132) (ii) -
(13211) (iii) -
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SCRIPTAL 1:
(C) (1) Washing. ED)
(13 i$2) (ii) Dressing. ED]
(1 1 32) (jjj) -
Subject Number (13):
SCRIPTAL 2:
(13l2) (1) -
(132) (ii) -
(1 1 32) (iii) -
MENTAL:
(C) (1) "It's missing!" EM]
(132 1 ) (ii) They fell dow and there's none in there. ED)
(12i 3) (iii) She's crying and sad.
(Why?)
Qiz she's lost her teddy. ED]
SCRIPTAL 1:
(1'32) (i) -
(1 1 32) (ii) -
(13112) (iii) -
Subject Number (8):
SCRIPTAL 2:
(12113) (i) Buying mieets. ED]
(121 3) (ii) Having lunch at home. ED)
(12113) (iii) She's eating his icecream. Naughty girl! ED]
MENTAL:
(11132) (1) -
(C) (ii) "My teddy's gone!" He took it. EM]
(1 1123) (iii) "My thocolate's gone?" EM]
SCRIPTAL 1:
(C) (1) Washing. ED)
(C) (ii) Dressing. ED]
(13 112) (iii) -
Subject Number (9):
SCRIPTAL 2:
(13 112) (1) -
(13 11 2) (iii) -
(1 1 23) (iii) -
MENTAL:
(13211) (1) "My sweet's is gone?" EM]
(C) (ii) Gone! The boy took it. (N]
(11123) (iii) -
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SCRIPTAL 1:
(13214) (1) -
(C) (ii) -
(132 14) (iii) He's digging. ED)
Subject Plumber (5):
SCRIPTAL 2:
(C) Ci) She gets sweets. ED)
(C) (ii) -
(1 1432) (iii) She took the boy's icecream. ED]
(What happed here?)
He got it back.
MENTAL:
(C) (1) "They've gone!" EM)
(C) (ii) The boy took the teddy.
(What did she say?)
"It's gone!" EM]
(12143) (iii) -
SCRIPTAL 1:
Cc) (1) -
(11432) (ii) -
(C) (iii) -
Subject Number (6):
SCRIPTAL 2:
(C) (1) She buys sweets. ED)
Cc) (ii) -
(12143) (iii) Icecreaxn. ED]
MENTAL:
(13142) (1) The sweets dropped on the floor. ED]
(C) (ii) "Where's my teddy!" EM)
(C) (iii) "Where's y thocolate!" EM]
SCRIPTAL 1:
(12143) (i) Washing hiielf. ED]
(C) (ii) Getting dressed. ED)
(12143) (iii) -
Subject Plumber (1):
SCRIPTAL 2:
(C) (1) Buying sweets. ED]
Cc) (ii) -
(13142) (iii) Naughty girl. She took his icecren arx ate it. ED]
MENTAL:
(C) (1) "Where's my sweets gone!" EM]
her friends. (DI
th she gives it to him
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(C) (ii) "My teddy's gone!" EM)
(13142) (iii) -
SCRIPTAL 1:
(1 1432) (i) Washing. (Dl
(C) (ii) The boy's getting dressed. ED)
(132 1 ) (iii) -
Protocols of 9 Norl children:
Subject Number (5):
SCRIPTAL 2:
(12143) (1) She's getting some sweets for
(132 14) (ii) The thddy is cooking. ED]
(1 1432) (iii) He's eating an icecreani, and
arxl he eats it. ED]
MENTAL:
(C) (i) "thi My teddy ain't there!" EM)
(13142) (ii) She took the chocolate, then he came back and looked and
there weren't mthing in there and he said "Cti my chocolate ain't in
the box!" He was sad! EM)
(C) (iii) He lost all his sweets.
(What did he say?)
"Ct! They're gone!" EM]
SCRIPTAL 1:
(C) (i) He's takin' a shower.
(C) (ii) He's gettin' dressed
(13142) (iii) He's digging,
here.	 ED]
ED]
in his clothes. ED]
but I don't krDw what he's doing
Subject Number (3):
5CR IPTAL 2:
(12143) (1) She bought some sweets. ED]
(11423) (ii) Cooking a flan, I think. ED]
(C) (iii) She nicked his icecream, naughty girl. ED]
MENTAL:
(C) (1) "Where are my sweets!" (Cries). EM]
(C) (ii) "Q! Where's my teddy!" EM)
(C) (iii) "My chocolate's gone!" EM)
SCRIPTAL 1:
(12143) (i) He's having a shower. ED]
(C) (ii) He's dressing hi'selt to go to school. EM)
(13214) (iii) He's digging a hole to hide something. EM)
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Subject Number (1$):
SCRIPTAL 2:
(12d13) (1) She's buying some sweets. ED)
( 1 1 23) (ii) -
(121 3) (iii) The girl wanted it. EM)
MENTAL:
( 1 1123) (1) The thocolate Pvrt her mouth.
(What does he say?)
I want my chocolate.
(Where iS it?)
Gone.
(Who took it?)
She did! ED)
(13112) (ii) The boy nicked her teddy and she were angry. ED)
(132 14) (iii) He lost all his sweets. He'd better pick 'em up. ED)
SCRIPTAL 1:
(1 1 23) (i) -
(132 1$) (ii) He 's d oin' the gard1n'. ED]
(13112) (iii) -
Subject Number (6):
SCRIPTAL 2:
(C) (1) She's bought some sweets. ED]
(13112) (ii) They want some pizza. EM]
(C) (iii) She snatched it! ED)
MEN TAL:
(C) (1) "I don't know where my sweets is!" EM]
(1321$) (ii) She put her teddy dom. Thei he nicks it. Thai he puts
it back. ED]
(C) (iii) "Where's my chocolate'?" EM)
SCRIPTAL 1:
(13112) (1) He has a shower. Thai he gets out. ED)
(1321$) (ii) Here's a boy. Here's a girl dressing. ED)
(C) (iii) He's burying his dad's money! ED)
Subject Number (19):
SCRIPTAL 2:
(C) Ci) She snatched his iceczeaui. He
back my icecream!" ED]
(C) (ii) This girl wants to eat some. EM)
(C) (iii) She goes Into the sweetshop six!
comes out. ED)
nearly punched her. "Gimne
she buys jellybabies and
MENTAL:
(C) Ii) The boy is putting the sweet in the box so nobody n't find
it. Thai he goes out. She eat it. And he's shouting "Where 's my
sweet gone?" EM)	 -
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(C) (ii) She put! her teddy doi and the boy snatched it cuz she
weren't looking. And he took it to his house and she said "Where's
my teddy gone!" CM]
(C) (iii) The sweets fallin' out. He said "Where's my sweets gone?"
(M]
SCRIPTAL 1:
(C) (1) He's digging and he puts his money in the hole so nobody
won't tEnd it. CM)
(C) (ii) He's getting dressed. ID]
(C) (iii) He's having his wash. CD]
Subject Number (12):
SCRIPTAL 2:
(C) (1) She's buying sweets in the shop. CD]
(1 q 23) (ii) That man is cooking a pie. CD]
(C) (iii) She nicked his iceoream. CD]
MENTAL:
(C) (I) There was a hole in the bag and they dropped out.
(What did he say?)
"My sweets have gone?" CM]
(C) (ii) The old lady ate the thocolate, so he got mad.
(Did he know she ate it?)
No.
(Why rot?)
Cuz he were out of the room. CM]
(C) (iii) She put her teddy doia, thea, while she were looking here,
that boy nicked it.
(What did she say?)
"My teddy's gone!" CM]
SCRIPTAL 1:
(1 1 32) (1) He washed his hair. CD]
(C) (ii) He's getting dressed. CD]
(C) (iii) He's digging to make a hole. ID]
Subject Number (10):
SCRIPTAL 2:
(C) (i) She's bought some sweets. CD]
(C) (ii) The cbd is making a cake for the whole family. (Dl
(C) (iii) She's naughty. She stole his icecream and now he's gorma
get angry. tD]
MENTAL:
(C) (1) The little boy come and nicked it.
(What did she say?)
"My teddy's gone!" CM]
(C) (ii) Whe he came back the thocolate was gone. tD]
(C) (iii) His sweets dropped out of the bag... "Oh? My sweets have
gone?" CM)
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SCRIPTAL 1:
(C) (1) Re's washiri' hi'self. (D)
(13211) (ii) Re's dressing to go to school. [D]
(C) (iii) He digging up the garden. [D]
Subject Number (9):
SCRIPTAL 2:
(C) Ci) She's running away cuz she didn't pay enough. tD]
Cc) (ii) -
(C) (iii) She nicked his icecream. tD]
MENTAL:
(C) (1) "I'll have to go br some re aieets." (M)
(11132) (ii) He's putting the teddy back cuz she were angry with hi
cuz he nicked it before. (D]
(1 1123) (iii) He put his chocolate in his box then he shouted cuz his
chocolate was gone, then he went out and his mum ate it. [D]
SCRIPTAL 1:
(C) (1) -
(C) (ii) He's digging in his garden. [D)
(C) (iii) -
Subject Number (8):
SCRIPTAL 2:
(C) (i) They look like nice ieets! Bubblegtins! tD)
(C) (ii) This man is making a pizza for all his friends. ED]
(C) (iii) She takes it away. ED]
MENTAL:
Cc) (1) They've all dropped out.
(What does he say?)
"lThere's my ieets!" EM]
(C) (ii) The boy take's it while she's picking a Flower. She said
"Where's my teddy!" EM]
(C) (iii) "Where's my chocolate gone!" EM]
SCRIPTAL 1:
(C) (1) The boy is having a shower and washing hi 'self. ED]
(C) (ii) Another boy is getting dressed and looking In the
mirr.	 ED]
(C) (iii) Re's digging to hide his toys. EM]
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Appidix 5: Pictures used in Experiment $.
SCRIPTAL 2, STORY 1:
312
STORY 2:
313
STORY3:
311$
MITAL, STORY 1:
315
STORY 2:
316
6
STORY 3:
317
SCRIPTALSTORY 1:
318
STORY 2:
319
320
STORY 3:
Sa Number
1
	 1
2
3
2
	
1
2
3
3
	
I
2
3
14	 1
2
3
5
	
1
2
3
6
	
1
2
3
7
	
1
2
3
8
	
1
2
3
9
	
1
2
3
10
	
1
2
3
11
	
1
2
3
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APPENDIX 6: Individual Raw Secres in Experiment 5.
Key:
Causal 1 Story (1) = Balloon; (2) = E; (3)
	
Tree.
Causal 2 Story (1) = Water; (2) Rock; (3) = Tripping.
Autistic Sujects:
Story
	 Causal 1	 Causal 2
12311
12311
12311
12311
12311
12311
12311
12311
1 2311
12313
12314
12311
12311
1231$
12311
12313
12313
12314
12313
12311
12311
12311
1 2314
12314
12311
1234
12314
12313
12314
12314
12311
12314
12314
12313
12311
12313
12314
12313
12314
12311
1231$
12311
12311
1234
12311
12311
12314
12314
12311
12314
12314
1231$
12314
12314
1234
1231$
12314
12313
12311
12311
1231$
12313
12314
12314
1231$
12311
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12	 1	 12314
	
12314
2	 1234
	
1234
3	 12314
	
12314
13	 1	 12314
	
12314
2	 1234
	
1234
3	 1234
	
12314
114	 1	 1234
	
11423
2	 1234
	
12314
3	 1234
	
12314
15	 1	 1234
	
12314
2	 1234
	
12314
3	 1234
	
1231$
16	 1	 1234
	
1234
2	 12314	 12314
3	 12314
	
12314
17	 1	 1234
	
12314
2	 12143	 12314
3	 12314
	
13211
18	 1	 1234
	
1231$
2	 12314
	
1234
3	 1234
	
1234
19	 1	 1234
	
1234
2	 12314
	
1234
3	 11432
	
1231$
20	 1	 12113
	
1324
2	 12314
	
1321$
3	 1234
	
1234
21	 1	 1234
	
1231$
2	 12314
	
1234
3	 12314
	
123$
Dow's Syrrce Subjects:
1	 1	 12314
	 12314
2	 13142
	 13214
3	 12314
	
1231$
2	 1	 1234
	
12113
2	 12314
	
1234
3	 12314
	
12113
3	 1	 12314
	
12314
2	 12314
	
12314
3	 12143
	
132$
is	 1	 12314
	 13142
2	 12314
	
12314
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5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
I
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
12314
12311
1 243
11132
1231$
1 2113
1231$
121$ 2
11432
114 23
1321$
114 23
1243
11432
12311
12143
12314
11132
13142
12143
11432
12314
12311
11432
13211
12143
12143
1342
12311
13112
13142
12423
12314
1232$
1231$
13214
13212
1231$
13211
12314
12143
1321$
11432
13142
1234
11423
12113
13214
13112
11123
12314
11423
11432
12113
12314
13112
11432
1231$
1324
12314
12432
12143
12314
11423
13112
11432
13214
12314
Nor1 Subjeet3:
1	 1
	 13142	 12423
2
	 11132	 13142
3
	 11432	 13214
2	 1
	
12314
	
12314
2
	 11432	 1321$
3
	
12314
	
12314
35
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
15
16
17
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
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12113
11432
1234
1234
11432
11423
13214
13112
11132
1231$
1324
13142
1324
1324
12311
12311
1234
1234
1321$
13211
1234
12143
13211
1324
1231$
1234
1324
12311
11132
13142
11332
13214
14323
12311
12311
11432
12314
12314
12143
12314
13142
1324
1234
11123
11123
13214
12314
11423
11123
11132
1234
1342
12314
1324
13142
12314
1234
12314
11423
12311
12314
1231$
1231!
12314
1234
13112
11432
12314
1231$
13214
12311
13214
1 2113
1234
11423
11132
12313
11132
1342
13214
12314
12311
13211
11432
12113
132!!
1231$
1231$
31
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
18
19
20
21
22
23
21$
25
26
27
25
13214
11123
1 3214
1 3214
12314
1321$
13214
12314
11432
13214
12314
12311
1231$
12143
12314
12311
1231$
12314
12314
12314
12314
12314
13142
1234
12314
11432
12143
12314
12314
11432
13142
12143
12113
1321$
13214
11432
11423
11423
11132
13112
12143
12314
12314
1234
12314
12311
12311
12314
12314
12314
12314
12314
12314
12113
1231$
12314
12314
1321$
12143
12314
1321$
12113
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Appendix 7: Protocols from Experiment 5.
Protocols of 10 autistic subjects:
Key:
(C) Correctly sequenced pictures.
(C] Causal Rating.
(D] = Descriptive Rating.
C....) = Experimenter.
Subject Number (1):
CAUSAL 1:
(C) (i) The balloon is gassy. The gas came out because the tree made
it pop. [C)
(C) (ii) The floor made the egg creek. (C]
(C) (iii) The ball is rolling do 	 the bill and it broke the
tree.	 [C]
CAUSAL 2:
(C) (i) The boy pushed the ball into the water. [C)
(C) (ii) The ball is rolling and it is rolling and it hurt the
man.	 (C)
(C) (iii) The man is walking. He tripped over a (pause) Uta is
coming torrow. He tripped over a brick. He hurt his foot.
(Why did he hurt his foot?)
Because of the brick. (C)
(Does he have a happy or a sad face?)
A sad face.
Subject Number (2):
CAUSAL 1:
(C) (i) It got caught on the branches and went pop.
(What made it pop?)
The branches. Very sharp. (C)
(C) (ii) The boulder broke the tree. [C]
(C) (iii) The egg cracked open.
(What made it creek?)
Cuz it fell off the table. (C]
CAUSAL 2:
(C) Ci) He tripped over and his foot bleeded. CD)
(C) (ii) The splash. The rock made a splash. [C]
(C) (iii) The carrion ball knocked the man over. [C]
Subject Number (3):
CAUSAL 1:
(C) (i) It popped on tree. ED]
(C) (ii) The egg broke because
(C) (iii) The tree broke.
(Why?)
The rock hit it. (C]
it fell dom oft the table. [C)
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CAUSAL 2:
(C) (1) The ball rolling and the ball falls in the water. (D]
(C) (ii) The man is walking. He tripped. Red blood. [D]
(Why is there blood?)
Hurt his foot.
(C) (iii) The rook made the man fall doai. [C]
Subject Number (U:
CAUSAL 1:
(C) Ci) It popped.
(What made it pop?)
The tree. [C]
(C) (ii) It smashed.
(why?)
It fell off the table. [C]
(C) (iii) The tree has broki.
(What broke the tree?)
The big black rock. (C]
CAUSAL 2:
(C) (1) His knee bleeds. Blood.
(Why is it bleeding?)
Because he fell over. [C]
(C) (ii) Got kr,cked doai.
(Why?)
Don't krrw.
(Yes you do. Why did he fall dom?)
Because the ball krcked him. [C]
(C) (iii) It made a splash. [C]
(What did?)
The rook.
Subject Number (8):
CAUSAL 1:
(C) (1) It hit the tree and it 'bang!'
(Why did It bang?)
Cuz it hit the tree. [C]
(C) (ii) There's an egg and it rolls there, and thei it smashes.
(Why?)
Cuz It fell do. (C]
(C) (iii) The ball rolls dom and it cracks the tree. (C]
CAUSAL 2:
(C) (I) A ball hits the man and he falls doia.
(Why does he fall doa?
Because he's dead.
(What happs wh you die?)
You fall dowi. [D)
(C) (Ii) The man is walking along. He trips over a brick. He falls,
and there's blood.
(What made the blood come out?)
The brick made....(Is he happy a' sad?)
Sad.
(Why?)
Cuz he tiart his foot. [C]
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(C) (iii) The ball goes into the water and it makes a splash. [C]
Subject Number (5):
CAUSAL 1:
(C) (1) The ball is rolling dobli, bit more, bit more, it krcked
dowi the tree. [C)
(C) (ii) The egg rolled along the table, it fell off the table and
it cracked.
(Why did it crack?)
Because it tell do. tC]
(C) (iii) It blew up a bit more. Burst.
(What made it burst?)
The tree branch. tc]
CAUSAL 2:
(C) (1) The boy rolls his ball dot. Splash.
(What makes it splash?)
It fell in the water. [C]
(C) (ii) The boy is walking. He trips. (I)]
(C) (iii) Man tell over.
(What made the man fall over?)
The big ball. [C]
Subject Number (7):
CAUSAL 1:
(C) (1) The balloon popped because it had very sharp things on. [C]
(C) (ii) The egg rolled off here and went on here and it
smashed.	 (D]
(C) (iii) (Nothing)
CAUSAL 2:
(C) (1) This was the story of a boy with a big boulder. Threw it up
to here, then here, then It landed in the water. (D]
(C) (ii) The man is krEcked over and hurt his foot.
(Is he happy a' sad?)
Sad.
(Why is he sad?)
'cause he's kmcked over. He has to go to the hospital and have his
foot in bandages. There's blood. (C]
(C) (iii) He was krcked over by the boulder. [C]
Subject Number (9):
CAUSAL 1 and 2:
(C) - No description - impatient.
Subject Number (10):
CAUSAL 1:
(C) (I) The tree falls over.
(Why?)
Because it got krocked over. (C)
(C) (ii) The balloon has popped.
(Why?)
It hit the sharp twigs. (Cl
(C) (iii) The egg is broken on the floor. (I)]
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CAUSAL 2:
(C) (1) He tripped over and hurt his foot on the brick and he is
crying. (C]
(C) (ii) The man got krrcked over by the - what is this?
(A big rock)
A big rock. (C)
(C) (iii) Splash.
(What made the splash?)
The rock. [C]
Subject Number (15):
CAUSAL 1:
(C) (i) The egg's brcke because it fell on the floor. (C]
(C) (ii) The rock krcked the tree over. [C]
(C) (iii) The balloon pops.
(Why?)
Because it hit the tree. No ure balloon. (C]
CAUSAL 2:
(C) (1) The man was lkthg along. He tripped over the brick, and he
cut his foot.
(Why did he cut his foot?)
Because of the brick. [C]
(C) (ii) The man is kmcked over by the rock. (C]
(C) (iii) Here is a splash.
(why?)
The rock fell in the water. [C]
Protocols of 7 Do's Syndrome Children:
Subject Number (10):
CAUSAL 1:
(1342) (1) It fell over. (D]
(1432) (ii) (Looks on floor for brokei egg).
(C) (iii) It burst. [D)
CAUSAL 2:
(C) (1) -
(1423) (ii) Man tel]. overt [D]
(1432) (iii) Splashing in the water. (D)
Subject Number (13):
CAUSAL:
(1342) (1) The ball fall do the tree. (C]
(1243) (ii) The egg fell dori.
(Why?)
Fell off the table. (C]
(1243) (iii) -
CAUSAL 2:
(12113) Ci) He fall dowi.
(Why?)
Fell over that. (C]
(11132) (ii) -
(C) (iii) Splash in the water. ED]
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Subject Number (8):
CAUSAL 1:
(1243) (1) It broke. ED]
(1423) (ii) It smashed. ED]
(1324) (iii) It burst. ED]
CAUSAL 2:
(1243) (1) He fell over. ED]
(1423) (ii) It krcked him over. [C]
(C) (iii) Splash. ED]
Subject Number (9):
CAUSAL 1:
(1243) (1) Tree fell dowi. ED]
(C) (ii) Crashed.
(Why?)
It fell on the floor. ED)
( 1 1132) (iii) It burst! A bird made it burst? [C]
CAUSAL 2:
(1423) (i) Bleeding? He fell over on the brick and hurt his
knee!	 ED]
(1342) (ii) He got krcked over. ED)
(1324) (iii) Splash. (D]
Subject Number (5):
CAUSAL 1:
(1432) (1) It fallen don. tD)
(1243) (ii) It spilled. ED]
(C) (iii) It popped.
(Why?)
Qiz it hit there. [C]
CAUSAL 2:
(1342) (1) -
(C) (ii) Fell over. ID]
(132 14) (iii) Splash! ID)
Subject Number (6):
CAUSAL 1:
(C) (1) The ball made the tree fall doa. tC)
(1243) (ii) It broke on the floor. ED]
(C) (iii) It popped.
(Why?)
Oiz it hit the tree. [C]
CAUSAL 2:
(C) (1) -
(12113) (ii) The ball fell doim and the man tell dobm. ID]
(132 1$)
 (iii) It tel]. in the water. ID)
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Subject Number (1):
CAUSAL 1:
(C) U) -
(13212) (ii) Egg on flocr. CD)
(Why?)
Fall doirai.
(C) (iii) Pop! CD)
CAUSAL 2:
(C) (1) He fell over the brick. [D)
(132 21) (jj) -
(C) (iii) Splash in water. [D)
Protocols of 9 Norul children:
Subject Number (5):
CAUSAL 1:
(13212) (i) It sshed. [DI
(12132) (ii) It cracked.
(Why?)
Oiz it fell off the table. [C]
(What happened here?)
It fallin' off again.
(13221) (iii) It busted. CD]
CAUSAL 2:
(C) (1) He fell on his face. CD]
(13212) (Ii) He got krcked doi. CD)
(C) (iii) Splash! [DI
Subject Number (3):
CAUSAL 1:
(C) (1) It kmoked over. CD)
( 1 1132) (ii) The yoke came out. CD]
(12213) (iii) The balloon's bust.
(Why?)
O.IZ it popped itself on the tree. (C)
CAUSAL 2:
(C) (i) Oh! Poor thing! Look! He's tripped over! CD)
(13221) (ii) He got kmcked doai cuz the ball, went on his leg. (C]
(12123) (iii) It splashed! CD]
Subject Number (24):
CAUSAL 1:
(1 1 23) (i) It breaked.
(Why?)
Cuz the rock kixcked it. (C)
(11132) (ii) It sahed.
(What happened here?)
It got up on the table again! ED)
(C) (iii) It burst.
(Why?)
Oaz it hit the tree. CC)
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CAUSAL 2:
( 1 1 23) (1) He fell doai.
(Why?)
He got hit, didn't he. (C)
(1143 2 ) (ii) He tripped over the brick. (DI
(11423) (iii) Splash!
(What made the splash?)
Dunr. Here's arvther one coming. Splash! [DI
Subject Number (6):
CAUSAL 1:
(13*12) (1) It krcoked it over. [C)
(132 1$)
 (ii) It fell off the table. [DI
(C) (iii) It bust.
(What made it bust?)
The branch. (C]
CAUSAL 2:
(C) (i) He fell dobm.
(Why?)
cuz he tripped over that thing. (C)
(13 1*2) (ii) The ball rolled down there, and there, and kixoked 'un
down, and it's rolling down again. [C]
(13214) (iii) It splashed.
(Why?)
Cuz of the water. (DI
Subject Number (19):
CAUSAL 1:
(132 1$) (i) It smashed the tree. [C)
(13214) (ii) The egg smashed.
(Why?)
Cuz it fell off from here onto the floor. [C)
(C) (iii) Balloon bursted. (DI
CAUSAL 2:
(11423) (1) He falls over. He looks sad. [DI
(1423) (ii) The man fell over ouz the ball rolled him. (C)
(11432 ) (iii) It splashes in the water. (DI
Subject Number (12):
CAUSAL 1:
(13 142 ) (1) -
(11432 ) (ii) -
(C) (iii) -
CAUSAL 2:
(121 3) (1) He fell over, and he was dead. (DI
(1324) (ii) He got krcked down by that rock. (C]
(C) (iii) It splashed. [DI
Subject Number (10):
CAUSAL 1:
(132 1*) (i) It kn,cked down the tree. (C)
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(132's) (ii) The egg broke.
(Why?)
It fell off the table. Someone must've pushed it. (C]
(12l3) (iii) Here it popped, and iw arther one's coming along. (D)
CAUSAL 2:
(C) (1) He tripped over. CD]
(1 1132) (ii) He got knocked do by that black thing. (C)
(13 1 2) (iii) It splashed in the water. CD]
(What's it doing there?)
Rolling doi& again.
Subject Number (9):
CAUSAL 1:
(C) Ci) The tree got knocked over. (C]
(132 1 ) (ii) The egg broke on the floor.
(Why?)
Because it fell off the table. CC)
(1321) (iii) The balloon popped whet it flew up on the tree. CD]
CAUSAL 2:
Cc) (1) He cut hi 'self really hard. There 's blood. CD)
(C) (ii) That man got knocked over. (C]
(C) (iii) It splashes. CD]
Subject Number (8):
CAUSAL 1:
(C) Ci) It breaks the tree. (C]
(C) (ii) It smashed on the floor. (C)
(C) (iii) It burst on the branch. (C]
CAUSAL 2:
(C) (1) He's got blood. Someone left a brick. It's not nice. tD)
(C) (ii) He got knocked over. CD]
(C) (iii) It made a splash. (C]
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Appedix 8: Pictures used in !xperiment 5:
CAUSAL 1, STORY 1:
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STORY 2:
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STORY 3:
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CAUSAL 2, STORY 1:
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STORY 2:
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STORY 3:
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idix 9: Responses to Justification uestjon in the Viii
eriment (6), [Trial 1 only).
Autistic Subjects:
Subject Number 2: "He krEws the icecre am-man is at the thurch".
7: "Cuz the van is at the thurch".
8: "He krr ws the icec ream-van went to the thu rch".
21: Nothing.
Do's Subjects:
7: "Cuz she dont krcw the icecream-man talked to
him".
8: "She thinks he doesn't krx,w it's at the thuroh".
9: "Cuz she thinks he thinks it's still in the
park?".
10: "Because she thinks he doesn't krcw the
ieee ream-man is at the thu rth".
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APPENDIX 10: INSTANCES OF DIFFERENT BEHAVIOURS CLASSED
INTO 14 CATEGORI!S OF PLAY BY FIRST JUDGE.
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Instances of different behaviours classed as pretend play by first
judge.
Normal Subjects.
V : Very Sure.
Q Quite Sure.
A = Ambiguous.
Subject 1:
(VI Puts sponge into saucepan, and saucepan into stove. Then takes
it out.
(VI Transfers sponge into frying pan and dish.
(Q] Makes elephant walk/ slides elephant along.
(VI Makes mouse wa].k/ bounces mouse along.
(Q] Opens and closes crocodile's mouth.
(A) Makes frog jump/ lifts frog into air, glides it along, then
places it doai again.
(V] Lifts elephant over brick. Says "Elephant's jumping over there".
(VI Says "Bear is cuddling the cow". Puts cow into big bear's ari.
Subject 2:
(VI Makes animals hold hands. Says "They're playing".(VI Points to sponge which she has placed in basket. Says "All the
shopping".
(V] Puts saucepan with sponge into cooker. Then takes it out.
[VI Stirs sponge in dish. Says "I'm making dinner".
(V] Puts sponge in dish on stove. Says "If it's burned I'll have to
run away!"
(VI Says "Quick! Take the food off before it burns!"(Al Stands the dolls by the stove and says "2 children".(VI Bounces frog up and do. Says "Frogs don't walk, they always
bounce".
(VI Puts snake inside crocodile's mouth. Says "He's eating the
snake!"
(V] Makes hissing/ snake sound.
(VI Says "It's gobbled 'im up. It's bit his head off. It's gorra go
all do his throat. Oh look! He ate himaelf! (Makes eating roises).
Look! The snake went round my arm! Silly sausage!"
(VI Piles bricks up. Says "It's a train hole. That's ere the train
comes through and that's the long thing there the train trackles".
IV) Makes crocodile kmck bricks over.
(VI Says "He's kmcked it over. I'm goroa squeeze him on the
bum-bunt" (Hits crocodile on the back). Says "I'm gorma smack him
cuz he destroyed my new thingy. I'll gobble him up!" (Bites
crocodile).
IV) Laughs. Says "I'm only pretending! I'll bite his tail off!"(VI Says "I'll chop his tail off arid his mouth off!" (Uses brick to
cut orocodile/ as a knife). Says "All that's left is his tail and
his legs". Uses brick as a knife. Says "Cut".
Subject 3:
(Q) Holds 2 dolls face to face and touches their faces to ehother.
Says "Kissing".
(A) Stirs spoon in empty basket.
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Subject 'i:
(V] Holds doll and dish with sponge, and places dish onto stove.
(V) Makes doll walk over to stove.
(Vi Says "This is Lucy". Walks doll over to telephone.
(Vi Holds telephone to doll's ear.
(vi Doll opens oven door, then removes dishes trcm top of cooker.
(Vi Doll lays out 3 dishes on table.
[Vi Doll puts new dish into oven.
(Vi Makes frog jump up, glide in air, and land, then walk along
table.
(V] Makes crocodile walk.
(vi Then mekes frog walk.
(Vi Then umkes mouse walks along.
(Vi Piles up bricks. Says "Castle".
(Vi Points. Says "Horses live inside there".
Subject 5:
[Vi Puts sponge in dish in cooker.
(Vi Says "I'm cooking".
(A) StSIXIS the 2 dolls in front of the stove.
[V] Then holds telephone receiver to doll 's ear. Rings phone and
dials it.
(vi Says "It's my muy! Now I'm gorra talk to my dad". (Does so).
(Vi Opens door of cooker. Takes out dish. Shows experimenter
contents.
(Vi Says "It hasn't finished yet".
(vi Makes elephant walk.
(VI Makea crocodile eat elephant.
(v] Says "It's cutting its trunk".
(Vi Then sakes crocodile eat a brick.
(Vi Says "He's eating his dinner".
(Vi Then says "He gorvm eat him next".
(vi Makes crocodile eat snake. Says "You're gora die".
(Vi Makes eating noises.
(vi Bounces frog along.
(VI Bounces bear over to frog.
Subject 6:
(Vi Puts sponge in saucepan arid saucepan on stove.
(Vi Says "It's food".
Subject 7:
(Vi Puts sponge in saucepan on stove.
(Vi Turns dial on stove. Stirs 'food' with spoon.
(vi Puts lid on saucepan. Puts another dish of "food" in the oven.
(Vi Says "I'm making sausages arid bakebeans".(vi Transfers sponge betwaen 2 dishes on stove.
(vi Says "Simon. This is a pancake. It's for you".
tV] Transfers 'food' into 2 dishes, one infront of eenh doll.
(VI Puts sponge in dish on stove again arid says "These ones aren 't
cooked airight". Puts lid on saucepan.
(Q] Takes 'food' off stove.
(Vi Rings phone. Picks it up. Says "Who is it? Oh, alright. When
will you cotiie?" Then hangs up. Says "That was Elsie on the phone.
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When I said 'Who is it?' she didn't anier. Thai I asked her again
and she said she'll come when she's dressed James".
(Vi Says "There's one zoo and one hill. And the bear is the biggest
of all of them and he lives in Hertford and it 'a a really big zoo
cuz it's in China, in Oxford, everywhere, in India, in Hongkong, and
the bear's over here and the zoo's right over there".
iv] Says "He lives there and all the houses only come up to here
(uses brick as house) - so he's the biggest of all the animals and
all the giants. The giants are only about up to here".
(Vi Traces an imaginary line half way up the bear. Says "And god 'a
only about up to here (traces another line with hand).
(Vi Says "And I'm making a whole big zoo. How can I make such a big
one? There 's not enough bricks to make it so big. And you know what?
It's gorria be a really big house. This is his big house".
[VI Says "The house is up to there and there (uses bricks, piles
them up).
[V) Says "This is the bear's chair and you have to be really careful
with it ouz it's really precious".
(Vi Says "So he's sitting on his little thair".
[V) Makes Frog jump on elephant, thai on phone.
(V] Announces "Now I'm gonna make the zoo".
Subject 8:
(Vi Puts individual bits of sponge in stove. Turns dials.
(Vi Puts dishes with sponge into stove.
(A) Has dolls standing up, watchirig(?).
(Vi Pours sponge from dish to basket to box.
Subject 9:
(Q] Moves crocodile along.
(VI Makes crocodile bite elephant's trunk.
IV) Makes frog bite elephant's trunk.
(Vi Makes frog bite mouse's leg.
(Vi Makes crocodile bite frog's head.
(VI Makes crocodile bite elephant's head. Says "He's eating them all
up!"
(Vi Animates frog. Repeats.
(Vi Crocodile eats frog's leg, thai head again, then snake.
[V] Puts sponge into saucepan and saucepan into stove.
[Vi Takes it cut and transfers 'food' to dish.
(Vi Puts 'food' on stove.
(Vi Transfers it into another saucepan and into the oven.
(VI Says "I'm making a cake".
LVJ Puts food into basket arid then into another saucepan.
Subject 10:
(Vi Makes crocodile eat snake.
(Vi Pretend eating noises.
(QI Says "He's got a big long tail".
[VI Walks snake. Makes hissing noises and
(Vi Builds with bricks. Says 'This is the
lives".
(VI Makes cow noises, snake noises.
then eating noises.
thing where the snakes
(Vi Makes a tor of bricks. Says "Look at this chiuiey. The snake
knocked dobm the thiariey".
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[VI Makes crocodile eat snake. Says "He bited his tongue, lookt"(VI Pretend eating rDises.
(VI Makes snake eat bear.
(VI Makes bear eat snake.
(VI Puts sponge in pan on stove, and in stove.
(VI Says "I'm gora cook her" - puts doll in oven.
(VI Puts food in oven. Says "Ouch! It bunied me!"
(VI Says "I'm making everything". Turts dials.
(VI Takes food out and says "Mmml"
Do '5 Syndrome Subjects:
Subject 1:
IV] Makes doll put sponge in dish.
[VI Makes doll put dish in oven.
(0) Tells doll off - smacks doll's hand.
(VI Stirs sponge with spoon in dish.
(VI Transfers sponge from one dish to arDther.
(A] Hits doll on head with dish, aggressively.
tQ] Makes snake and mouse fight.
[Q] Has extended talk into telephone receiver, modulated intonation,
says "Muy" and "Goodbye	 y".
Subject 2:
(0] Makes doll put dish in oven.
(VI Opens the door. Says "No ready".
(VI Says "A pie in the oven. Muniny's cooking in the oven".
(VI Says "Take the pie out of the oven". Points to food.(A] Rings phone. Listens in receiver. Replaces receiver and makes
gesture (hands inverted, ie: "Noone's there").
(0] Says "Snake" - then pushes snake along.
(VI Makes hissing roise.
Subject 3:
IV] Puts saucepan with sponge on stove.
(VI Puts sponge from broim container in basket. Puts basket on
doll 'e arm.
(VI Transfers basket sponge to saucepan and puts the saucepan into
oven and closes door. Sets dials and says "$ hours".
(VI Stirs sponge with spoon, repeatedly.
(VI Then puts it back on stove and then serves it into a dish.
(VI Animates snake and crocodile and elephant.
[VI Makes hissing sound with enake. Prolonged hissing.
(VI Makes mouse n,ises.
(VI Opens crocodile's jaws and makes eating roises.
[VI Says "I'm gorim eat you!" Says "Elephant says 'Oooh!'"
[VI Wraps snake around elephant's thrct.
[VI Makes elephant scream and run away. Snake hisses.
(V] Makes snake attack crocodile.
(Al Makes snake move along a row of bricks.
(V] Piles up bricks. Says "It's a house!"
L'VJ Makes crocodile bite snake. Says "CII! Help!" then says "Ouch!
Ouch! You cn 't bash me never again".
Closes door. Turns
sponge).
into each one's
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Subject :
(VI Stirs empty dish, transfers imaginary food on spoon frc*n one
dish to arther.
(VI Puts dish with sponge in it in oven.
(VI Takes it out again.
(VI Makes mouse walk along.
(VI Animates bear.
(VI Makes snake slide along floor. Wriggles It. Says "Look at the
snake".
[Q] Says to the crocodile "Come on, don't be stupid. Good girl".
(Could be self-referenced).
IV] Makes frog and crocodile bite the mouse.
(QI Puts finger inside crocodile's mouth, then looks hurt.
Subject 5:
(VI Puts sponge into dish.
(VI Puts dish with sponge inside into oven.
(VI Transfers invisible 'food' fri bror dish to pan with spoon.
(VI Stirs sponges.
[VI Says "I'm making dinner: sausages".
(VI Takes 'food' out of oven. Stirs it with spoon.
(VI Says "Sausages. It's hot. It's hot".
(VI Puts them in aither saucepan, and then back into oven.
(VI Says "Right. Turn it Ofl". (TurTls dials). Says "That's it. (Opens
door). Hot dinner". Takes it out.
(V] Says "Don't eat it", while making the crocodile eat the brick.
(V] Lines up bricks. Says "Building". Knocks it dort. Laughs.
(V] Holds the snake at arme length. Says "It's frightening me!"
(Doesn't look frightened).
Subject 6:
(A] Puts sponge on doll's mouth.
(V] Puts doll in large container. Then feeds doll with spoon, frc
dish. Repeats this.
(A] Puts brick in crocodile's mouth.
(Al Makes frog lk/jump.
Subject 7:
(QI Makes elephant walk.
(VI Makes crocodile walk.
(QI Makes animal rise.
(VI Wriggles snake.
IV) Makes crocodile bite snake.
(V] Makes snake wrap around crocodile.
(VI Makes frog jump.
IV) Stirs sponge with spoon in dish.
(VI Transfers it to dish and puts it in oven.
dials. Puts 2 other pans on top of cooker.
(Q) Opens door and puts arDther inside. (Can't see
(VI Takes food out and says "Dinner".
(VI Sits 2 dolls do1 and serves it with spoon
plate.
(VI Then serves doll (spoon to doll's mouth).
(Vi Transfers sponge to box. Stirs it.
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Subject 8:
(VI Puts dish with sponge into stove. Says "I've done it. Bye-Bye".
Closes door.
(V] Takes 'food' out and says "Tastes goodi". Puts 'food' on spoon
and thai 'food' back in ov.
(VI Preteds to eat from empty dish with spoon.
(V] Transfers 'food' into arother dish with spoon and puts it into
stove.
(Q] Makes frog jump.
(VI Makes elephant walk.
(VI Makes crocodile rcises.
(V] Makes cow rz,ises.
Autistic Subjects.
Subject 1:
(A] Puts toy spoon in south.
(A] Bangs toy spoon against inside of empty dish (stirring?).
(A) Puts toy saucepan to her mouth.
Subject 2:
(Al Touches sponge. Sniffs it. Does zt use it for cooking or
feeding.
(A] Names toy frog. Th bounces it up and doii on table. (Hover,
this could be to tike it 'squeak').
Subject 3:
(Q] Says "Don't touch it . It's hot" (pointing to stove - could be
eolalia?).
(A] Smells sponge.
(VI Puts sponge on saucepan, and puts this into the ov.
(VI Says "Cooking pancakes".
(Q] Repeats "Don't touch it. It's hot". Opes door. Turns dials on
stove. Says "1,2,3,1,5".
(VI Takes 'food' out of ov.
(Q] &sells it. Says "Ready frying pan".
(VI Puts more sponge into ancther pan.
(V] Puts this ontop of cooker.
Subject $:
(VI Says "The 2 (rings) are red. They're on".
(A] Says "You can put sponge in the ovei".
EQ] Says "Are these potatoes? I don't kncw. They might be peas".
(VI Puts pans with sponges on stove.
(VI Mimes rolling out pancakes, thei puts them in the ov.
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Instances of different b&iaviours classed as functiorni play by
first judge.
Noril Subjects:
Subject 1:
(VI Puts hat on playperson's head.
IV] Puts man Into swing.
(VI Sits playpeople on beich.
(VI Swings playperson back and forth.
tv) Puts hat on axther playperson's head.
IV] Says "That's a muse", touching the use.
Subject 2:
(V] Puts people In swing.
IV] Puts people sitting on beich.
EY) Makes person climb ladder.
(VI Puts hat on playperson.
Iv) Swings people in swing.
CV] Names spoon.
(VI Makes phone ring. Picks up receiver and says "Hello".
Subject 3:
CV] Puts playpeople into swing and pushes it back and forth.
(VI Puts hat on playperson.
(VI Sits playperson on beith.
(VI Stands dolls up, facing eachother.
Subject :
(VI Turns dials on stove.
(VI Puts playpeople into swing.
(V] Attaches anther person to trapeze.
(VI Sits one person on beidi.
(V] Makes arther climb ontop of climbing frame aix! jump dowi.
(VI Swings the trapeze back and forth.
Subject 5:
(V] Swings playpeople.
(1) Places 3 playpeople on beith. Sits 2 others on table and floor.
Says "I've finished".
(VI Sits people around the swing.
(VI Dials telephone.
Subject 6:
(VI Rings phone and holds to ear.
CV] Stands souse up on table.
IV) Puts people in swing and pushes it.
(VI Stands people up on table.
IV) Puts arther person In swing and pushes it.
(VI Sits the largest person on the beith.
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Subject 7:
(VI Stands up 2 dolls on table.
(VI Sits 2 dolls doa on table.
(VI Puts people on climbing frame.
(VI Attaches man to climbing frame.
(VI Swings him back and forth.
(VI Puts people in iing and miings it.
Subject 8:
(VI Holds telephone receiver to ear.
[VI Turns dials on stove.
(V] Puts people into iing.
(V] Names aninals. Says "Snakes go in water. That goes in a farm.
That goes in the water".
(Al Asks "Why does it need that?" (Pointing to frog's mouth).
Subject 9:
(VI Swings playpeople.
(VI Puts hat on playperson.
(VI Sits person on bch.
(VI Swings it again.
Subject 10:
[VI Swings playperson.
(V] Makes a playperson climb up the ladder and jump off.
(VI Sits playpeople on b&ich.
[VI Puts hat on playperson.
[VI Makes arother playperson climb up ladder.
[V] Dials phone.
[V] Rings phone.
Doai's Subjects:
Subject 1:
[VI Picks up and replaces telephone receiver.
(VI Puts empty dish on stove.
[V] Puts playpeople on ithg and rocks them back and forth.
[VI Stands playperson on bech.
Subject 2:
(Al Feeds hielf bits of sponge (rot pretmd because he appears to
think it is really is edible).
(V] Speaks into telephone receiver.
Subject 3:
(VI Opeis door of ov.
(V] Makes phone ring.
(VI Puts 2 playpeople in wing. Pushes it back and forth.
(VI Puts playpeople on beoh.
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Subject 1:
(V] Swings playpeop]e.
CV] Sits playpeople on bth.
(VI Makes playperson climb up ladder. Says "Climbing up".
(V] Tries to attach playperson to trapeze (unsuccessfully).
CV] Puts hat on playperson's head.
(VI Rings telephone and dials it. Holds receiver to ear.
CV] Says "2 ar and 2 legs" (describing crocodile).
Subject 5:
CV] Rings telephone and smiles repeatedly.
CV] Puts empty saucepan in ov&i.
CV] Puts doll in ovi. Takes her out again.
CV] Puts empty dish in ovei.
CV] Puts playperson in swing and swings it.
CV] Stands person on baich and says "Standing on the chair".
CV] Repeats this with a second play person.
CV] Stands person next to swing and says "Push the swing. Push".
Repeats.
Subject 6:
[VI Rings phone. Holds receiver to her ear.
[V] Dials phone. Hangs up.
CV] Rings phone again. Picks it up.
Says "Look, it 's ringing".
CV] Names bear.
CV] Puts people in swing ai swings
Swings".
CV] Puts people on beich, sitting.
(VI Stands people up on table.
CV) Puts toy hat on her head.
Subject 7:
Says "Hello". Rings it again.
it. Says "Different toys.
CV] Puts heater rings on stove.
CV] Picks up phone, mumbles into receiver,
[Q] Tries to undress doll.
CV] Turns dials on stove.
CV] 'Talks' into phone again.
(A) Ops stove door and closes it again.
(V3 Swings people.
and hangs up.
(VI Makes a person walk on top of climbing frame.
Subject 8:
CV) Swings playperson.
(VI Sits playperson on bech.
CV] Attaches playperson to trapeze.
IV) Stands playpeople up on table and bench.
CV) Rings phone.
CV] Dials phone.
CV] Says "Hello. See you later. Bye-Bye".
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Subject 9:
(VI Names spoon.
(VI Puts phone receiver to ear arx says "List".
[VI Dials phone ani talks into it.
(VI Rings phone.
(VI Names cow.
(VI Sits people on bth.
(VI Attaches man to trapeze and iings him.
(Al Puts bidi on climbing frame.
(VI Swings people In Jing.
[VI Sits man on bath. Pats man on head.
Autistic Subjects:
Subject 1:
(VI Turns dials on stove.
(VI Ops and closes door of stove.
tV] Inserts tray into ove.
(VI Holds telephone to ear. Dials telephone.
(VI Ops draw of cooker.
(VI Makes telephone ring repeatedly.
Subject 2:
(VI Puts heater rings in position on stove.
(VI Dials phone. Rings it. Holds receiver to ear.
[VI Opes do' of
(V] 'Mouths' sileitly into receiver of phone.
[VI Fits lids to saucepans, trying out different sized lids and
bases.
(V] Names frog, crocodile.
(VI Puts 3 playpeople sitting on beic*i.
(VI Attaches playperson to trapeze. Swing it bk and forth.
(VI Puts playperson into iing. Swings it.
Subject 3:
(VI Swings playpeople on m,Thg.
Subject 1t:
(A] Picks up both dolls, stands th up.
(A] Moves their limbs as if exploring their properties.
(VI Puts playpeople on ,ing. Swings it.
(VI Makes a playperson climb up on climbing frame. Says 'Vlimb up.
Swing".
(A] Examines little man. Moves its legs, ar, beds it/ explores
it.
(VI Swings man again. Vocalizing throughout, not clearly.
(VI Repeats "Up, ming".
Subject 5:
(VI Dials phone.
(VI Replaces receiver.
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Subject 6:
(VI Puts heater rings into stove, ocrrectly.
Subject 7:
(A] Tries to eat sponge. (Not pretend).
Subject 8:
(VI Puts person in wing. Says "Sit dow on swing".
(VI Swings It back and forth. Says "! Falling doia."(VI Sings "All sitting on a swing".
(VI Names crocodile, snake, elephant, and frog.
(VI Puts saucepan Into stove.
(VI Names cooker.
(VI Names ov&i.
(VI Rings phone.
Subject 9:
(VI Names animals.
(VI Says "Hello bear".
(V] Says "He's a nice bear".
(VI Makes man walk over climbing frame. Says "You'll hurt yourself
if you do that".
(VI Swings playpeople.
(VI Asks "Where's the seat for here?"
(VI Makes the man walk up the ladder.
Instances of different behaviours classed as sensorItor play by
first judge.
Normal subjects:
Subject 1:
(VI Squeaks frog.
Subject 2:
(VI Tries to squeak mouse.
Subject 3:
(VI Touches snake's and crocodile's tails.
(Q] Picks up cow and puts It doiii again.
Subject ii:
(V] Plays with string.
(V] Handles all the materials, but talking about TV thrcughout.
Do'a Syndrce:
Subject 1:
(VI Bangs saucepan on table repeatedly.
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(VI Throws brick on floor.
(VI Flicks crocodile's tail back and forth.
(VI Flicks snake's tail back and forth.
Subject 2:
(V] Throws bricks on floor.
(VI Bangs anii1s on table.
(VI npties rest of bricks on floor.
(VI Throws sponge on floor.
(VI Throws telephone on floor.
Subject 3:
(VI Squeezes frog to omke it squeak.
(VI Pushes empty swing back and forth.
Subject 1:
(VI Squeaks the frog.
Subject 5:
(V] Bangs bricks on table, repeatedly.
(VI Squeaks frog.
Subject 6:
(V] Bangs climbing frame on table.
(V] Pushes swing without people in it.
(V] Turns frame upside do and bangs it repeatedly.
(V] Vocalizes/ grunts.
(VI Peels texture of soft bear.
CV] Picks up mouse and puts it doimi again.
(V] Pzipties bricks onto table.
(VI Fingers elephant.
(VI Bangs elephant on table.
(VI Picks up telephone and puts it do again.
(QI Opais and closes cooker door.
(v] Rattles saucepan on table.
(VI Holds up ov&i tray to light.
(VI Hits ov tray on stove, repeatedly.
(V] Taps ov tray with fingertips.
Subject 7:
(V] Bangs saucepan on table a few tiss.
(A] Bangs aninal on table.
(VI Stands bricks up.
(VI Makes frog squeak.
Subject 8:
(V] Throws bricks on floor.
(VI npties rest of bricks onto table.
(A] kisses mouse.
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Autistic subjects:
Subject 1:
(VI Sucks saucepan, and heater ring.
(VI Rotates saucepan against metal dish betien index finger arEl
thumb, to ke clattering sounds. Repeatedly.
(VI Rotates saucepan against back of stove for auditory effect.
Repeatedly.
(VI Sucks crocodile's tail.
(VI Rotates mouse's tail in the same nner. Sings at same tim.
(VI Sucks snake.
(VI Drops climbing frame on floor.
Subject 2:
(V] Pushes swing back and forth, without playperson, not necessarily
as a swing but as a pedulum.
Subject 3:
(VI Peels doll's hair, th puts it dom again.
Subject t:
(VI Rotates top of saucepan round and round.
(VI Bangs bricks on table.
(V) Sucks bricks.
Subject 5:
(VI Puts saucepan in mouth.
(V] Bangs it on table, thei against fingertips.
(VI Bounces saucepan against wall.
(VI Juggles with saucepan and basket.
(VI Sucks everything.
[V] Bites doll's foot.
(VI Taps tray from stove.
(VI Taps door of stove.
(VI Bites crocodile, spins it.
(VI Juggles with mouse and frog.
(VI Spins mouse in circles, and same with snake.
(VI Juggles with bricks.
(VI Squeaks frog.
(VI Bites frog.
(VI Bites elephant.
CV] Juggles with playpeople.
(VI Taps climbing Frame repeatedly.
(VI Sucks playpeople.
Subject 6:
(QI Licks dish.
(VI Bites phone cord.
(VI Bites basket. Bangs it on phone. Repeatedly.
CV) Dangles phone by wire off table.
(VI Stretches cord and bangs phone on table.
CV] Diantles stove and bangs it on table.
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(V] Puts mouse's tail into his mouth.
(V] Bites frog's head.
(V) Licks cow.
(v] Licks brick.
CV] Bites elephant's trunk.
(V3 Feels texture of bear's fur against face.
CV] Bites elephant's foot.
('V) Licks crocodile's tail.
(V) Swings seat back and forth as peidulum.
CV] Sucks playperson.
CV] Throws playperson.
(V) Bangs climbing frame on table.
(VI Twists head of p].ayperson round and round.
Subject 7:
(VI Puts bricks into bag and thai empties them onto table again.
CV] Shakes crocodile.
(Q] Puts all the bricks back into the bag again. Makes strange
r is es.
(V) Pulls crocodile's tail.
(VI Bites crocodile's tail.
(V] Dangles phone by cord, off table.
Subject 8:
(VI Bangs doll on floor, repeatedly.
(Q) Bangs spoon inside dish.
CV) Buries face in bear's soft fUr.
(VI Flicks crocodile's tail.
(V] Bites crocodile's tail.
(VI Bangs crocodile's tail on table.
(VI Bangs snake on floor.
(V) Stretches snake.
CV] Pushes swing back and forth without people in it.
(VI Bites swing.
Subject 9:
(V) Touches snake with lips.
Subject 10:
IV] Looks inside phone to see what makes it ring.
CV] Squeaks frog.
(A] Names colours on frog.
Instances of behaviour classed as ordering by first judge.
Normal Subjects:
Subject 1:
CV] Puts all the saucepans in the basket.
Subject 2:
CV] Piles up 6 brIcks into a wall-like structure (2x3 bricks).
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Doesn't say what it is. Thea Ices it eve bigger.
Subject 3:
(V) Piles up bricks.
Subject 1:
tY] Compares his ow size to bear's size.
Dowl 'S Synd rome Sub jec ts:
Subject 1:
tv] Makes a 'tower' of bricks.
Subject 2:
EVI Makes a 'wall' of bricks.
Autistic Subjects:
Subject 1:
[V] Puts the 2 saucepans into the broim box.
Subject 2:
(Q) Lifts up every object on table arxl sets them do'im again.
(Q] Makes a series of structures in a 'stone-hige' shape, all
iditical, with the bricks.
Subject 3:
[V] Puts all the saucepans in the brobm dish. Drops bits of sponge
into the dish, but does not treat it as food.
(V] Piles up bricks into a brick structure, th kn,cks it do.
(V] Lays out all the bricks onto the table, in a pattern,
unconnected.
Subject 11:
tV) Stands all the people in a straight line. Knocks them over.
Repeats.
Subject 5:
(V) Lines up all the aninnls.
(V] Puts bricks next to each aninal.
(V) Names the oolours of the bricks, th counts them.
3:9	 78	 2:11	 1:8
12:2	 8	 5:6	 2:10
11:9	 30	 2:0	 1:8
9:2	 30	 2:0
7:10	 66	 5:3	 3:1
6:3	 89	 5:7	 2:11
7:5	 78	 5:9	 2:6
2:6	 65	 1:9
7:5	 72	 5:t	 3:8
6:7	 35	 2:11
3:0
it: 8
5:1
3:3
11:8
3:10
11:5
11:11
11:7
3:8
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Appedix 11: Individual subject data for Experiint 7:
CA	 IQ	 HA	 'VT	 SexNumber	 Initial
Auti3tic Subjects:
1	 A
2	 N
3	 P
11	 B
5	 H
6	 A
7	 J
8	 C
9	 L
10	 C
6:8	 35
6:9	 112
5:3	 118
6:8	 110
9:8	 106
7:4	 911
10:5	 35
11:3
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12:5	 63
11:7	 37
2:11	 2:0
2:10	 2:0
2:6	 -
2:0	 1:8
10:2	 11:3
7:2	 2:8
2:6	 -
3:0	 2:0
7:10	 3:5
11:4	 -
H
P
H
M
H
M
H
F
F
H
Dowis Subjects:
1	 J
2	 D
3	 S
i;	 K
5	 N
6	 B
7	 R
8	 D
9	 T
10	 S
!or l Subjects:
1	 P
2	 T
3	 J
11	 L
5	 T
6	 T
7	 N
8	 J
9	 A
10	 P
H
F
H
M
F
F
M
H
F
F
H
H
H
F
F
F
H
M
H
H
